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THE POLITICAL IDENTITY SOUTH LEBANON FROM 1943 TO 1978 
 
Abir Bassam 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
To understand the present political situation of the identity of South Lebanon, it is 
important to understand how this identity has developed since the formation of the 
Lebanese State. This thesis’s aim is to highlight a period of the history, from 1943 to 
1978, during which the South of Lebanon was ignored by researchers. This small yet 
strategic place in area has played and is still playing an important role in conducting and 
contradicting the policy of the state of Lebanon, and sometimes the Middle East. This 
thesis has two major aims: one is to reveal the Southerner’s political identity before 1982 
as well as to explain the different historical and social factors that led to this formation of 
identity. Secondly, to emphasize on the role of the different political parties in the South 
which have been marginalized in the studies in general, yet have played a role in forming 
the afore mentioned identity. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Research Methodology 
 
Jabal ‘Amel [Mount ‘Amel], or the South of Lebanon, is an area currently known by 
the two names. Though, Mount ‘Amel does not only include the Lebanese territories, 
but it also includes villages in the north of Palestine. The Name ‘Amel is given after the 
first Arab tribe ‘Amelah, which immigrated to the Mountain after the collapse of Marib 
Dam in Yemen. The area of Jabal ‘Amel is around 3200 square kilometres and 
constitutes in space about the third of the Lebanese State. Unfortunately, there were not 
any political studies on the ground concerning the inhabitants of the area whether it was 
among Muslims or Christians. Nonetheless, the ‘Amili people consider themselves to 
be Arabs and of an Arab origin. 
On the other hand, South Lebanon’s boarders nowadays stretch from Sidon to Naqoura 
in the West to Al-Sheikh Mountain in the East. The Eastern boarders form a triangular 
area. Its border lines meet with Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Therefore, the South has 
occupied a critical position in the Arab- Israeli struggle. The South includes two Casas 
which are Al-Janoub and Al-Nabatieh. On the other hand, in 1948 the Israeli occupied 
seven villages which are Hawnin, Qadas, Yosha’, Ebl Al-Qamkh, Salhah, Al-Malkiah 
and Tarbikha. The inhabitants of those villages, which are considered to be part of 
South Lebanon escaped from their villages to live in the South and later on moved to 
Beirut. 
To understand the present political situation of the political identity of South Lebanon, 
it is important to understand the facts related to its history and the history of founding 
the Lebanese State. Within this context, the relation of the South’s people to the area 
and to its surrounding can be understood. Accordingly, the development of the area’s 
identity can be clarified. It is essential to recognize whether these facts have changed 
after the formation of the Lebanese State, and if they did to what degree. This thesis 
aims to highlight a period of the history, which extends from 1943 to 1978. However, it 
is difficult to separate this period from the previous periods of history which shaped the 
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identity of the Southerners. Furthermore, the factors that determined the formation of 
the South’s political identity, which are history, language, culture, and economic 
interests. Therefore, it is difficult to ignore the prior historical period to the formation 
of the Lebanese State, such as World War I, and the awareness that was incited by 
Napoleon Bonaparte campaign on Egypt and Bilad Al-Sham in 1798. Subsequently, 
Lebanon’s formation and the division of the Arab area as we know it today was one of 
the consequences of WWI.  
Until 1943, South Lebanon has witnessed many confrontations with the French 
mandate authority, and suffered from its unjust treatment and exploitation. It was the 
price the South had to pay for its support for the Arab State led by King Faisal, 
resisting the mandate’s authorities, and supporting the Palestinian cause against the 
Jewish migration and the creation of the Israeli State. These realities about the South 
have played a major role in drawing its identity not only as it is known today, but also 
as it was expressed in the years of the conducted study. Identity is an accumulative 
process: it can only be acquired through time. Unfortunately, the South of Lebanon was 
ignored not only by the Lebanese government, but also by researchers. Most of the 
studies came to focus on South Lebanon within the assumption that the population are 
of a majority of Shiite sect. Accordingly, the South was politically labeled. This was an 
excessive exaggeration because the label ignored the fact that the South constitutes of 
multi-confessional diversity. Christians and Muslims, of all sects in the South, joined 
the same parties and fought the Israeli with and without the Palestinians. George 
Habash (1998) the Christian, Palestinian, Arab Nationalist, and later Communist says 
that it is absolutely unacceptable to deal with the Christians with the consideration that 
they are strangers to the Arab civil and social context. They are simply original Arabs 
with their own religious beliefs, which do not contradict with their national or cultural 
identity. He even goes further by saying that he believes that it is difficult to talk about 
Islam in the Arab region without relating it to Arabism and Vis versa; when it is easy to 
talk about Muslims or Islam in Pakistan without refereeing to Arabism (Habash, 1998). 
Furthermore, it is disappointing that until recently several academics that lectured about 
the Famine in Lebanon during World War I try to exclude the South’s suffering. Then, 
they try to deny it or minimize the consequences since there were not any statistics 
about South Lebanon famine victims. 
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The excessive interest in the South started in the year 2000; it was the year the rest of 
the South was liberated from the Israeli occupation. It was the Shiites of Lebanon who 
were the center of those studies. The liberation contributed to part of the Southerners 
instead of all the freedom fighters who fought Israel since it started its attacks on the 
South ever since the creation of the State of Israel. Ever since the attacks on the South 
started, the freedom fighters were mostly members in the secular parties and 
movements, who were highly active in the South and of the different sects. 
It was difficult to find resources or researches that deal with the political identity of 
South Lebanon. As it has been explained before, many of the studies were concerned 
with the Shiite as a sect framed within certain perspectives, which are: first, it is part of 
the Lebanese sectarian system. Second, its political orientation has to coincide with the 
policies directed in Iran, or the Islamic State in Iran. These kinds of studies were mostly 
derived after the liberation of the South from the Israeli occupation in 2000, and the 
rise of the Shiite power in Lebanon in particular after the Lebanese Civil War. The 
change in distribution of power in Lebanon allowed the two biggest Islamic sects to 
gain more power. In addition, the power of the Christian sect, mainly the Maronite, 
declined after Taif Agreement in 1989.  It is essential in this thesis to look at the people 
of the South, as a multi confessional group that shared a certain identity before the 
Lebanese Civil War. There has been great injustice towards the South and its struggle 
to accomplish the liberation of its land. If we listen today to the Shiite leaders, even 
religious leaders, the Shiite speech nowadays still refers to the importance of the Arab 
nation, and then the Islamic nations, in targeting critical issues in the Arab region, such 
as the Palestinian cause, the economic and Arab regional cooperation, and the solidarity 
of Arabs towards crucial issues.  
South Lebanon, a small yet very strategic area, played and is still playing an important 
role in conducting and contradicting the policy of the state of Lebanon, and sometimes 
the Middle East. This thesis has two major aims: one is to reveal the reality about the 
Southerner’s political identity before 1978, as well as to explain the different historical 
and social factors that led to the formation of the identity. The second objective is to 
emphasize the role of the different political parties in the South, whose importance has 
been marginalized in the studies in general. It is worth mentioning that few studies 
were conducted on the social structure of certain villages, such as the work of Ayyob 
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(2008), Samhat (2009), and Hamadan (2017), or such like a study conducted by Jurdi 
Abisaab and Abisaab (2014) who are interested in Communism and the Islamic parties 
in the South in particular, marginalizing other parties and movements that have played 
an essential role in forming the identity of the South. 
The political identity of the South of Lebanon did not go through changes in depth 
before 1978. However, the Southerners have shifted between the political parties and 
major political changes that have swept the region, such as communist parties, Arab 
National and Syrian National Parties, and Local Lebanese National parties. Though, the 
effect of the latter group of parties remained limited amongst the Christian Maronites, 
actually, it is hard to confirm or deny this fact because there were no polls or studies to 
confirm what has been said, except for the poll that was conducted by the King-Crane 
Committee in 1919. The poll has concluded that the Lebanese, [including Southerners], 
except for the majority of the Maronites and Catholics, wanted to be part of Great 
Syria. 
This thesis is going to show that the South’s political identity was secular; furthermore, 
the movement of the parties was always affected by the South’s social demands to 
improve their living conditions and situations. Secondly, the South’s political identity 
was constantly affected by the political demands that swept over the Arab region.  
In 1943, Lebanon gained its independence; yet, the South was not separated from its 
natural surroundings Bilad Al-Sham [Greater Syria which includes Palestine, Jordan, 
Syria, and Lebanon]. It was still connected through economic, social, and national 
interests. Actually, it was not until 1948, after the British withdrawal from Palestine 
and the declaration of the Israeli state, when the Southerners started to head towards 
Beirut and live in the Eastern part of it, mostly in Anab’a, a poor quarter near Burj 
Hammod. Though, this did not stop the Southerners from continuing their seasonal 
trips to Houran in South Syria for wheat harvesting. These seasonal trips continued to 
take place until June 1967 when the Israeli occupied Golan Heights and the West Bank. 
At this date, the road they took to Houran through Hula plains to Banyas River, then to 
Golan Heights to reach Houran was completely out of reach. This set of information 
was told over and over again by the Southerners from all sects, the primary source of 
information in this work. 
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The reaction towards the declaration of the Arab Revolution led by Sharif Hussein, the 
King of Hijaz, in 1914 against the Ottoman Occupation was declared by the South’s 
leaders and people, who responded to the declaration and joined the revolution. The 
Arab State flag rose over the official governmental institutions. Furthermore, in 1916, 
representatives of the Arab State in each district were appointed by Amir Faisal. Hence, 
the Southerners considered themselves as part of the Arab State and closer in relations 
to Great Syria as it was known as Bilad Al-Sham. The injustice the Southerners had 
lived during the Ottoman Occupation, the Arabic language they had spoken, the close 
social and economic relation they had already developed with Damascus, Houran, 
Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, and the harmonious life they had lived with their 
surrounding could not be easily broken. Add to that, the Southerners were arm 
comrades with their other Arab revolutionaries. In addition, the Southerners joined the 
Great Syrian Revolution against the French mandate in 1920, and then again in 1925 
and 1936 etc. Finally they were engaged with the Fedayeen, the liberation fighters 
against Israel. The Fedayeen came from different parts of the Arab world to fight 
through the South’s territories.  
Hence, the tense emotions of belonging cannot be easily erased and can only be 
translated into political orientation and attitude. In addition, political identity can’t be 
only referred to religion; otherwise the same concept would be applied to all the 
Catholic Christians in Europe and the World, or to any other sect. Can we apply one 
identity to all the Buddhists of the world? Can we say that everyone’s political identity 
is related firstly to their sect or religion? The Muslims of Indonesia express their 
political identity through their history, language, geography, and many other factors. As 
a result, how can the identity of the South be only identified through its sect, regardless 
of the history, the language, the education, the culture, the geography, and many other 
factors? The simplicity with which the South’s identity is defined as a sect without 
taking into consideration other factors is anarchic. The other factors that were revealed 
through the reviewed literature about the political identity of the South which did not 
include the other sects, such as the Christian orthodox that were the first inhabitants of 
the South. In the area, there are various sects, who live in it and share common 
ideologies and inclinations. Moreover, this diversity that exists in the South is similar to 
the diversity of the whole Lebanese State.   
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Additionally, most written literature doesn’t consider the South as a varied region, it 
concentrates on the Shiites of Lebanon as a sect. It is not sufficient to study the South’s 
history and identity through the movement of his ‘Ulama, who went to Najaf in Iraq or 
in more limited number to Mashhad in Iran to continue their studies in Islamic Shiite 
Theology. Though, Najaf was well known as the scholar’s theologists’ gathering place. 
Secondly, Najaf was an Arab oriented place. This can be identified in terms of 
language, culture, history, and many other factors. Furthermore, the identity of the 
South cannot only be branded through the movement of a small group of theologists. In 
comparison, other studies don’t explain the rise of Arabism among the Sunnis or the 
different Christian sects in relation to their theological centers. This argument did not 
apply to other sects, such as Christian sects, or other Islamic sects localized in Bilad Al-
Sham. This area is known for its diversity, and there are Alewites, Ismailis, Druze, and 
many others. Accordingly, it is out of common sense to talk about people’s identity 
outside their regional context. Some reviewed literatures tried to find justification to the 
results by creating an additional origin to the Shiite of the South. And so, by alleging 
that, they are the Kurds descendants or Iranian descendants. The assumption is related 
to the relation between Hezbollah and Iranian Islamic state as a Shiite state. This 
situation rose up in an attempt to tie the freedom fighters of Hezbollah to Iran. It was an 
attempt to change the Southerners’ belonging and linking their political decision into 
international Shiite one. 
After the liberation of the South, it was possible to execute many studies. The studies 
included collecting oral history. The Southerners’ history revealed that the main 
historical incidents have affected the population in the area, such as the two great wars, 
the French and British mandates, the relation with Palestine, the harvest seasons in 
Houran, Syria, the famine, the Palestinian Nakbah (calamity), the Palestinian Nakssa 
(setback), the local parties, the international political parties, the revolution against 
Shamoun1, opening the roads, the first persons who owed cars, the installation of 
electricity, and many other subjects. It was quite a different source of history that was 
engraved in the South’s tales. It was engraved in their minds and was of different 
reading from the history books. It was their way of life and the agony they had lived, 
                                                          
1Camille Shamoun was the second Lebanese President in 1952, and he was elected after the independence of 
Lebanon in 1943. 
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which determined their social and political orientation, in other words their political 
identity. They never spoke about their Shiism, as much as the Christians in the South 
spoke of their Christianity or the Sunnis or any other sect did. They all were aware of 
their sect or religion; however, in their conversations this did not imprint their identity. 
This idea will be fully explained in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, in which on the 
South’s political orientation and the role of the political parties is elaborated upon. The 
declaration of the Movement of the Disinherited, which was led by Moussa Sadr, was 
the first movement to call for the Shiite rights as one pillar of the Lebanese political 
structure. He pushed towards the Shiites’ right to be represented through the Shiite 
High Cancel as a separate sect from the Sunni’s Dar Al-Fatwa. Actually, Sadr’s 
movement was not accepted at the beginning. Still, it was the first sectarian claim, yet 
the results did not crystallize until 1982. 
Through following the stories, it was amazing that there were still people alive to talk 
about subjects, such as Al-Hujeir Conference, Sayyed Hussein Sharaf Addin, Sadeq 
Hamza, Adham, Khanjar, the mandate, Palestine, the French air raids on the South, 
World War II, Sultan Bash Al-Atrash, and many names that only existed in history 
books. Nevertheless, now they are represented as part of the collective memory and its 
effects on the people’s political orientation, which turned out to be shared by the rest of 
the region. Sometimes, the interviews were shared by their siblings and grandchildren, 
who were present, sharing and filling the gaps because they knew the stories by heart. It 
is about time to put this history and the collected memory into benefit, in order to 
understand the nature and the culture of the South.  
The thesis consists of seven chapters. The First chapter is the introduction, talks about 
the history, the importance of the study, and its purpose. The Second Chapter is the 
Literature Review. It is a review for several studies that have talked about the South 
and the community in it. Yet, these studies in general did not consider the multi 
confessional diversity in the South. The Third Chapter is the Historical Background. 
This chapter will present the history of the region. The thesis will refer in particular to 
the events that have affected the South of Lebanon. It will be clarified that South 
Lebanon history was never isolated from its Arab surroundings and the history 
Lebanon and its relation to the regional, Arab, political, and social interaction. It is 
going to be essential to go through the history of the region and of Lebanon.  
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Given that, the study will depend on historical methodology in understanding the 
political orientation that has developed in the South. In addition, it is important to 
distinguish that the division of the Arab countries was not based on advanced studies or 
in accordance to polls conducted in the region. The division was the result of the work 
of two men, mainly Mark Sykes and George Picot, who sat down and drew lines on the 
map to divide the region in accordance with their own perception and their countries’ 
interests. Hanf (2015) describes the boundaries created as: “arbitrary colonial 
boundaries” (p. 10). Nonetheless, most people did not accept that, and the revolutions 
that swept over the area were interrelated and were always connected to Palestine. 
The Fourth Chapter and the Fifth Chapter will discuss the Political Orientation and the 
Role of the political parties. In these chapters, only the political parties that spread in 
the South will be listed. It will also explain the roles those parties have played in 
creating the general political atmosphere. In some cases, the parties have contradicted 
with the general political and social orientation of the South. Therefore, the people 
drifted away from them until they changed their political attitudes towards Arabism and 
supporting the Palestinian cause. The order, in which the parties were listed, is not 
related to their importance or effectiveness on the people’s political orientation, but 
simply, to a historical timeline. Henceforth, the Southerners had confidence in the 
parties’ leaders that led the struggle towards political, social justice, economic 
development in the South, unity with Syria and other parts of Bilad Al-Sham, stopping 
the Jewish immigration, and demanding the freedom of Palestine and the Arab 
countries from foreign occupation. The last demands are going to be repeated in every 
party goals and principles. In addition, those two chapters will explain the ideological 
relation that has developed between the Palestinian Resistance, mainly the Fedayeen 
and the Southerners. Consequently, the relation with the Fedayeen was not constant. 
Yet, this did not stop the Southerners from facing the Israeli danger and occupation 
with or without the Fedayeen. Furthermore, the Southerners distinguished between 
standards that measured the significance of the Palestinian cause from one side, and the 
mall practices of certain groups on the other. In one of the interviews held on Al-Manar 
TV with a Southerner said that it was the Palestinian dilemma that taught us about the 
need to hold on to our lands because we did not want to face the same fate the 
Palestinians did, a story that has been repeated several times in the South.  
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Chapter Six discusses identity from a theoretical point of view. It reveals the factors 
that affected the development of the political identity, whether it was local or regional. 
South Lebanon has welcomed publically and officially the Arab State declaration in 
1916. Many of its partisans have fought with the Arab army that was led by Amir 
Feisal, who is the son of Sharif Hussein and leader of the revolution against the 
Ottoman Empire. There was a great fear of falling under the British and French 
occupation, as it had happened in the West Arab countries, Egypt, and Sudan. The 
Southerners sensed the danger coming with the foreign occupation. They lived the 
discrimination against the Shiite, the Druze, the Christians, and the Arabs for four 
hundred years. They saw the salvation from discrimination was possible in the Arab 
state under which all Arabs are equal. Chapter Six will try to present the political 
identity formation through theoretical understanding that would explain and elucidate 
the factors that can participate in shaping identity, whether they were social or political 
factors.  
In accordance to what has been pointed out, Hanf (2015) explains Kohn’s classical 
formation of nationalism, which could take two forms: “[One] ‘subjectively political’, 
the other ‘objectively cultural’. The former concept is voluntaristic, and the latter 
deterministic” (as cited in Hanf, 2015, p. 7). Then, he continues to clarify that the 
objective nation can’t be created because it already exists. Its only prerequisite is the 
wish to have one. Since the nation is a: “consequence of destiny, determined by origin, 
language and culture” (Hanf, 2015, p. 7). This is what the South has shared with its 
surrounding which explains the rise of the Arab national movement in the South and 
the demand to be part of the Arab nation, especially in the time of the study from 1943 
till 1978, and even beyond.  
On the other hand, the economic school is based on theories of modernization and 
Marxism. According to Hanf (2015), these two schools don’t regard cultural factors as 
a permanent one. It is subject to change. Moreover,  
Both [modernization and Marxism] tend to take an instrumentalist view of 
culture and cultural characteristics or markers: one takes note of them as long as 
one needs them and as long as they are useful… The speed of change of cultural 
characteristics proceeds at different speeds in different societies (Hanf, 2015, 
p.15).  
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The factors that affect change and the speed of change are communication, 
urbanization, and education. Conversely, these factors “frequently do not help to reduce 
cleavages, but rather to emphasize and intensify them” (Hanf, 2015, p.18). However, 
Hanf (2015) assures that it is difficult to generate social class awareness that might 
transcend the group. Therefore, this thesis is going to adapt a culturalistic and 
economistic approach. This assumes that:  
… Loyalties to people, ethnic, religious or linguistic groups are ‘primordial’ 
that is, are primeval or original and have a more lasting influence on the 
behaviour of people than all other loyalties. Rooted in history, passed on and by 
upbringing and often embedded in particular weltanschauung, primordial bonds 
are germinant realities. Even if sublimated and seldom conspicuous, given the 
opportunity, they surface (Hanf, 2015, pp. 14-15).  
 
On the other hand, this cannot eliminate the effect of education, communication, and 
industrialization on societies. But, the economic approach cannot first explain, the 
continuity of the rise of the Arab identity even after the declaration of the Lebanese 
independence. Secondly, it cannot explain the deep involvement with the Palestinian 
Liberation Movement. Conversely, the economist theory can explain the economic 
reasons behind the strong relation with Houran, where the Southerners used to go to 
harvest wheat and bring back their supplement of cereals and two golden liras every 
season2. It can also explain the development of the relation with Palestine through 
history in accordance to economic relationship and goods exchange. It also can 
elucidate the educational effect in raising the theories and political associations that 
called for the revival of the Arab state and nationality, especially after the 
implemention of printing facilities during and after the French campaign on Egypt.  
Moreover, many theorists, as it will be explained in Chapter Six, have come to the 
conclusion that social identity and social interaction are of most important components 
of political identity. The South social construction and economy was affected by its 
surrounding and by the difficult curves of its land and scarcity of water resources which 
limited the cultivated area. They had to depend on tobacco plantation and on their 
social surrounding to provide its people with their needs, such as jobs, wheat, 
vegetables, oil, Kerosene, clothes in North Palestine, Damascus, and Houran. In other 
                                                          
2 according to several interviews conducted in 2003 in South Lebanon 
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words, these are the areas which represented extension to the South’s livelihood 
necessities that it knew for centuries.  
Chapter Seven is the conclusion. The main aim of the conclusion is to establish that the 
South of Lebanon was not a sectarian community or adapted a politics that was 
religiously oriented before 1978. On the contrary, the Southerners joined the secular 
parties and actually they were described as the fuel of those parties. 
The Southerners have led many revolutions against the Ottoman Empire since the days 
of Nasif Al-Nassar in the second half of the eighteen century. In later stages, many 
revolutionary gangs were formed, whose leader’s names are still remembered until 
today, such as Sadeq Hamzeh, Adham Khanjar, and Ahmad Bazi etc. Those gangs stole 
from Ottomans soldiers and fought with them whenever they came to collect taxes, and 
then gave the money back to the poor and the disadvantaged people. The same names 
mentioned before were fighting with the Arab Revolution in 1916 with the hope to 
establish a constitutional Arab Monarchy led by King Faisal (Bassam, 2011). This is an 
important point to indicate here. The South did not identify itself through religion or 
Islam, but it identified itself as part of the Arab nation once the Arab revolution 
erupted. Accordingly, its leaders fought with the Great Syrian Revolution in 1920 and 
then in 1925. Furthermore, because of the South’s nationalistic attitude, the French 
troop which landed and occupied Beirut in 1918 was not able to occupy the South until 
1920 when Damascus was occupied as well. The South was in contact with the Arab 
movements everywhere, from Palestine to Bagdad, then again to Egypt and its 
president Jamal Abed Al-Nasser. Finally, when the hopes of the Arab unity declined, 
and the bitterness of the loss of Palestine grew, the resentment of the weakness of the 
Arabs to prove themselves prevailed. But, the Southerners never stopped believing that 
they were Arabs first and second Shiites, Christians, Sunnis, Druze, or even Lebanese. 
This is the main contribution of this thesis to exploring the political identity of the 
South. 
Due to the lack of studies on the ground in the South of Lebanon, it was important to 
depend on memories and oral history as a primary resource for the study. There were 
many Arabic studies on the Arab identity formation. Nonetheless, the Arabic books 
which discussed the political identity of the Arab region and Arab nationalism in 
particular were mostly theoretical. In spite of the importance of those studies, they are 
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mostly dependent on ideologies. On the other hand, there are not any social, 
psychological, or political studies that involve the public attitude since identity can 
develop based on culture, language, and costumes. Definitely, the language in the 
Islamic religion is considered to be a factor in the establishing a cultural identity in the 
region.  
 
Methodology 
This research is going to apply two types of methodology. One is descriptive 
methodology and the second is the historical methodology. Descriptive research can 
answer questions, such as who, what, when and where. Those questions can answer 
how an individual or a group of people identify themselves. This identification can be 
described in the collective memory of the political, environmental, social, and many 
other changes that mark the lives of hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. 
The South of Lebanon is similar to any other place in the world: its memory is 
inscribed in the tales of the elderlies and the recitations of the youth. 
In order to understand this memory, which sums up the identity they have carried, it is 
important to ask the questions: Where did this happen? Why did it happen in this 
manner and not in another? When did it happen? And finally who did it? Interviews 
were conducted with more than twenty people in addition to several stories that were 
held in the South. It is always the same land marks, but with personal touches. 
However, basically interviews took place with people from Tyre district and in Bint 
Jubeil district. Also, this study relies on the memory of the people in the South of 
Lebanon who are still aware of the period and the events from 1943 to 1982, though 
more or less the study will depend on Arabic studies that have generally discussed the 
history of Lebanon, the Arab Identity, and the few studies that have touched the South 
in particular. It is important to understand the relation between the creeds of the parties 
and the hopes of the Southerners. Many political parties have spread in the South and 
were very active. For example, the Communist party won the elections in the first 
municipality in Hula/ Marjeon in 1968.  According to Lynn Abrams in her book The 
Oral History Theory, she points out the importance of oral history in the field of 
politics though it is a methodology that was first adapted in anthropology and social 
sciences (2010, p.8). She explains that oral history is an autobiography; it reflects the 
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personal version of events and memories. Memory is the key to our identity and 
without it we have no social existence (Abrams, 2010, p.88). May Seikaly, in an 
unpublished lecture on a conference held in Beirut in 2015 wrote 
As an interdisciplinary field, Oral History has many objectives, though this 
paper limits itself to the two-pronged objectives of viewing the field as being an 
informative, non-traditional apparatus for research and to historicize the 
subaltern; it also considers the field as instrumental in influencing modes of 
thought and social development. In that respect, oral history is a devise for 
reconstructing history, expanding its boundaries as well as a platform for 
conscientious activism. 
 
The second methodology adapted in this research is historical methodology. According 
to Hamzah Al-Anssari (1997), “Knowing the events that happened in the past and in 
reviving the societies past experiences… through gathering the facts, examining it and 
checking critically its validity to interpret and explain it” (p. 29). Historical 
methodology is not only a way to understand the depth of historical facts and the 
historical reality; it revives the history and brings it more closely to the mankind. 
During the course of using historical methodology, it is important to identify the 
problem that needs to be solved, and secondly collect historical information. This 
information can be collected through many sources, such as historical documents, 
manuscripts, memoirs, printed documents and books and finally memories. These 
memories can be written, printed, drawings, maps, and oral memory. Finally, when all 
the documents and facts are collected, these facts and documents need to be checked 
for their validity, analyzed, dismantled and finally reconstructed. This process will lead 
to representing the facts and history. In this prospective, the historical methodology 
plays a significant role in accurately proving and scientifically discovering the 
historical and political facts.  
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Chapter Two  
Literature Review 
To understand the present political situation of the identity of South Lebanon, it is 
important to understand how this identity has developed since the formation of the 
Lebanese State. This thesis’s aim is to highlight a period of the history, from 1943 to 
1978, during which the South of Lebanon was ignored by researchers. This small yet 
strategic place in area has played and is still playing an important role in conducting 
and contradicting the policy of the state of Lebanon, and sometimes the Middle East. 
This thesis has two major aims: one is to reveal the Southerner’s political identity 
before 1978 as well as to explain the different historical and social factors that led to 
this formation of identity. Secondly, to emphasize on the role of the different political 
parties in the South which have been marginalized in the studies in general, yet have 
played a role in forming the afore mentioned identity. 
Parker (2005) describes:  
All politics is identity politics. Political activity is—and, at its best, is—
animated by efforts to define and defend who I am, or we are, or you are, or 
hope to be, or hope to be seen to be. By extension, it is motivated by our 
imagination of what is or ought to be mine or ours or yours. It is not only about 
self‐government. Nor does it always involve much in the way of public debate. 
What structures it, often beneath the surface, is the always unfinished enterprise 
of self‐construction and self‐presentation." (2005, p.53) 
 
Many of the readings about the South are titled in sectarian definition, such as ‘The 
Shiite Correction Movement: the Ulama3 of Jabal ‘Amel4and his Writers from the End 
of the Ottoman Era to the Beginning of Lebanese Independence’ by Sabrina Mervin, 
‘Shiite of Jabal ‘Amel and the Establishment of the Lebanese State 1918- 1943’ by 
Tamara Chalabi, ‘Amal and The Shi’a’ by Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Constructing 
Lebanese Shi’ite Nationalism: Transnationalism, Shi’ism and the Lebanese State’ by 
                                                          
3Ulama is a description of well-educated and informed religious scholars in Islam.  
4Mount ‘Amel, according to Muhammad Saed Bassam in his book Mount ‘Amel between Great Syria and Great 
Lebanon 1918-1920: in facts and Document, “is the area that is known now as South Lebanon, according to Sheikh 
Ali Al-Zein(1973).  in his book To Research in Our History, He defines the borders of the area as the following:’ the 
area starts at Alawali river estuary at the north of Saida… then it goes up to the east north of Brameih village…and 
Rom… until it arrives to Jezzen and it is included… with the villages included in Jezzen district” 
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Roschanack Shaery- Eisenlohor and many others. These books and studies described 
the South Shiite as a separate unit from its surrounding. The reviewed writings are not 
about the community in South Lebanon, whether it was social, political or historical, 
the writers and researchers tend to focus only on one aspect ‘Shiism’, although there 
are several sects and religions in the area. It is clear that Shiites, like many other sects, 
tend to live in places as untied groups because they feel safer together, especially 
during the Ottoman era. Though, there are many multi confessional villages and cities 
in the South, and its inhabitants formed a harmonious unity, such as Sidon, Jun, Tyre, 
Tibnin, Marjeion, and many others. Eisenlohr (2005) explains that Shiites have a dual 
loyalty, one to their own state and the second to Iran or Iraq. Her arguments were based 
on researches conducted by scholars who performed their work in Najaf and Karbalaa 
in Iraq or in Mashhad in Iran. She writes:  
In this context, it is useful to review some of the scholarship on Shi’ite identities 
in the Middle East. Chibli Mallat views some Shi’ite identity production in 
terms of the important role of Najaf in producing a “Shi’ite international” 
‘Ulama’ who then take leading roles in the formation of their communities 
(p.18-19).  
 
On the other hand, focusing on Iraqi Shi’te identity production in the pre-1958 period, 
Nakash concludes that Iraqi Shi’ite identity is distinct in its Arab character, despite the 
ties between both Iraqi and Iranian Shi’ites. In addition, Eisenlohor points out that 
Litvak studies explain the dynamics of change in the Shi’ite ‘Ulama’ community in the 
shrine cities of Iraq during the nineteenth century. Litvak clarifies that Najaf and 
Karbala had a majority of Iranian, Indian and Arab Shiite residents, and while  
[R]eligion had a unifying power, [it] did not eliminate ethnic differences even 
before the rise of nationalism, [but rather] the gathering of individuals from 
diverse places sharpened the sense of otherness, and enhanced ethnic and 
regional consciousness (as cited in Eisenlohr, 2005, p.18-19).  
 
In other words, Eisenlohr (2005) clarifies based on Litvak, Fuller and Francke that 
“Iran did not figure significantly in Arab Shi’ite thinking. It was essentially a foreign 
culture, albeit Shi’ite” (p. 18-19). This was due to many barriers, including the 
language, which is the most significant one along the cultural constructs in the political 
framework of Middle East history. She also believes that sectarian as practice, which is 
considered as an analytical concept opposed to nationalism, is eminently compatible 
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with nationalism. She also argues that the paid efforts of Moussa Sadr to break the 
Maronites-centred national narrative and create an alternative nationalism in which the 
Shi’ites occupy a central position. The Zu’ama resisted Sadr’s efforts, she explains: 
 The point I want to raise here is that this resistance to Sadr was not because the 
Zu’ama or Shi’ite communists feared their loss of power, but also because Sadr 
imagined and propagated a type of nationalism that competed with nationalism 
of both these groups. Sadr clearly rejected any force of secular state in Lebanon 
as he argued that religion was the basis of morality for society. He suggested the 
creation of religious nationalism for Lebanon while he insisted on changing 
Lebanese parliamentary structured based on confessional representation” 
(Eisenlohr, 2000, p.58).  
 
This is a good point to build on. She highlights the divers’ ways of imagining Lebanese 
identities. In Sadr’s point of view, religion plays a central role in the identity of loyal 
citizens. This image has made other Lebanese view the Shiites as unsuitable 
representatives of Lebanon especially that several researchers5 that were mentioned 
before agree on this point. It is an important point because it shows that different ideas 
and ideologies have existed and expressed a diverse identity which is not Shiite. 
Secondly, Eisenlohr focuses on the relation with Iran. She elaborates on the 
transnational identity amongst the Lebanese Shiites with Iran and the Lebanese national 
identity. Some writers go as far as giving the Shiites in Lebanon a label of being 
originally coming from Iran.  Max Weiss (2010) is one of those writers. In his book, In 
the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, and the Making of New Lebanon (2010), he 
discusses Shiite’s origin. According to him, one theory claims that they descend from 
Arab origin, and that they came with Abu Dharr Al-Ghifari , a companion of the 
Prophet Muhammad from the Banu ‘Amila tribe in the Arabian Peninsula, who 
migrated to the Eastern Mediterranean at some point in the seventh century (2010, 
p.44). 
Weiss (2010) also states that the Metawalis (another title for Shiites) are quite different 
from the people in their surroundings. He says that Lortet believes that one can boldly 
affirm that the Metawalis probably arrived in the South in the thirteenth century. Many 
                                                          
5The Shiite Correction Movement: the Ulama5 of Jabal  ‘Amel5and his Write 
rs from the End of the Ottoman Era to the Beginning of Lebanese Independence’ by Sabrina Mervin, ‘Shiite of Jabal 
‘Amel and the Establishment of the Lebanese State 1918- 1943’ by Tamara Chalabi, ‘Amal and The Shi’a’ by 
Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Constructing Lebanese Shi’ite Nationalism: Transnationalism, Shi’ism and the Lebanese 
State’ by Roschanack Shaery- Eisenlohor 
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Kurds, just like Metawalis, are partisans of ‘Ali, but without the exaggerated fanaticism 
which characterizes the Shiites of Syria (Bilad Al-Sham). Lortet is supported in this 
reading of Metawali ethno genesis by Orientalist Ernest Renan, who “also thinks that 
the Metawalis are men of the Iranian race, possibly the same as Kurds of Iraq that 
moved to Syria during the era of Saladin.”(Weiss, 2010, p.45)  
On the other hand, this theory contradicts with the facts that other scholars from 
Southern Lebanese origin supports. To illustrate, Tamara Chalabi (2010) highly doubts 
Renan’s theory because it is based on limited source of references on explaining: 
Mission de Phoenician: the Phoenician Mission. She explains 
It is clear, through his report, that he considered his mission was to 
repaint the crude lines of the previous history, to awake an ancient 
slumbering one. However, the connection between that ancient 
civilization and the ones who claim it is yet to be proven (Chalabi, 2010, 
p.185).  
 
Chalabi (2010) basically tackles in her study the construction of the Lebanese State. 
Her work focuses on the period between the formation steps of Lebanon in 1920 until 
its independence in 1943.  
On the other hand, Wadah Shrara (1996) bases his quest for search for the origin of the 
Shiite on Henry Lamns’ theory, a historian, who argues that the Southerners descended 
from two main Arab tribes Jutham and ‘Amelah. These two tribes emigrated from 
Yemen to Palestine in the third century. Later on, they immigrated to South Lebanon 
through Hula plains (Shrara, 1996).  
These different arguments are trying to find justifications to relate Shiites to one origin 
or another. Secondly, such perspectives are trying to justify the present ties with Iran as 
a Shiite state. Still, reality relies on one of the two facts as Koury (1972) partially 
explains the inability of the weak Lebanese state to form a collective national identity 
in Lebanon. Koury (1972) thinks that Lebanon’s ‘collective identity’ represents the 
blending of many orientations and attitudes that need to be analysed. Starting from this 
point, Koury presents in the first chapter the early Lebanese history (Mount Lebanon) 
before the formation of the state in 1920. In the second chapter, he explains the dual 
loyalty of the citizens in the Lebanese State and the failure to promote a unified 
Lebanese identity. It is the weak state that couldn’t keep up with changing social 
classes, for as Koury explains, when “the ‘communal identity’ [rises] in social classes 
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[it leads to] changes of the social- economic classes.” For Koury there is basically a 
dichotomy between ‘national identity’ and ‘communal identity’. Thus, in analyzing the 
problem of political socialization and integration, a distinction must be made according 
to the level of analysis. Political socialization, like integration, can mean either national 
socialization or communal socialization. It is on two levels as well, communal and 
national. When the issue is narrowed down to Lebanon, Koury emphasizes on the 
power of the Za’im (traditional leader) and the traditional institutions in which the 
individuals are identified by no matter what the religion or sect is. He explains, “In 
confessional Lebanon, religion appears to be a precondition for preserving the all-
important loyalty of the people” (1972, p.197). 
Precondition reserving kept confessions pretty much isolated, except on the highest 
political and social levels. According to Kuory, this is most applicable to the Shiite 
sect. The Shiites are still predominantly landless peasants with tribal affiliation. The 
extensions of education, roads, and other means of socio-economic benefits have just 
reached these remote areas, and they are more violent than other sects. Finally, Koury 
reaches the peak point when he quotes a study conducted by the Manhattan Bank under 
the title “Special Report Lebanon” that reveals, “Christians in general are more 
concerned with preserving the identity of Lebanon than their Muslim counterparts, who 
are motivated by other considerations, namely Arab Unity” (1972, p. 215).  
Actually, Koury makes a ground on which South’s identity can be understood. The 
weakness or the strength of the state is an important factor. Similar to other Lebanese 
writers or researchers, such as, Nawal Fayyad, Masoud Al-Daher, Ahamad Beydon, 
share the same concept that Koury followed regarding the Shiites origin:  Shiites of 
Lebanon are of Arab origin. While, scholars or researchers like Weiss, Eseinlohr seem 
to find another origin, whether it was Iranian, Kurd, or any other ethnic group; their 
studies were more recent. It was written after the liberation of the South from the Israeli 
occupation in 2000, at a time when the Shiite and mainly Hezbollah and the Iranian 
were at the highest peak of relations. It is an attempt to understand the relation with 
Iran, though this relation took a new turn after the Iranian revolution in 1978. That is 
what Eisenlohr (2005) and Weiss (2010) have also explained in their work. Still, they 
all did not cover the period between independence and the declaration of the movement 
of the deprived. Consequently, the political mode of South Lebanon in particular and 
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Shiites is still vague in these studies; hence, revealing the particularity about the 
identity of the South is the contribution of this study. 
Chalabi’s (2010) study is socio- historical; and she was interested in the Shiites of 
Lebanon. Chalabi (2010) basically focuses in her study on the Shiite community in 
Jabal ‘Amel; on the other hand, through the study she reveals different facts which 
others, like Eisenlor, Weiss and most western scholars did not explain. Chalabi points 
that Jabal ‘Amel, historically was not led by the religious figures, the political influence 
was in the hands of its Zu’ama (leaders). Furthermore, ‘Ulamas in Jabal ‘Amel, 
inherited the religious post from father to son. They had earned the respect of the 
population, but they have never been part of the political life. The ‘Ulama did not 
participate in formulating independent political parties (Chalabi, 2010, P. 74). 
This fact changes the general idea that claims that Mount ‘Amel was held only by the 
Shiites, and the Shiite identity prevailed. Chalabi (2010) elucidated on the multi 
confessional movements in the South that called for fighting the Ottomans and 
supporting the Arab state. She states that the key to ‘Alleh’s trials was the meeting of 
May 1915. It is noteworthy to mention that the importance of the trials lies in the 
common platform it has created for the anti-Ottomans and the Arab supporters to meet. 
It was the first time in which politicians, leaders, and educated Shiites met with other 
educated Christians form Marjeon and Sunnis from the Lebanese coast and Syria” 
(2010, P.105). Chalabi continues to illustrate that the experience in ‘Alleh, in addition 
to the participation of the ‘Amelis in the Arab revolution, will play a central role in 
forming the political background to Shiites’ place in the common Lebanese national 
history (2010, p.109).  
Fawwaz Traboulsi (2007) refers to the role of Christians as organized groups in 
promoting for the Pan Arab call. It seems like Chalabi, he agrees that the pan Arab call 
was not an exclusive call for the Muslims in Lebanon, but it is a Christian call as well. 
According to Traboulsi, Lebanon, before the civil war in 1975, knew many strikes and 
movements that asked for better living conditions. On the occasion of Christmas in 
1968, the Jeunesse Etudantine Chritienne (the Christian Student Movement- JEC) 
issued a manifesto demanding social justice (2007, p .176- 177). 
The books of Traboulsi (2007) and Chalabi (2010) are two books that deal with 
Lebanese history. Each one of them tackles Lebanon from different perspectives: one is 
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historical and the other is social. Traboulsi is a historian; Chalabi on the other hand is a 
sociologist. However, the information drawn from the two scholars’ books will 
participate in understanding the political attitude in South Lebanon, hence, the political 
identity. 
During the French mandate, the Shiites suffered from discrimination against them; 
moreover, their civil rights as Lebanese citizens were denied. Chalabi (2010) sees that 
it was a great disappointment for the Shiite in Lebanon after the French- Lebanese 
treaty in 1936 that Sunnis were given the authority over the Shiite. The Sunnis were 
able to manage their political differences with Maronites and find their own political 
space they needed to work within. Many of the religious Shiite figures who came back 
from Najaf, “at a time were Najaf was politically active and Iran inactive”, they started 
joining the political ideological parties, such as communist, Ba’athist, Arab 
international and Syrian National parties. The most two active parties in Southern 
Lebanon were the Arab international (Arab Nationalist Movement: the Nasserite), and 
the communist parties. The parties’ call for social change was appealing for the Shiite. 
They considered that communism will take care of worldly issues and not belief issues. 
It was the way how the Shiite found their way out of sectarian definition (Chalabi, 
2010, p.222-223). Unfortunately, the important role of the political parties was plainly 
explained in all the studies in forming the political identity of the South.  
Chalabi’s (2010) study perceives South Lebanon as a secular community in principle. 
Religion was related to faith, but not to a political insinuation. Chalabi’s (2010) 
readings of the South contradict with Eisenlohr (2005) and Weiss who claim that the 
Shiites’ identity is dual. Accordingly, the same fact was articulated by the people 
interviewed in different places in the South, secular identity applied until the eighties. 
Nonetheless, change in identity started to take place after the mid-seventies, the South 
was going through radical changes such as the rising of Moussa Sadr. Sadr is a Shiite 
religious figure, who came from Iran and lived in the South to fill the void Said Abd 
Hussein Sharaf Al-Din left after his death as a religious Marja’ for the Shiite sect. The 
coming of Sadr was in 1957-1958; yet, the results of Sadr’s coming to the South didn’t 
crystallize until the late seventies. The second change was the involvement with the 
Palestinian Fedayeen (Palestinian Freedom Fighters) in the fights against Israel, who 
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had invaded the South twice until 1978. And the third factor, the Southerners talk about 
is the secular and national parties that became very active in the South.  
The neglect in South Lebanon has started since the early days of the formation of the 
Lebanese State. Nawal Fayyad (1998) in her book ‘Pages of Jabal ‘Amel’s History’ 
During the French and Ottoman Era’ affirms that the Southerners hope was that the 
area of Jabal Amel (Mountain ‘Amel) would become part of the Arab State. This hope 
was ended when the allies, France and Great Britain, declared French mandate on Syria 
and Lebanon, and British on Iraq and Palestine. In 1918 the allies’ troops occupied 
Lebanon, and it was not until 1920 that the South was completely occupied, and 
became part of Greater Lebanon:  
The French mandate authorities wanted to make this mountain pay for its 
positive attitude towards adapting the union with Syria. Therefore, the area at 
that period was subjected to political swings and military actions. Armed anti- 
French groups took actions that were related to the revolution in Syria. In return 
the French armed the Christian minority that lives in Jabal ‘Amel. The French 
hoped by doing this, they would ignite the sectarian differences and have the 
excuse to occupy Jabal ‘Amel, under the pretext of protecting the Christian 
Minority from the Muslim majority….. The aim was to prevent the ‘Ameli 
people from the hope to be part of the Syrian union, hence to force the ‘Amelies 
to be part of the Lebanese State”. (Fayyad, 1998, P.5)  
 
By saying this Fayyad explains that the difficulties were imposed on the ‘Amelies 
because of their political attitudes. Hence, political identity in the South was a complex 
combination of attitudes that attribute to a political, secular, and patriotic stance. 
Moreover, Fayyad clarifies “their diverse writings in the Arabic newspapers especially 
in Egypt, Syria and Iraq conveyed their thoughts to all the Arabs and Muslims” 
(Fayyad, 1998, p. 5). Thus, Fayyad confirms that the French attitude did not prevent the 
people of ‘Amel from participating in any conference to express their need and hope to 
join the Syrian State and to be part of Arab and Muslim world. 
Southerners’ tendency to be part of the Arab State led by King Feisal was expressed in 
the memoirs written by Sheikh Ahmad Rida Al-Zein, who states that the Syrian 
conference that was held in 1919-1920 insisted on keeping Bilad Al-Sham (Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) under King Faisal’s flag. Therefore, the Syrian 
government sent a declaration to all regions in which it fully supported Jabal ‘Amels 
and Sidon’s recognition of the Arab State. The French’s first reaction was a series of 
imprisonment of people in Sidon and Jabal ‘Amel.  “The French also held a campaign 
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to force people to sign petitions rejecting Faisal’s rule, but it was a complete failure.  
Nabatiah district director said that with the spirit that prevailed in the region, it was 
difficult to force anyone to sign” (as cited in Fahss, 2012). Furthermore, Sheik Ahmad 
Rida mentions that  
When King Crane’s commission came to Sidon in 1919 more than 100 people 
came to meet with the committee who represented the Shiites claiming to the 
unity with Syria and refusing the French mandate. When the French military 
governor, Charpentier met with people he said to them that the French 
government liked the Shiite and had a tendency towards them. And once the 
fate was decided and Syria was put under the French mandate, the Shiites would 
get their rights and additional benefits (as cited in Fahss, 2012).  
 
When South Lebanon was calling for unity with Syria another atmosphere prevailed in 
Lebanon, mainly amongst Maronites. The South was politically and socially affected. 
This came as a result to many reasons; the first reason is related to the goals behind 
establishing the Lebanese State demanded by the Maronites, a Christian sect in 
Lebanon. According to Hassan Hallaq (1988) in his book The Political Currents in 
Lebanon 1943- 1952, the Maronites wanted to turn the state into a Catholic one. There 
was a call in the Christian schools for discrimination among different sects. According 
to Halaq: 
Emile Habbosh, one of the teachers of the Jesuit schools, used to tell his 
students that Protestant, Orthodox and Muslims are doomed because they don’t 
submit to the Pop’s authority in Roma. And religiously it is forbidden for the 
Catholic Christian to marry a non-Catholic. Then Emile Habbosh added that the 
schools are the places where the nation’s brains are steered. The division in 
school’s ideas, education and cultural conflicts is reflected in the Lebanese 
conflict about the identity of Lebanon. The religious schools had a great impact 
in directing the students towards the east or the west (as cited in Halaq, 1988, 
P.192). 
 
 Actually, some figures demanded a Christian state in Lebanon in parallel to 
establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Many of the Lebanese leaders such as Emil 
Edde and religious figures as Bishop Huweik and many others claimed a State within 
the boundaries of Mount Lebanon and its citizens were limited to the Maronites and 
Catholics affiliated with the Vatican. This resulted from the fear of competition with 
the Muslim in ruling Lebanon. On the other hand, the Muslim majority tendency was to 
be part of the Arab state under the rule of King Faisal. Baiham (1977) writes that after 
the First World War there were different demands to expand the Lebanese boarders; its 
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independence from Syria and its existence should have been based on a national 
Lebanese identity. This wish was expressed by Bishop Elias Huweik in a list dated in 
25 October 1919, in which he presented to the peace conference in Paris in the name of 
the Lebanese delegation. He stated that the declaration of the independence of Lebanon 
is not independence resulted from the deterioration of the Turkish state, as most of the 
Lebanese see it.  It is a complete independence especially from any Arab state that 
might be established in Syria (as cited in Baiham, 1977, P.15). Baiham (1977) 
continues to explain the desire for having Lebanon as a Christian State and discusses 
how Huweik demanded that the president should only be Christian. Furthermore, upon 
the return of the high commissioner, Mr. Bonsso, from Paris, a group of Lebanese 
religious men expressed their wish that the constitution should clearly state that the 
president should be Christian (Baiham, 1977). Accordingly, this was published in the 
newspapers in 1933. As if the Christian religious men were pleased with the Zionist 
attempt to have a National State in Palestine. A state built over the shedding bloods. 
Baiham (1977) built this assumption on the statement that Bishop ‘Aridda gave in a 
declaration to Muqattam newspaper on the  9th of March in 1933 in which he 
proclaimed that the Christians have no other home land left in the whole East except for 
Lebanon where most of the Christian Bishops had resorted to, compared to other big 
countries. “‘Arrida also noted if they believed that  Lebanon was a Christian State, it 
didn’t mean that it couldn’t be a homeland for the rest of the sects who lived in it” (as 
cited in 1977, P. 15). 
Solh (2004) states that the objective of the Phalanges was publicly announced in 
November 1936; a few months after it had been launched. The proclamation stressed 
that the overriding issue facing the Lebanese was the relationship between the ‘two 
sister states’, Lebanon and Syria (El-Solh, 2004, p.42). Solh explains that the Phalanges 
wanted a complete independent Lebanon from Syria and they considered the relation 
with it crucial but, “The Phalanges opposed Arab Nationalism, regardless whether it 
called for Syria or for Arab unity, since they considered it to be based on a religious 
bond namely Islam” (El-Solh, 2004, p 42), 
Those ideas are shared with the founding father of the Phoenician origin of the 
Christians in Lebanon, Micheal Chiha, who refused to adapt Arabic language as the 
language of the Lebanese State. He is one of Lebanon’s distinguished leaders and 
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promoter of the Phoenician origin of the Lebanese people, especially among Christians. 
According to Traboulsi (1999) Chiha was calling for a Lebanese French speaking state 
that should have best relations with France and the western world. At the same time, 
Chiha severely objected, at the time of President Bshara Al-Khury, the economical and 
customer unity with Syria and any restrictions in trade laws. Chiha was in favour of the 
idea that Lebanon should join the western military alliance. He promoted for a 
Lebanese state between the Mountain and the coast: Mount Lebanon and the coast 
reaching Beirut. Most of the Presidents who came until the time of Camille Chamoun 
were students or comrades of Chiha and his ideas. (as cited in Traboulsi, p. 11-32). 
On the other hand, Southerners were believers in the Arab state and the only language 
they spoke was Arabic. This idea was led by many leaders in the North as well as in the 
South, such as Kamel Al-Assad, Sayyed Abed Hussein Sharaf Aldin, Kathem Al-
Khalil...etc. According to Chiha Lebanon’s economical life should have been based on 
trade and services.  
This way of thinking led to the neglect of agriculture, industry and crafting, the 
three basic means of living in the South. Traboulsi (1999) criticizes Chiha for 
underestimating and showing contempt towards the manual work. Agriculture 
for Chiha was important only in Becaa valley so that it could meet with the need 
for providing food, but he never believed that agriculture had a real role in 
minimizing the deficit in trade balance (Traboulsi, 1999. P 66-70).   
 
Khashan (2000) explains that identity is the definition of the relationship between state 
and society. He also explains that the South in 1920 was still embracing the feverish 
call for establishing the Arab state led by Sharif Hussein, when he raised the revolt flag 
against the Ottoman Empire. There was great tendency towards joining the Arab 
kingdom in Iraq and Sham led by King Faisal, his son. The great disappointment of two 
European declarations of Sykes- picot and the Jewish national state in Palestine had 
brought up the feeling of resentment amongst the Arabs in general and the South in 
particular. Khashan (2000) out lined the important events that marked the history of 
Lebanon and the Arabs. On the other hand, Kashan (2000) failed to see that the 
sentiments of joining the Arab state was not suppressed until 1967 when the South lost 
all contact with Syria and Palestine after the Israeli occupation of Golan Heights and 
the rest of Palestine. These facts are relevant to the international and national events 
that have had their impact on South Lebanon and the formation of its political identity.  
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Accordingly, Traboulsi (1999) explains that there were, in the occupation of Palestine, 
many benefits and gains for Lebanon, such as the decline of Acre’s harbour importance 
and the rise of Beirut’s harbour, the Saudi and Iraqi pipe lines that found their way to 
the Syrian and Lebanese coast instead of the Palestinian one and the immigration of the 
Palestinian Capitals and business men to Beirut. Traboulsi (1999) writes however in 
return to the benefits gained in the fields of finance, trade, and services because of the 
establishment of the state of Israel and from the Arab economic boycott, there were 
tragic results in other places.  
Most of the exports of the Lebanese traditional industry and crafts that were 
shifted to Palestine faced a major stroke. The economy in the neighbouring 
areas in Bekaa and the South was on the borders with Palestine, which was the 
link between Jabal ‘Amel, Nabatieh, Marjeon, Hasbaiah and Rashaeah in 
Western Bekaa. It was 1948, the beginning of the intensive immigration from 
those areas to Beirut’s suburbs and Africa (Traboulsi, 1999, p284). 
 
Furthermore, according to the Southerners’ stories, the South was divided into three 
social classes. The first were the religious: this class was composed of the traditional 
religious families that owned lands. Financially, they depended on collecting the 
“Khums”6. The second group were the landlords who were in power during the 
Ottoman occupation. They maintained their position as people representatives in the 
parliament, through compromising and winning the trust of the presidents of Lebanon. 
These traditional families’ landlords held their positions in power until the late 70s. 
Finally, the third group were the peasants, who were poor, mostly illiterate, and not 
well represented. They were subjected to the two other classes. The Southerners rallied 
in large numbers to declare their loyalty to Al-Assad (the Baek). They went raising 
their private traditional village flags (Sunjaq). Then, they recall laughing with sarcasm 
about how Al-Assad (the Beak and Za’em) fooled them and offered them what they 
had already brought as gifts for him. The Southerners remember their devotion to those 
families that never bothered to build any schools for their kids and establish any social 
security program to the people. Also Eisenlohr (2005) describes this System as the 
patronage system of Shi’ite Zu’ama which was comprised of Shi’ite families of Al- 
Assad, Osseyran, Al-Zein and Al-Khalil. These families regulated the relation between 
the Shi’ite masses and the state, and ideally functioned as intermediaries between the 
                                                          
6The fifth is a kind of an obligatory tribute the Shiites pay for the religious “Olama” 
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two, and mostly what Eisenlohr implied was the exploitation of these Zu’ama of the 
poor masses (Eisenlohr, 2000, P.58). 
In addition, the big dilemma of the South for around 80 years was the struggle with the 
new made neighbour Israel. The struggle, among other factors, has shaped the political 
identity of South Lebanon. Though, this struggle is of a great importance because it has 
affected Lebanon’s foreign policy for decades. This atmosphere prevailed at the dawn 
of the creation of the state of Lebanon. In addition, the neglect the South has suffered 
through which we can understand many of the factors that led to the South’s identity, 
which is more complicated than it seems. 
The speeding events of the world since the First World War have left their deep marks 
on the South. Though the area was not a terrain of actions; yet, it reacted to all the 
reactions. The South holds a great memory. Unfortunate, this memory was partly 
recorded or written about by the religious men or by those who had the financial and 
political resources7. On the other hand, people were not able to write their own memory 
because they were illiterate. Hence, the memory was never collected, especially after 
the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 and the Israeli occupation in 1978, it was 
completely ignored. In later stages there were scholars and writers focusing on the 
history of the South such as, Tamara Chalabi, Nawal Fayyad, Ahmad Baydon and 
many other Southern writers who concentrated on the history and the social history of 
the South. It is important to re-read this history from another perspective to present it 
through a political frame work. Then, rediscover the political identity through what 
have been read for those Southern writers and through the great memory held by 
Southerners themselves.  
Thus, the thesis will explain that identity was not only affected by the socio-political 
history and current events, but also it was affected by the spread of political parties and 
the role those parties played in raising the collective awareness among people, in 
specific the secular parties and the spread of secular ideas in the Southern community. 
Khadija Ayoub (2008) explores in her study, Theeconomic, social, and political history 
of Einatha81920-1978 the role of parties in the town. She explains the role of Al-Nahda 
                                                          
7 Such as: Ahmad Bydon, Sayyed Muhsen Al-Amen, and Sheikh Rida Zein. It is not to underestimate those people 
who preserved the history of Jabal ‘Amel, as a Shiite inhabited area. They wrote about villages and families like 
Muhsen Al-Amen in his book Kitab Al-‘Ayyan (the book of the notables), and they were more of religious men who 
seek their religious readings and writings. 
8 Einata is a village located in South Lebanon in Bint Jubeil Casa.   
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(Renaissance) party, which was established by Ahmad Al-Asaad9, and was very limited 
among people in Einata. On the other hand, Al-Tale’ (Pioneers) Party was established 
by Rasheed Bayedon10. Al-Tale’ enjoined more influence among the people because it 
dealt with their daily issues and living difficulties. It supported the Palestinian cause 
which was embraced by Southerners. Ayoub also describes the importance of the 
parties that had a big role in the South and was joined by a lot of people, such as: 
Socialist Arab Party, Baathist Arab Party, that were joined later on to become the Arab 
Socialist Baathist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Workers League (Rabitat 
Al-Shaghila), the National Syrian Social Party, and many others. The people responded 
and engaged in the National Appeal Party (Hisb Al-Nidaa Al-Qawmi) which was 
established by Kathem Al-Soluh. These parties had great influence in the uprisings of 
1958 and in joining the Palestinian revolution. Also they participated in liberating the 
limitations of the women’s role in political, cultural, union and military involvement 
(Ayoub, 2008, 222-252). 
Moreover, Tamara Chalabi in her book stresses on the important role the political 
parties played in the South. Chalabi sees that this role developed because in their basic 
principles the political parties had expressed the Southerners’ needs and hopes to claim 
their social and economic rights. Shi’is had limited resources to political power, jobs 
and other benefits compared to Sunnis, whose leaders were able to establish a 
compromise with the Maronite leadership. The Sunnis were able to conclude a political 
deal (2010, p.222). Chalabi states: 
In the absence of a viable ideology for the Shi’i intellectuals, they were left 
with few options. One was to retire entirely, as did the ‘Amili Trio11 and their 
entourage, thus confirming their ideological disinheritance and political 
disempowerment, and perpetuating a Shi’i centric view of history. And the 
second was to join ideological movements (Communist, Arab, and Syrian 
Nationalist), which many, particularly those with a Najafi education, 
eventually did, predominantly after Lebanon’s independence in 1943”... “The 
appeal of the transnational ideology parties- Ba’thist, Syrian Nationalist, 
Communist and eventually Nasserite- to the Shi’i of Jabal ‘Amel was great. 
They carried a larger massage than just Lebanon, one in which they could 
attach their political demands, transporting them from the alienation of their 
                                                          
9 Ahmad Abed Al-Latif Al-Asaad (1902- 1961). He descends from Ali Al-Sager family in Jabal ‘Amel. The family 
enjoyed high political influence. He was a member in the Lebanese Parliament for the years 1937, 1943, 1947, 1951. 
10 RashiedYousofBaydon, (1889-1971) A Lebanese Parliamentary, he established the ‘Ameli College in Beirut. He 
was a minister in several Lebanese governments, and was elected several times to the Parliament. 
11 Al-Sheikh Ahmad Rida, Al-Sheikh Suleiman Daher and Muhammad Jaber Al-Safa. Threeintellectuals from Jabal 
‘Amel, they called for the Arab State led by King Faisal and for the Union with Syria.  
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mountain. The Communist Party had the greatest appeal of these and it had an 
extensive grassroots operation in the South after 1943. (2010, 222-223) 
 
The national and secular parties in Lebanon and consequently in the South were a 
mixture of many sects. They expressed the Lebanese needs for a national home for all 
its citizens, regardless of their sect. For example, Al-Murabiton was basically 
established by the citizens of Beirut. It was established as a socialist Arab movement 
with a military branch. The party participated in the uprising against Chamoun in 
1958.12 In 1975 Al-Murabiton joined the National Lebanese Movement led by Kamal 
Junblat against the Right Lebanese wing parties led by Kamil Chamoun and Pier Al- 
Jmeil. This party consisted of 45% Sunnis and 45% Shiite and 10% Druz. The Shiites 
until that time did not consider themselves as part of sectarian group; they were part of 
the national movement in Lebanon calling for the change and social justice.13 
This phase of the history of the South came to an end with the coming of Mousa Sader, 
a religious man from Qom in Iran. His family origin is from the South, from Ma’rakeh 
in Tyre Casa. 14 Mousa Sadr was not the first to officially demand for the Shiites’ rights 
for education, social care, infrastructure in the South and employment as Lebanese 
citizens. In 1944 According to Halaq (1988), Rashied Baydon one of the South’s 
representatives to the parliament demanded for the Shiites right to be given equal 
opportunities in employment in government offices. He accused the government of 
preventing the Shiite in particular from their rights to employment and to reach official 
and governmental offices. In the same session on May 11, 1944, Baydon called for the 
parliamentarians and to the Government:  
He [Baydon] suggested to give the Shiite sect its rights in employment, 
education and learning, pave their roads, facilitate transportation all over its 
deprived areas, reinforce the abilities of their farmers and workers, pledge for 
necessary caring, look at them with dignity and respect as others were looked 
at; he added that if not all sects are treated fairly, sectarianism will prevail (as 
cited in Halaq, 1988, p. 203).  
                                                          
12 The 1958 U.S. Marine Invasion of Lebanon – It was no day at the beach. http://adst.org/2013/07/the-1958-u-s-
marine-invasion-of-lebanon-it-was-no-day-at-the-beach/ 
13 Independent Nasserite Movement.(12/ 1987). (11/6/2016).  http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-
8042.html 
14 Mousa al-Sadr Limathat Huwa? [Mousa Sadr Why Him?]. (28/9/1978). (11/6/2016). 
http://akhbarlubnan.net/?p=1115 
 
  
29 
 
On the other hand, according to the tales I have heard in the South, Sadr’s effect on the 
general political and social mode in the south was not notable until the end of 1970s. 
The Shiite community in the South and in the rest of Lebanon was affected by the call 
for sectarianism. It was clearer as an identity with the emergence of Hezbollah in the 
Islamic resistance and the call to Wilayat Al-Faqeh (Rule of Jurisprudent). Also 
according to the people’s tales it was the regional and political change that brought the 
sectarian powers after Taif Agreement in 1989 which reinforced the sectarian system. 
However, Imam Sadr was not able to reach a large number of Shiites until a later stage 
though he understood the needs of the South and the Shiites in general for better living 
conditions and opportunities as citizens of the Lebanese State.   
 Rami Siklawi, in his article, The Social and Political Identities of the Shi’i Community 
in Lebanon, writes about Musa Sadr and his re-emergence of the Shiite social and 
political identity. In 1959, Sadr came to Lebanon. He was regarded as a potential threat 
to the traditional Shiite leadership (Zuama). In that period the Shiite were attracted to 
the left wing parties. Sadr upon his coming restructured The Local Benevolent Society 
(Jamiyat al- Bir wa al-Ihsan), which was basically found by Sayyid Abed Al-Hussien 
Sharaf Al-Din. Moreover, he founded many social organizations and established youth 
clubs that helped the poor and strengthened their stay in their villages and town and 
eliminated migration towards Beirut. Social and political reforms continued through the 
establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shi’i Council (SISC). Hence, he began working 
within the Shiite communities. In 1974, Sadr established the “Movement of the 
Deprived” (Harakat Al-Mahrumin) and in 1975 Amal militia. Basically Harakat Al-
Mahrumin was none sectarian movement that was established to prevent the 
segmentation between the Lebanese, to put an end to the unjust laws, to equate the 
deprived population and their areas with the rest of Lebanon, and most importantly, to 
end the Zuama hegemony over the wealth of the country and its people. Nonetheless, 
the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War directed the Movement from being non- 
sectarian to sectarian (Siklawi, 2014, p. 286-287). 
On the other hand, Mousa Sadr’s aim was to repress the left wing parties’ effect on the 
Southerners, especially the Communist Party. Traboulsi (2007) clarifies that Musa Sadr 
settled in Tyre, where he attempted to fill in the religious vacuum created by the death 
of the leading mujtahed Sayid ‘Abd Al-Husayn Sharaf Al-Din, and the political 
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vacuum created by the death of Muhammad Al-Zayyat, the popular leader of the Arab 
National Movement (ANM) against Kalil clan of local Za’ims. Sadr, who advocated an 
enlightened and open religious discourse, tried to build a third force between the 
traditional leadership of Ass’ad and the parties of the left, especially the LCP15, the 
OCA16 and the Ba’th, which were highly influential among the southern public, 
especially the youth (Traboulsi, 2007, p.177).  Traboulsi (2007) further expands on the 
issue saying: in his first endeavours, Imam Sadr managed to enlist the support of Sabri 
Hamadeh, Shi’i Za’im of Ba’albak- Hirmil. As early as 1966, the reports of the US 
Embassy in Beirut described Sadr as a bulwark against the influence of Abed Al-Nasser 
on the Shi’ie masses. “In 1974, Sadr confessed to US Ambassador Godly that his main 
concern was to counter Communist influence among Shi’i Youth” (2007, p.178-179). 
The area has witnessed ages of independency and luxury, before the days of Ahmad 
Basha17 Al-Jazar. There is still a rich memory in the South about the spread of schools 
all over the area, as Ayoub (2008) explains in her book Economic, Social and Political 
History of Einata 1920- 1976. She also reveals the fact about the burning of private 
libraries which were full of authors, poets and religious men’s writings between the 14th 
and the 17th centuries. 
During Jazar’s military campaign against the South he burned these 
libraries in 1780. In Einata the family of Khaton has established 
important religious schools that contributed to the establishing and 
flourishing of intellectual and literature movement in Mount ‘Amel. The 
towns of Einata, Maiss, Jezzen, Mashgara, Karak Noah and many others 
were full of schools and students. The South sent Ulama to Iran, India, 
Najaf and Russia. Their books are still taught there. Ayoub reveals, “The 
Ulama of Einata schools have several writings and scripts in Feqh, 
rational sciences, science of men, history and arithmetic in both Arabic 
and Persian” (Ayoub, 2008, P.151).   
 
Al-Safa (1981) writes in his book, The History of Mount ‘Amel, about the successive 
list of names of the Rulers of Al-Ass’ad family. He reflects that during their reign 
prosperity prevailed in Mount ‘Amel  
It is astonishing, the books and writings are lost. All the heritage of their 
distinguished writings in divine philosophy, feqh, mathematics, algebra, 
language and literature did not reach them…it is most peculiar that this 
                                                          
15 Lebanese Communist Party 
16 Organization of Communist Association  
17Ottoman important royal title 
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golden age of science was during the reign of Hamad Bek18, Ali Bek Al-
Ass’ad, and Muhammad Bek Al-Ass’ad the descending princes from Ali Al-
Sager. It was the age of prosperity, tranquillity and political stability…a time 
when people were in peace with their neighbours. They worked in farming 
and benefited from the earth's resources. It was a time of prosperity and 
wealth (1981, P. 16).  
 
However, Aal19 Safa continues to explain that the treasures (the books and inscriptions) 
were lost as a result of Ahmad Al-jazar’s campaign on the south in 1780. Al-Jazar 
burned and confiscated the libraries of Aal Khaton, Aal Al-Sager, Aal Sharaf Eldin and 
many others. Over five thousand volumes were burned and destroyed (1981, P.17). The 
South’s memory is filled with these stories, and they tell them with pride.  
 
2.1 Analysis 
In order to understand the political identity of the South, it is important to understand 
the previous historical events registered and investigate oral memory. In addition, it is 
important to review the written material. It is an accumulative process. The collective 
memory in the South of Lebanon is similar to other memories in the region in general. 
It is full of the destructive effects of the successive occupations, from Ottomans to 
French mandate reaching to 24 years of Israeli occupation. It is the calamity that 
brought the South to make its own choices. Perhaps, the decisions would have not been 
taken if the people were living in peace and dignity under the protection of the 
government. These events have pushed the people in the South to take courageous 
decisions some would think of them as reluctant, such as establishing the national 
resistance against the Israeli occupation.  
After the establishment of Lebanon in 1920, during the French mandate, the South has 
kept a strong relation with Houran in Syria and Palestine. It was not until the 
declaration of the Israeli state in 1948 that the area was familiarized with Beirut in the 
fifties of the last century. For the Southerners it was a difficult stage in the course of 
history. Though the thesis will focus on the period between the establishments of the 
state of Lebanon since 1943 until the disappearance of Imam Sader, it is important to 
understand the earlier events that led to the newer ones. I am going to elucidate that 
                                                          
18 Ottoman important royal title 
19 Aal is an Arabic word that refers to the Family of 
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between 1943 and 1978 it was the era that witnessed the secular age in South Lebanon. 
The late 70s South Lebanon was entering the age of secularism. On the other hand, the 
change started to take place with the coming of Imam Sadr. It is the time when the 
Shiite identity started to rise. Still, it did not take its final present form until the date of 
Taif Agrement in 1989.  
In conclusion, unfortunately, many of the studies perceived the South from a 
confessional point of view. Its identity is minimized to be seen through the narrow 
Shiite identity. In these studies, the South was seen through the confessional Lebanese 
system. Yet, they overlooked the role of the secular parties in forming the identity of 
the South, especially, during the period of this study which extends between the 
independence and the third Israeli invasion, from 1943 to 1978. First, these studies 
were historical studies related to the general history of Lebanon like Traboulsi, Halaq, 
Beyham and El-Khazen and many others. Secondly, Shiisim has shaped the reviewed 
studies I have mentioned20. They didn’t consider the fact that the South includes many 
religions and sects. They were only interested in Shiite in the South or Lebanon. The 
South’s diversity is similar to Lebanon and its structure is almost identical to the whole 
structure of Lebanon. In this study, I will try to reveal facts hidden about the secular 
identity. The presumption that Shiites’ loyalty is to their sect first and secondly to their 
surrounding and home country is false. Generally, most of the people in the South of all 
sects, aimed to join the Sunni Arab state led by Sharef Hussein and be part of the Arab 
State. They joined forces and stood by the Palestinians from the beginning of their 
struggle against the Israeli state, and Palestinians are mostly Sunnis as well. The 
commitment of the Southerners to the Palestinian cause was not a matter of the holy 
land, Al- Aqssa Mosque or the great stories of Salah Al-Din. It was rather a long 
history based on trade and social interaction and kinship. Southerners’ economic life 
was linked for centuries with two main areas, the north of Palestine and Hawran in 
Syria; the work in Hawran was seasonal; the Southerners went for wheat harvest and 
brought back their year’s supplies. On the human and social level, they witnessed the 
prosperity the Palestinians have lived. The Southerners worked in the factories in 
                                                          
20 Scholars or writers such asEisenlohr, R.: Constructing Lebanese Shi’ite Nationalism: Transnationalism, Shi’ism 
and Lebanese State. Weiss, M.:  In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law Shi’ism, and making f Modern Lebanon. 
Shrarah, W. Al-Ummah Al- Qaliqa: Al-‘Amelion Wa Al-‘Assabiah Al-‘Ameliah ‘Ala ‘Aatabat Al-Dawlah Al- 
Lubnaniah. Chalabi, T.: Shiite Jabal ‘Amel and the Establishment of the Lebanese State.  
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Haifa, and in farming and other manual labours. They watched the Palestinians fleeing 
from their homes and lands to live in tents, in closed camps and in poverty. Every 
elderly in the South has seen the civil and comfortable life the Palestinians lived in their 
home and Lands. It is difficult to restrict the South’s identity to one factor; it is shaped 
and obtained through a course of history. 
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Chapter Three 
Historical Background 
It is difficult to separate the history of Lebanon from the history of the Middle East 
because it is inter-related. Therefore, if we want to study a certain geographic area, 
such as the South of Lebanon, It is important to study the history of Lebanon or the 
South of Lebanon as part of its surrounding Bilad Al-Sham (Great Syria). The area has 
gone through a series of changes; it was occupied and inhabited by different nations 
and people. However, in order to understand the recent history with its complications, 
which participated in the formulation of the political identity of the South; hence, it is 
useful be identified with the past events and how they affected the Southerners political 
orientation and approach. 
 
3.2. 1 HISTORICLA BACK GROUND PRE 1943 
 
3.1.1 Pre-First World War Back Ground 
Basically, the Southerners identify themselves as the descendants of the ‘Amelah tribe. 
This tribe immigrated from Yamen and inhabited the South area in the thirteenth 
century. Hence, they are Arabs and they have always viewed themselves from this 
perspective. ’Amelah inhabited a part of the land that was since the seventh century 
under the Arab Islamic ruling that have extended between two main states; first the 
Umayyad (662- 750), its capital was in Damascus. And the second state was the 
Abbasid (750- 1516), its capital was in Bagdad till 1258 when Hulagu Khan Invaded 
and destroyed Bagdad, the capital of the Abbasid moved to Cairo.  
 
3.1.1.1 The French Campaign in 1789 
In 1516, the Ottomans occupied Bilad Al-Sham, Iraq and Egypt. The succession of 
events for more than 300 years did not really change; the area was totally under the 
Ottoman influence and policies. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans 
were becoming weaker; therefore, the French seized the opportunity of their weakness 
and prepared a military campaign led by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. The first aim of 
the military campaign was to build a French Empire in the East that could control the 
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area’s commerce, natural resources, and trade roads between Europe from one side and 
India and China from the other (the Silk Road). The second aim was the dream of 
competing with the British on larger influence areas (Marefa.org, 2009). The French 
campaign began in 1798 and ended in 1801. Bonaparte continued with his campaign 
with the aim to occupy Bilad Al-Sham. But, after reaching Acre in Palestine, he was 
defeated in 1799 by the Ottoman leader Ahmad Bash Al-Jazar, who was supported by 
the British Fleet led by Sidney Smith. Al-Jazar’s victory raised his importance and 
status in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Al-Jazar became the absolute 
dominant over Acre, Galilee, and in great part of Bilad Al-Sham. In this respect, the 
Southerners in South Lebanon still recite the stories of the Al-Jazar campaign with 
great disappointment. They recall his attacks on the South’s schools and the destruction 
of around five thousand books (Ayyob, 2008). In addition, 
[Napoleon] was resisted by Jazzar as the representative of the Ottoman Sultan. 
In order to weaken this resistance Napoleon tried to stir the Sultan’s subjects 
into revolt. He had success with the Maronites and Shi’is, non with Sunnis 
(Hourani 1968, p. 28)”.   
 
Later, Jazzar Pasha of Acre ruled ruthlessly and cruelly from 1779-1803 (Hourani, 
1968). 200 years later, it was revealed that the French campaign was financed by the 
Irish Jew Thomas Copart. Copart sent a letter to his distinguished friend in the French 
government, Paul Barras who was in the “Directior” government in France in 1779. 
Copart advised the French to occupy the East and create a national homeland for the 
Jews which will become of a great support to France. The letter was received by 
Bonaparte with great interest. He held a secret meeting with the Jews of France in 
which they had a bargain. They agreed that the Jews would finance Napoleon’s wars in 
the East and the two parties will split the gains of the war and build the state of Israel. 
Accordingly, Napoleon put down two objectives of the campaign in the open that were 
first: to dominate the trade road to India, and second: to turn the Mediterranean into a 
French Lagoon (Encyclopedia Palestine, 2014). 
The French campaign lasted around three years. Nonetheless, it had a major influence 
on the Middle East area. It had a significant historical, civil, military and economic 
effect. The campaign had changed the whole area. The French campaign was 
considered to be the first European military campaign since the Crusaders. It ended the 
Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was a turning point in the 
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relation between the East and the West. It increased the interests between the West and 
Egypt on one hand, and the West and the rest of the East on the other. One of the 
greatest achievements of the campaign was the introduction of the Arabic printing press 
to the East (Encyclopedia Palestine, 2014 and Hourani, 1968, p. 28). And thus, 
Kheirallah Kkeirallah assures that Bonaparte’s campaign on Egypt did not only awaken 
the national assertiveness in Egypt, but also awakened the national assertiveness in the 
Arab countries. It also laid the foundation for the movement towards the West which 
initiated the movement of printing and restoration of the Arab education and awakened 
the National Arab Feelings (as cited in Najarian, 2005, p.19).  
 
3.1.2 The First World War and the Fertile Crescent  
On June 28th 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by a Serbian 
nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia. As a result, Germany declared war against Russia who 
consecutively declared war on the Ottoman Empire. An escalation of threats and 
mobilization orders followed the incident, leading by mid-August to the outbreak of 
World War I, which pitted Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (the 
so-called Central Powers) against Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Japan (the 
Allied Powers). The Allies were joined on April sixth 1917 by the United States 
(history.com staff, 2009). In order to support the alliance with the Ottoman Empire, 
Germany started shipping arms to the Ottoman Empire on August third. Furthermore, 
the Ottomans closed all straits to all shipping ports on the twenty-seventh of 
September. In the same year, on November fifth, Britain and France declared war on 
the Ottoman Empire. Due to the closure of harbours, and the need to feed the Turkish 
army, Lebanon suffered from the shortage of food supplies, famine, and diseases which 
spread widely throughout the country and Southern Lebanon. In addition, dragging men 
between the ages of 18-60 into compulsory recruitment to fight next to the Ottoman’s 
army left the South without its labour force to plough and plant its difficult hilly lands. 
To escalate the suffering, locusts attacked what was left to be eaten and grown above 
the soil. As a result, the South of Lebanon suffered from great famine and lethal 
diseases.  This was the primary impact of the First World War on the South. This 
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memory is still alive amongst the population until today21. In the same year the Arab 
Revolution led by Sharif Hussein in the Arabian Peninsula [Hejaz] against the Ottoman 
started, many of the Arab soldiers who were fighting with the Ottoman’s deserted to 
join the Arab Revolution forces in Bilad Al-Sham and Iraq. 
 
3.1.3 Sharif Hussein and Arab revolution 
In 1915, Ottoman Empire forces crossed Sinai and launched attack on Suez Canal in 
January. As a response to the attack, the British initiated an attack on Gallipoli in 
Turkey on February nineteen. In spite of this, the British were severely defeated in 
March. On April 6, Sharif Hussein opened correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon. 
It was named ‘Hussein- McMahon Talks’ between Sharif Hussein on the part of the 
Arab movement and McMahon on the British part. The British showed an 
understanding and support to the Arab revolution and the right of the Arabs to end the 
Ottoman occupation. In return, Sharif Hussein accepted the British offer for an alliance 
on October 24. The British accepted the terms of Sharif Hussein on January 30th, and 
on June fifth, he declared the beginning of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. On 
October 29, Sharif Hussein was proclaimed as the King of the Arabs. Nonetheless, the 
British recognized him as the king of Hijaz on December 15.  
The successive events during the First World War brought its greatest disappointment 
to the region with the approval of the Belfour declaration, which was issued in a form 
of a letter to Lord Rothschild on October 16 1917. This came as a result to British 
cabinet discussions that began in Jun of the same year. By December 11, the British 
troops occupied Jerusalem. Baghdad was occupied on March 11; then again, the British 
and the French assured the Iraqis that the occupation was for their liberation and was a 
necessary step towards Arab self-rule on November 7 of 1918! 
In 1916, the Great Arab Revolution led by Al-Sharif Hussein, and was supported by the 
British started from Hijaz in the Arabian Peninsula and spread to Bilad Al-Sham and 
Iraq. The Ottomans led a campaign to stop the revolution and suppressed it. On the 6th 
of May 1916, tens of national leaders in Lebanon and Syria were hanged in Beirut and 
Damascus. Even though in 1918 the Arab and British troops entered Damascus 
                                                          
21This memory is registered since 2003, and it was mentioned by every person I interviewed in the South of 
Lebanon.  
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declaring the end of the Ottoman era, the Arabs declared the establishment of the Arab 
State led by King Faisal the son of Sharif Hussein. On the other hand, Great Britain and 
France, which won the First World War and the most powerful states back then, were 
secretly conducting the Sykes-Picot agreement in parallel with Hussein-McMahon 
talks. At the end of the War, the two winning states agreed to divide the Middle East. 
The two minor French and British officials, Mark Sykes and Francois-Georges 
Picot, held a series of secret meetings in 1915, in the midst of World War I, 
during which they drew a blueprint to carve up the Ottoman Empire, which was 
fighting alongside Britain and France, Germany’s enemy. Sykes and Picot 
divided Ottoman territories in what was once called the Fertile Crescent into 
British and French zones of influence along an east-west axis stretching from 
the Mediterranean to Iran. France was allocated Syria and Lebanon, while 
Britain would control what is now Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan and 
most of Iraq (Lekic, 2014).  
 
The British government in 1917 agreed to “view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” despite opposition from local 
Arabs who formed the vast majority of the population. Sykes and Picot had agreed that 
an “international administration” would be established in an area that was later to 
become Palestine, but London never implemented that part of the accord, (Lekic, 
2014). 
 
3.1.4 First World War Results on South Lebanon 
The Lebanese South was affected directly with the historical events. In his book, 
Muhamad Jaber Aal Safa (1981)  Tarekh Jabal Amel [the history of Mountain ‘Amel] 
explains the retched living conditions the southerners have lived during the Ottoman 
period, the compulsory recruitment, the famine and lethalDiseases, especially the 
Cholera.  The Mountain, before the First World War, has encouraged promoting Arabic 
culture and language, though the Ottomans were banding the learning of Arabic 
language. Maki (2004) elucidates the general situation 
In short, this was the situation in the Arabic states during the Ottoman 
occupation: high taxes, tributes paid by the poor masses of population, 
dominance over economic and political life and neglecting health and 
education, which the Sultanate considered itself irresponsible of those chores. 
The Ottomans practiced national persecution against the Arab nation and 
deprived the Arabs from studying their own language, which was the language 
of Quran and Hadith (prophet Mohammad speeches) from which the Ottoman 
Sultan derived his legitimacy”, (Maki, 2004). 
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When the First World War erupted many governments and groups were interested in 
changing the general political status in Syria. First, the Arab nationalist wanted the 
Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire to become autonomous, either as a federation under 
the Ottoman ruling, or as an independent state. A third group wanted to achieve their 
goal of independence with the help of the western powers, such as French and British, 
while others wanted to rely on their own strength and efforts (Hourani, 1968, p. 41).  
In 1918, the British began a campaign to regain Damascus from the Ottomans. This 
was not possible until September thirty, when the Arab forces joined the British and 
together conquered Damascus. Eventually, Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, declared 
Syrian independence from Ottoman occupation. Fawzi Qawiqji in his memoire 
describes details of the fights in September 1918 between the British from one side and 
the Turks from the other. The fights led to the withdrawal of the Turks from Dara to 
Damascus, after they have withdrawn from Palestine. Qawiqji back then was fighting 
with Turkish troops. The Turkish officer, Qawiqji, recalls in his memoire the Arab 
movement that was active in 1912, which was not as organized as the Turkish 
movement. Qawiqji opposed the cooperation between Sharif Hussein and the British. 
However, the Arab officer in the Turkish army was able to arrange for the safe 
withdrawal of the defeated army from Palestine to Dara towards the North. In 
describing the events in details, he clarifies that the saving of small inconsiderable 
group which turned out to be Turkish and German high ranked army leaders, affirms 
that he had specific orders not to engage in the fights with the British. Meanwhile, the 
Sharifi’s Army, as he calls Sharif Hussein Arab army, was freeing more lands from the 
Turks. He reveals:  
“During these accidents we were receiving the actions and the activities and the 
vandalism of the Sharifi army in cutting communication lines…. The news was 
describing the courage of the Arab soldier and his firmness. That soldier whose 
officers were able to train him in a short period of time, and proved in all the 
battles he fought against the Turks, to be a better soldier than his rivalry, who 
was supposed to be superior (Qasmieh, 1975, pp.53-54).  
 
Then, Qawiqji asks the question: “For whose interest this Arab blood was spelt” 
(Qasmieh, 1975, p. 54)? He replies that it was for the interest of England and not for 
the interest of the Arab Nation. He declares if the Turks were clever, they would have 
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recognized and admitted the Arabs rights and had them as their allies instead of 
enemies. Then he blames the Arab revolution leaders for not being careful and alert for 
the British betrayal because if they were, the Arab army would have been able to save 
the whole Arab nation (Qasmeih, 1975). It is clear that the Arab sentiments were high 
in that period. On the other hand, it was a well-known fact that many of South Lebanon 
farmers were dragged into compulsory recruitment with the Turkish army in the First 
Great War, and most of them flee to fight with the Arab Revolution.   
The disappointments escalated in the region, especially that on November 7, British 
and French assured the Iraqis that the British occupation was for their liberation and 
was a necessary step towards Arab self-rule, this assurance expired within the coming 
too years and eruptions began in Baghdad and many other Arab capitals. This came as 
a result of long negotiations in 1916 between the British and Sharif Hussein. The 
negotiations took the form of an exchange of letters between Sharif Hussein and Sir 
Henry McMahon, the British high Commissioner in Egypt. In which, “The Arabs 
offered to get the British assistance in revolting against the Ottoman Empire in the aim 
of getting their independence should the revolt be successful” (Hourani, 1968, p.43). 
Sharif Hussein was provoked by the British recognition to the right of the French in 
Alexandretta and the Syrian coast based on the pretext that they were not inhabited by 
Arabs. Sharif Hussein denied the British assertion that the Syrian coast line was not 
purely Arab, and he stated:  
The two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea-coast are purely Arab, and 
there is no difference between a Muslim and Christian Arab”. And McMahon 
replied by asserting the French interest in the two Vilayets, and he proclaimed 
that careful examination was required To assure the French rights in the region 
(Hourani, 1968, p. 44).  
 
In the end, on October 7, 1918 a small group of the French force landed in Beirut for 
the first time to assert the new status quo, regardless of what the Arabs expected 
according to prior agreements. 
On January 18, 1919, a Peace Conference convened in Paris, and thereby the League of 
Nations was created on January 25. The Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations 
Covenant was signed on June 28. Meanwhile, disappointments occurred in the Arab 
region because of the news of Balfour Declaration and the Sykes- Picot Agreement. 
Hence, between January twenty seven and February ten the First Palestinian National 
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Congress met and rejected Balfour declaration and demanded independence. There 
were series of independence calls among the Arab countries in that period. On June 
twenty eight, an American commission was assigned to investigate the situation in in 
the Arab region. King-Crane Commission began investigating with the support of the 
United States and the opposition of Britain and France. Bassam (2011) explains the 
different attitudes of the different conflicting parties which declared their petitions to 
King- Crane Committee. It was clear that only the Maronites and Catholics delegations 
called for the declaration of Great Lebanon under the French mandate. On the other 
hand, the other delegations called for a free Arab State (Great Syria), a supervised state 
by the US and led by King Feisal. Even the Christian Protestant delegation in Sidon 
called for Great Syria. The most interesting delegation came from Marjeon Casa, 
Bassam (2011) documented:  
The delegations that came from Marjeon Casa was unique it represented a form 
of National unity and political consciousness. It consisted of Christians and 
Muslims from different sects…they together presented petitions that agreed 
with the Syrian Convention Agreements (Bassam, 2011, p. 218).    
 
The report of the American committee, King- Crane, was delivered on August thirtieth. 
It recommended that the Syrian unity, under the rule of King Faisal, was a must due to 
geographic, linguistic, cultural, and economic reasons, and Great Syria should remain a 
unity including Palestine. Second, the mandate should be declared for a limited period 
of time over Iraq and Great Syria until the people are trained to rule themselves. Third, 
they called to restrain the Jewish immigration to Palestine and withhold the notion of 
building a Jewish state in it because building a Jewish state will be considered 
provocative to the People in Syria and it would contradict with Wilson’s fourteen 
principles. Finally, the Committee advised to grant Mount Lebanon an administrative 
independence to protect the economic interests of Great Syria and Lebanon. If the 
French insisted on protecting its interests in the region, it can be given a mandate over 
Mount Lebanon. However, even though the King-Crane report reflected the will of the 
people in the area, it was ignored. The report was published later on for historical 
reasons, after the death of Wilson (Bassam, 2011, p. 226-227). In 1919, the Syrian 
National Congress declared the Syrian independence on July 2nd, the French troops 
moved into Beirut area on October 9th, and the British troops withdrew from Syria on 
November 1st. 
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On April 24 1920, the South’s Olama and leaders, such as Sayyed Hussein Sharaf Al-
Din and Ahmad Al-Assad, called for “Hugier22 Convention”, in which they supported 
the Arab revolution and declared that Mountain ‘Amel should be part of the Arab State. 
Finally, the Convention elected Sheik Hussein Mugnieh, Sayyed Hussein Shraf Al-Din, 
and Hussein Nour Al-Din to be representatives of the convention before King Faisal in 
Damascus. Sheik Hussein Mugnieh excused himself because he was an old man, while 
the other two met with Sayyed Abd Al-Muhssein Amen in Damascus and went to meet 
with Faisal to declare that the South has unanimously endorsed the document released 
in the Syrian convention, and called for the complete independence of Syria, undivided, 
and independent, and Jabal ‘Amel will be part of the Arab State under the leadership of 
King Faisal. According to testimonies from the South, the participation in the 
convention was multi confessional (Andraous, 2009). The convention reflected political 
orientations in general and the dreams of the southerners in independence from any 
foreign occupation. Nonetheless, the conferees agreed to punish any individuals or 
groups who would support the French occupation (Sharaf Al-Din, 2014, p. 155). 
General suspicions prevailed in the South due to Belford declaration concerning 
Palestine. Many religious men such as Sayyed Sader Al-Din Fadllulah and Sayyed 
Najeb Fadllulah issued Fatwas23 that prevented selling lands to the Jewish Committee, 
which was very active in buying lands in Palestine. Even today if someone wanders 
around the South, will hear the people still retell about those Fatwas, especially 
amongst the older generations. Stories of betrayal, such as selling Al-Manara24, these 
stories are still present among the people of the South. 
 
3.1.5 Mandate and Mandate Treaties Enforcement and Palestine 
On April 24 of the same year, San Remo Conference25, an international conference, 
justified the mandate over the Arab region and announced the mandate system. As a 
result, General Gouraud demanded on July 14 that Feisal withdraws from Damascus.  
However, on July 25 France occupied Damascus and expelled Feisal. On August 10, 
                                                          
22 Hugier is a river valley in Marjeon Casa in South Lebanon. 
23 Religious legislation based on Quranic verses and Prophet Mohammad speeches.  
24 A hill just outside Hula in Marjeon Casa, which was sold by Abd Alaatif Al-Assad to the Jewish Committee. 
25 The mandate over Syria and Lebanon was entrusted to France at San Remo meeting on April 26 1920. 
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Ottoman government agreed to the treaty of Sevres26. By September 1 the French 
created Great Lebanon.  
 
3.1.5.1 The Syrian-South Lebanon joined revolutions 
The declaration of Great Lebanon was faced by resistance in South Lebanon. The 
South’s revolution against the French mandate joined efforts with the Syrian revolution 
in 1920 and later on in 1925. The people of the South till today tell the story of Sadeq 
Hamza and Adham Khanjar Al-Ssa’bi, the revolution leaders in the South. Adham 
Khanjar was arrested by the French in Qraya, near Sweida in South Syria. It was the 
village of Sultan Basha Al-Attrash the leader of the Great Syrian Revolution. The letter 
with the exact story’s details was written to Sultan Basha Al-Attrash, which he found 
hanged on his outside door. In the letter, Adham Khanjar Al-Ssa’bi was asking him for 
his help in facing the French arrest. Naturally, the French did not respond to the Basha 
who declared revolution against them and committed to the central state in Damascus 
(Kawtharani, 2013, p. 110-111). The stories of the South will include the heroic actions 
of Sultan Basha, and how he attacked the French tanks, climbing over them with his 
horse and killing the French soldiers inside them.  
 
2.1.6 Reinforcing the Division of Bilad Al-Sham on the Ground  
In 1920 the French troops occupied Lebanon and Syria and the British troops occupied 
Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine. This was implemented with the accordance of San Remo 
convention in 1920.  The French mandate over Lebanon and Syria was officially 
declared in 1923 in the League of Nations. After the Syrian mandate was declared, 
France created the Republic of Lebanon on May twenty third in 1926. And Charles 
Dabbas was elected as the first Lebanese president.  In this year South Lebanon was 
completely occupied by the French. They attacked Sayyed Hussein Sharaf Al-Din’s 
house and burnt it along with his rich library. As a result, he fled to live in Damascus 
                                                          
26The Treaty of Sevres was one of a series of treaties that the nations constituting the Central Powers signed 
subsequent to their defeat in World War I. The treaty was signed on 10 August 1920. It was marked as the 
beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire, and its ultimate annihilation. It included the renunciation of all non-
Turkish territory that was part of the Ottoman Empire and their cession to the Allied administration. Notably, the 
ceding of Eastern Mediterranean land allowed the creation of, amongst others, the British Mandate over Palestine 
and Transjordan, and the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon. 
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for two years. Then he moved to Cairo and finally to Palestine where he lived in a 
village called ‘Alma and was reunited with his family. When the French control was 
over the South they dropped the execution verdict against Sharaf Al-Din and he came 
back to Tyre in South Lebanon (Sharaf Al-Din, 2014, p. 162-167). 
In 1921, Abdullah Al-Hashimi arrived in Amman on March 2nd. In the meanwhile, on 
March 12th, Cairo Conference created the kingdom of Iraq with Faisal Al-Hashimi as 
its king. After Cairo Conference, Churchill and Abdullah met in Jerusalem the latter 
received temporary custody on Trans Jordan. It was not until May 25th 1923 that the 
British recognized Abdullah as Emir of Transjordan. On 2nd of May 1921, there was an 
outbreak of disturbance in Jaffa which resulted in the death of forty six Jews and the 
wounding one hundred and forty six. The British appointed Hag Amin Al-Husseini 
Mufti of Jerusalem on May eighth. In October, Haycraft Commission of Inquiry, a 
British commission that investigated Palestinian anti-Zionist disturbance in May 1921. 
The Commission attributed the Jaffa commotion to the magnitude of Zionist mass 
immigration. As a result, Churchill issued White Paper on Jun 2nd 1922 on Palestine. 
The White Paper stated the British concept of their obligation to the Zionist; it excluded 
Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations mandate. Jewish immigration was not to 
exceed the economic capacity of Palestine. Subsequently, on June 30, the US Congress 
endorsed Belford Declaration. 
Council of State elected Feisal king of Iraq on July eleventh. Plebiscite indicated ninety 
six percent of Iraqis approved Feisal as king. He was coroneted on August 23.  
Ironically, the next day, the League of Nations approved mandates on Syria, Lebanon, 
and Palestine on July twenty fourth. Consecutively, the British mandate over Palestine 
went into effect on September 29 1923. The Palestinians who rejected the British 
presence and Belfour declaration, began a general strike in March to protest Lord 
Balfour’s visit to Jerusalem.  
France signed the treaty of Ankara on October 10th 1921. The treaty brought diplomatic 
recognition and peace with France; it pushed the French mandatory border 10,000 
square miles south and restored the territory of Cilicia to Turkey. France ceded Cilicia 
to Turkey on October twentieth. 
On September 24 1928, Zionist religious leaders began efforts to change the status quo 
at the Wailing Wall, which is known to the Muslims as the Buraq Wall. The Wall 
  
45 
 
carries important importance in the Muslim culture. It is considered to be an Islamic 
Waqif. Hence, in November the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem demanded protection 
of Muslim property rights in the Wailing Wall. Ignoring these demands started a 
Palestinian revolution and riots, which was known as Buraq Revolution on twenty third 
of August in the same year. It was the British who stood for the revolution to protect 
the Jews, and took hard measurements against the Arab Palestinians (Palestinian Centre 
for Regional Studies, 2008). Buraq revolution was the first confrontation not only 
against Jewish provocative actions, but also with British who joined the Jews against 
the Arabs of Palestine. The Arabs had serious concerns about the future of Palestine. 
The Palestinians were not alone in their fights to protect their lands and their rights in 
their own land. Fawzi Qawiqji mentions in his memoires that courses of events in 
Palestine was of great concern to him and his Syrian friends. However, he who was 
from Tripoli in Lebanon. Qawiqji was always concerned about the Arab unity and 
freedom. He was a leader in the Syrian Great Revolution in 1925 and then a leader in 
the Palestinian Revolution, in 1936. In the second revolution, he grouped volunteers 
from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan to fight the British in Palestine (Qasmeih, 1975).  
 
2.1.7 The Land Mark Events of 1936 
In 1936, interrelated uprisings happened all over the Arab countries; they were in Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Trans Jordan, and Egypt. It all started in Palestine when 
Palestinian Arab Executives called for a general strike in October 1933. A strike started 
in the administrations. It began in the main towns to protest Zionist immigration. One 
of the reasons was discovering massive amounts of weapons and arms that the Zionist 
smuggled from Belgium. This fact explains the connection in the Arab countries’ 
collective memory- Belgium has always been associated to Israel, it is considered a 
main Israeli source of power and influence. Another reason for the revolution was the 
constant demand for limiting the Zionist mass immigration. It is clear in the thirties of 
the last century, a distinction of the term Zionism rather than Jewish came into presence 
(Grunor, 2005). 27 
                                                          
27The Mandate Great Britain over Palestine was accorded by the League of Nations, which called for the 
establishment of a Jewish Agency to represent the Jewish people vis-a-vis the Mandatory government and to 
cooperate with it in establishing the national home. The Zionist Organization was initially given the status of a 
Jewish Agency.  
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In 1936 revolutions against the French and British mandate erupted in all the countries 
of the Fertile Crescent: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. This age of 
revolutions was a landmark in the history of the area. In this period the South of 
Lebanon was the passage for delivering arms to the revolutionary men in Palestine. 
They knew that there were freedom fighters from different Arab countries. They all 
believed in the need to protect Palestine from Jewish settlers emigrating from different 
places in the world. Their leaders were well known in the South; for instance, it was in 
Ali Bazi’s house, in Beint Jubeil in South Lebanon, where the guns were collected in to 
be smuggled to Palestine.  
Until 1943 the Southerners were using the Palestinian currency in trade in the South’s 
markets (almaaref.org).28The Southerners were in doubt and fear from the Zionist 
expansion in Palestine and the Northern Palestinian boarders. Therefore, the 
Southerners’ revolutionaries were closely following the events in Palestine. Moreover, 
direct relations started with the uprisings in Palestine in one side and Beint Jubeil, Tyre, 
and with the Syrian revolution from the other. The two parties were considered to be 
the two wings of the Palestinian revolution in 1933 led by Eizddin Al-Qassam, which 
lasted till the beginning of World War II. The South had martyrs fighting alongside the 
Palestinian revolutionary fighters in 1936.  
2.1.7. 1 the Revolution against Tobacco Monopoly 
On the other hand, in 1936, the revolution in the South was also led against the Regie. 
It was a French company that monopolized the tobacco prices. In fact, tobacco was a 
product that the Southerners depended on as a major source of income, but Regie 
wanted to control tobacco plantation, production and exportation. Many of the young 
villagers began eruptions and demonstrations in protest against Regie. Henceforth, the 
French authorities imprisoned the demonstrators. In response to the French severe 
action, the demonstrations started from Einata, a town next to Beint Jubeil where the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
In 1929, an expanded agency was established as a partnership between the ZO and non-Zionist, public Jewish 
groups. At the founding conference in Zurich in 1929, half the delegates were representatives of the ZO, and half 
represented the non-Zionist organizations. Chaim Weizmann, president of the ZO, was elected president of the 
newly founded Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency was viewed as a tool for the involvement of the entire Jewish 
people in the building of the land. It was also hoped that inclusion of the non-Zionist organizations would boost 
the financial resources available to the Zionistmovement, something which did not occur, partly because of the 
worldwide economic crisis of 1929. The principle of equal representation in the Jewish Agency leadership was 
also gradually breached. After several years, the Executive of the Jewish Agency became identical with that of the 
Zionist Organization. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/wzo.htm 
28This is according to the tales of the South.   
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prison is located, and spread to the rest of the South. Demonstrators demanded the 
release of the prisoners and the French authorities took violent measures to oppress 
them. Many of the rebels were wounded and killed. Oppressive methods did not work 
out, and the French authority came to realize that the South was not only united against 
the ‘Regie Co- Interessee Lebanaise des Tobacs et Tombac’, but also to the revolution 
that was connected to the old claims of the Unity with Syria and the support of the 
national demands (Ayyob, 2008). 
Many Arab parties were created in the thirties of the last century, and there were 
promises of independence given to the countries under both the French and British 
mandate. Those years also witnessed the rise of Germany under the leadership of Hitler 
and the Nazi party. The German expansion inside Europe started and Paris fell to Nazis 
on June 14, 1940.   
On November 15, 1943, demonstrations filled the streets of Beirut and Sidon calling for 
independence. The strikers closed shops and institutions and were cheering for their 
leaders’ names. Many casualties were the victims of violent attacks by the French 
forces. Amongst the casualties there were school boys and girls at the ages of six, eight, 
and ten. Ma’rouf Sa’ed, the Lebanese leader, was also shot in his hand. Then, he was 
arrested with his comrades when the second uprising was in progress. The French 
troops were stopped at Al-Awali Bridge and prevented them from Getting to Sarai or 
the town hall (Alan about Al-Electroni, 2013). In response to the national pressure 
General Georges Catroux quickly arrived to Beirut on November 21. On the next day, 
the six leaders were released and the independence of Lebanon was declared. The 
independence was declared on November 22, 1943. But, the French troops left Lebanon 
and Syria in 1946.  
 
3.2. HISTORICAL EVENTS PRO 1943 
3.2.1. The Middle East and Lebanon Post Second World War 
The Southerners entered the next phase after the independence in 1943 loaded with a 
history of struggle and suffering against the French. Their aim to establish the Arab 
State and protect Palestine did not end with the declaration of the Lebanese 
independence. The ideological national parties were more active, as we are going to see 
in Chapter Four. However, the Second World War ended in 1945; subsequently, the 
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events in the Middle East areas were accelerating. The United States which is one of 
the greatest powers of the world became more concerned and involved in creating a 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Many events have developed rapidly between the 
years of 1945 and 1948, and South Lebanon as most of the Arab world was directly 
affected.  
3.2.3.1 The Americans and the Creation of Israel 
On February 14, 1945, Roosevelt met with Ibn Saud; the meeting included two major 
topics. The first topic was related to oil agreement and security. The second was 
Palestine as a home land for Jews. Taylor (2015): retells the event that took place with 
the two leaders. The discussions targeted several political issues. Among them the 
European immigration to Palestine. Abdul Aziz opposed the idea. 
They eventually came to an agreement on U.S. military training and support for 
Saudi Arabia, which was a fledgling country surrounded by stronger nations, in 
return for its oil and political support in the region. Roosevelt declared that he 
would not support the Jewish State in Palestine, "I would take no action, in my 
capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might 
prove hostile to the Arab people," Roosevelt later wrote to the Saudi King in a 
follow letter. 
 
 President Roosevelt died two month later and his successor, Harry Truman, didn't 
always see eye-to-eye with Abdul Aziz. In April, 1945, Truman demanded termination 
of the provision of the 1939 white paper. Still, “the core themes of the Saudi-U.S. 
relationship established at that meeting – security and oil – have endured through five 
Saudi kings and twelve U.S. presidents” (Taylor, A. 2015). As a result, Truman 
demanded the immediate acceptance of 100,000 Jews into Palestine on August 31. This 
declaration increased Zionists’ efforts to smuggle more Jews into Palestine in 
September. On October 1945 the Zionists started attacks on Palestinian railroad system 
in 153 places.  
Supplementary, the Arab League charter was established on March 22, 1945. The 
founding states that wrote its charter were Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi 
Arabia, and later they were joined by Yemen and Transjordan. The Arab League was 
formed under Britain Guidance. It granted Palestine full representation in its 
deliberation and made some of the strongest resolutions on behalf of Palestinian 
independence (Emory. 1996). According to Emory (1996), since 1941, Britain had 
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concerns about the anti-British sentiments in the Arab world. The Arab street exploded 
because of the non-stop Jewish immigration to Palestine; as a result:  
Widespread Demonstrations against Zionism in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon 
during the fall of 1945 indicated that opposition to further Western interference 
in their affairs through the promotion of the Zionist cause was central to Arab 
identity and its quest for independence (Emory, 1996, p. 231).  
 
Though the Jewish migration quota expired on November 31, the British announced on 
January 30 that they would continue allowing the previous quota until the Anglo-
American Committee finished its study. The decision became consistent with the 
committee that recommended the entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, in spite of the 
severe opposition of the Palestinians to take such an Act (Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry, 1946). Truman, the American president, endorsed Anglo-American 
Committee Report of Inquiry, on May first. Meanwhile, the Zionists attacked British 
troops and Irgun bombed King David Hotel on July 22 which residents were mostly 
British.   
 
3.2.3.2 The Southerner’s Workers in Palestine 
During this period, most of the Southerners were working in Palestine, in the refinery 
in Haifa as porters in the harbours, or as building workers. It was the Southerners who 
told me about building of the barricades in Palestine. They assumed: “We thought that 
we were working with the English (Englise) but it turned out that we were building 
barricades to the Jews who would lead their fights against us from behind them later 
on”. Actually, they were hesitant to tell the story; they assumed that they were partly 
responsible for giving the chance to the Jewish gangs to win the war in Palestine. 
Furthermore, they told me that back then no one said Israel or Zionist, they were only 
known as Jews. Some of the Lebanese villagers worked in their farms [Moshavs or 
Kibbutz]. Many of the villagers said, “They seemed to be friendly; we couldn’t foretell 
about the hostility they would practice later on”.  
 
3.2.3.3 Israel and the Occupation of Palestine 
As a result for the Zionist attacks, the British arrested large number of Zionist leaders 
on June 29. Accordingly, Morrison- Grady committee conducted a study to determine a 
compromise between British and American positions throughout July. However, the 
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Unites States rejected and Britain accepted Morrison- Grady report. On August six 
Zionist submitted their plan for immigration to Palestine, which Truman had accepted 
and formally endorsed on October fourth. Two days later, Thomas Dewey, a 
Republican candidate for United State president, called for even higher rate of Jewish 
migration into Palestine. It was clear that the matter of national state for the Jews have 
completely moved to the hands of the Americans. Especially that the Americans and 
the Jewish agency refused to attend London conference on Palestine, planed in 
February 1946, since the Arabs and the Zionists were not meeting together. The 
invitation to London conference was also send to the Arab League and to the 
Palestinian Arab Higher Executive delegation. Trumann’s support to the Zionist 
reached its peak29 
Following Britain's announcement in February 1947 of its intention to terminate its 
Mandate government, the UN General Assembly appointed a special committee - the 
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine - to make recommendations on the 
land's future government. UNSCOP30 recommended the establishment of two separate 
States; Jewish and Arab, to be joined by economic union, with the Jerusalem-
Bethlehem region as an enclave under international administration (Emory, 1996, 
p.239; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947). 
On November 29, 1947 the UN General Assembly voted on the partition plan, adopted 
by thirty-three votes to thirteen with ten abstentions. The Jewish side accepted the UN 
plan for the establishment of two states. The Arabs rejected it, and launched a war of 
annihilation against the Jewish state. Eventually, the level of violence increased and 
Irgun carried out dramatic terrorist attacks against dense Arab population centres in 
Jerusalem and Haifa. After the vote in the General Assembly in the UN, the British 
announced on December 18, 1947 that they would withdraw from Palestine on May 15, 
1948.  
 
                                                          
29 In August and October 1946, Truman went a step further in his support of Zionism by endorsing a Jewish Agency 
plan for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and a Palestinian state. The plan envisaged the incorporation 
into the Jewish state of some 60 percent of Palestine at a time when Jewish landownership in the country did not 
exceed seven percent. Truman's support for these Zionist territorial ambitions destroyed whatever hopes remained 
(and they were not plentiful) for negotiated federal or cantonal solutions that the British were proposing at the time 
(Khalidi, 2010). 
30United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
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3.2.4 The Arabs and the Loss of Palestine 
In January 1948 the Arab League organized and financed Arab Liberation Army under 
the command of Fawzi Al-Qawaqji, and Abed Al- Qadir Al- Husseini became 
commander of Palestinian guerrillas. Al- Qawaqji entered Palestine on March 15. On 
the other side, the Zionists completed a plan designated to the means to neutralize or 
remove the Arab population from places of special strategic importance on the borders 
between the Zionist and the Arab region of Palestine. They also had the intention of 
occupying Jerusalem. Accordingly, with the offensive plan, Irgun committed a 
massacre in Deir Yassin on April nine, 1948. Accordingly, many stories were told by 
Palestinians and Lebanese that there were other massacres committed by Yishuv gangs 
in several villages, such as Essafora, El- Mansura, Tarbikha...etc. Hence, people fled 
from their villages out of fear. The other reason for their departure was the assurances 
they have received from the Arab Leaders and Amir Abdullah that they will return 
within a month, still, in the meanwhile, they should leave or flee for their own safety.  
The Lebanese Southern workers were among those who fled from Palestine. They tell 
details of the road as if the images never left their minds. The Southerners were 
repeatedly reminded of those images each time the Israeli attacked their villages to 
kidnap someone and destroy his/her house, even before the occupation of 1976.  As a 
result of the assaults and attacks on Tiberias, Haifa, and Jaffa, they fell under Zionist 
control between April 20 and May six. At the end of April, the Zionist moved up the 
wall of the Old City (Jerusalem), until the middle of May they have had controlled 
most of Galilee. On the other hand, most of the Arab Palestinians who fled became 
refugees in the neighbouring Arab countries, and at least 120 thousand refugees entered 
Lebanon through the South!  
By May 15, 1948, the Zionist were in control of two northern sectors of the three that 
were assigned by the U.N.; the British withdrew from Palestine and the Zionist 
pronounced the creation of the state of Israel. The first two powerful states to recognize 
the Israeli state were the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel declared the 
creation of its army on May 26. There were calls for several Truces; however, the Arab 
Army withdrew and the fight was ended with a series of armistices that was signed 
separately between the Arab countries and Israel in the following year, in 1949.    
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The Southerners lived those stories in details. If they did not participate in action 
conducts, they had to participate in another way. For instance, the memories they have 
is related to the Arab Army that took their blankets because they were not properly 
equipped, when the Southerners themselves needed them; they expressed the fear they 
felt if the Rescue Army left the battle field and how they would be left under the mercy 
of the Zionist Gangs.  Indeed, the Rescue Army left, and on the next day at the down of 
October 31, 1948 the Zionist gangs the Haganah committed the first massacre in South 
Lebanon, in Hula/ Marjeon Casa. In the massacre, around 120 men and women were 
killed, 100 of whom were men between the ages of 16-60. Those gangs became the 
core of the Israeli Deafens Army. The terrorist attacks on the Southerners continued: 
steeling the people’s cattle, kidnapping and killing Southerners inside their houses at 
night.   
 
3. 2. 4. Suez Canal Crisis 
The root of the conflict was in the British decision to maintain military balance in the 
Arab-Israeli dispute by supplying limited amount of weapons. This did not stop Israel 
from arming, and Egyptians were about to improve their military abilities. In 1951, the 
news came that the Egyptians refused to work for the British, they also cut off food and 
water supplies to Suez Canal.  In 1952, the British attacked an Egyptian city 
‘Iasmailiya’, which caused more than one hundred casualties. As a result, the angry 
Egyptian demonstrators destroyed or damaged most European- owned businesses in 
Cairo. The occurrences escalated and King Farouk was exiled on July 26. In 1949, 
Muhammad Najib joined The Free Officer Society (FOS), which operated as a 
clandestine movement of junior officers during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Later, Najib 
became their official leader during the turmoil leading up to the revolution. Then, the 
FOS changed its name to Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that took all 
government authority under its control, disbanded all the political parties, and RCC 
members filled cabinet posts on January 16, 1953. In June the RCC abolished the 
monarchy from Egypt and declared Egypt a republic with Mohammad Najib as the first 
president. On April 1954, Jamal Abed Nasser became the prime minster. These 
developments carried within a political change in Egypt. Hence, this was a primer 
introduction to conflict confrontations with Britain and later on with France. 
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Afterwards, an arms deal took place with the Soviet bloc in September 1955, by which 
Egypt received Czechoslovakian tanks and modern aircraft (Al-Shae’r, 2013). As a 
result, Eden, the British Prime Minister in 1956, began to think in terms of isolating 
Egypt from other Arab states. Nonetheless, Eden did not wish to push Nasser, further 
into the orbit of the Soviet bloc. Subsequently, in November talks began in Washington 
about funding for the Aswan Dam project. When Eisenhower cancelled the promised 
grant in July 1956, Nasser’s response was the abdication of King Farouk of Egypt in 
Alexandria and declared of the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser believed that 
its returnees will build the High Damp. An immediate reaction choice was taken by the 
British decision makers that stressed on a quick response. On the other hand, an 
immediate military operation was out of the question due to military strategic reasons; 
in the meanwhile, a diplomatic process was needed (Joseph, 1970, Benson, 2006) As a 
result, all Egyptian funds in Britain were blocked; political and diplomatic pressure 
were to be applied and force would be used as the last resort,. For Eden, the issue was 
simple, Britain was prepared, with or without the US and France or alone, to use force. 
The Cabinet agreed that unilateral action might be necessary as a last resort because the 
nationalization of the Canal represented a threat to all Britain’s interests in the Middle 
East (Benson, 2006). Accordingly, in August, British and French military strategists 
began to plan an invasion. Meanwhile, it was increasingly clear that the US was 
unwilling to sanction the use of force and the Labor Party pressed Eden to involve the 
UN.  
As an attempt to promote the diplomatic efforts, The London Conference opened on 
August 16, 1956, with all interested parties – bar Egypt – to approve the resumption of 
international control over the Canal. One stumbling block was the insistence of India 
that Egypt was entitled to nationalize the Canal. India was supported by the Soviet 
Union, Ceylon and Indonesia. The convention negotiated placing the Canal under an 
international Board. This proposal was presented to Nasser, who turned it down, 
repeating that the nationalization was legal, and that the Canal remained open and 
operating normally. In spite of the Americans warning on October 29, Israel’s army 
attack on Egypt began and made rapid progress. On October 30, Britain and France 
issued their ultimatums, which Egypt rejected, ordering a full mobilization and 
announcing that they would refer the matter to the Security Council. Promptly, 
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following the ultimatum, the Anglo-French air attacks began at midnight. Though, the 
fights were uneven.  
On November second, the UN passed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, 
but Britain, together with France who as yet had no forces ashore, continued air 
operations. Egyptian forces in Port Said fought on when Nasser also rejected the terms 
of the UN resolution. However, it was until November sixth that the British and French 
governments accepted a ceasefire at midnight. Indeed, it was the Soviet pressure on the 
Americans that pressured the American to force seize fire. Nasser remained in power, 
and the evacuation of the British troops from Egypt was completed on January ninth, 
1957. Concurrently, U.S. worries rose towards the viability of European (particularly 
British) political and military power in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Suez 
Crisis, Eisenhower Doctrine was prompted.  
 
3.2.4.1 The Eisenhower Doctrine  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, 
and Congress approved it in March of the same year. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a 
country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military 
forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower 
singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. 
forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such 
nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled 
by international communism” (Office of the Historian, 1986). 
The Eisenhower doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward 
the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Canal 
Crisis. The results of the Suez Canal triumph, elevated the popularity and influence of 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Accordingly, Eisenhower feared that this had 
allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with 
Jordan and Syria, which had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower 
feared that radical nationalism would combine with international communism in the 
region and threaten Western interests; he was willing to send U.S. troops to the Middle 
East if necessary.  
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The first real test of Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat 
was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion. Lebanon’s President, Camille 
Shamoun, requested assistance from the United States in order to prevent attacks from 
Shamoun’s political rivals, some of whom had communist leanings and ties to Syria 
and Egypt. Eisenhower responded to Shamoun’s request by sending U.S. troops into 
Lebanon to help maintain order. Although Eisenhower never directly invoked the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, the American action in Lebanon was meant not only to help 
Shamoun’s Government against its political opponents, but also to send a signal to the 
Soviet Union that the US would act to protect its interests in the Middle East (Office of 
the Historian, 1986). 
 
3.2.4.2 Bagdad Pact 
The conflict in Lebanon started with Baghdad Pact, which was also known as Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO). It was a defensive organization for promoting shared 
political, military and economic goals founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, 
Pakistan and Iran, similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization. The main purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to prevent 
communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. Several developments took 
place in the Middle East, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon, in the years that followed, 
which weakened the Pact. 
In 1956 the leftist trend prevailed in the Arab region. There was a leftist cabinet in 
Syria with Baath and Khaled Al-Azm’s Democratic Bloc dominated. In addition, 
Akram Hourani formed the National Front in Syria. In addition, free elections in Jordan 
on October 21 led to an Arab nationalist and leftist majority in Chamber of Deputies. 
Suleiman Nabulsi, who founded the National Socialist Party (NSP), became prime 
minister of Jordan and formed a leftist cabinet on October 29. The alliance was known 
as the National Front, in which political, economic, and military cooperation with Arab 
nationalist states, and aiding other Arab states with their fight against imperialism 
(Anderson, 2005, p. 174).  
The official Lebanon was not part of this trend. Therefore, tensions with Egypt 
escalated earlier in 1956 when pro-western President Camille Shamoun did not break 
diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez 
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Crisis, which provoked Nasser. These tensions were further increased when Shamoun 
showed closeness to the Baghdad Pact. Nasser felt that the pro-western Baghdad Pact 
posed a threat to Arab Nationalism. As a response, Egypt and Syria united into the 
United Arab Republic (UAR). Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami supported 
Nasser in 1956 and 1958. Furthermore, the Lebanese Prime Minister formed a national 
reconciliation government after the 1958 crisis ended and pushed towards union with 
the newly created United Arab Republic. A rebellion was allegedly supplied with arms 
by the UAR through Syria caused President Shamoun to complain to the United Nation 
Security Council. The United Nations sent a group of inspectors that reported that it 
didn't find any evidence of significant intervention from the UAR. Nevertheless, after 
the toppling of a pro-Western government in Iraq Revolution on 14 July, Iraq 
eventually withdrew from CENTO in 1959. Along with the internal instability in 
Lebanon, President Shamoun felt the Lebanese rightest power was threatened and call 
for American assistance because Lebanon was threatened by a civil war.  
 
3.2.5 Moussa Sadr and the Disinherited Movement 
 In 1957-1958, Mousa Sadr, a Shiite religious figure, came from Iran and lived in the 
South in Tyre to fill the void left after the death of Sayyed Abd Hussein Sharaf Al-Din, 
as a religious Marja’. Ajami (1986) describes the coming of Sadr: “Musa Sadr arrived 
in Lebanon with a Farsi accent and Farsi way of speaking Arabic (p. 31)”. He came as a 
stranger, but “by criteria much older than the nation state, Musa Sadr belonged (p. 
188)”, as Ajami (1986) states. However, the results of Sadr’s coming to the South 
didn’t crystallize until the late seventies. In 1967, he established the Shiite Supreme 
Council. In 1968, the General Authority of the Council Board was elected and Sadr 
became the first head of the Shiite Supreme Council. Sadr released the Movement of 
the Disinherited in January 20, 1974. The Movement aimed to fight deprivation and 
establish social justice. Sadr refusal to be part of the Lebanese Civil War was put to 
doubt when the military branch of the Disinherited Movement AML, (Afwaj 
Muqawama Lubnaniyah: The Lebanese Resistance Regiments) was discovered. The 
announcement came after an explosion in a training camp in Baalbek, Al-Hermel, in 
July 7, 1975. Yet, Sadr declared that the reason behind establishing the armed 
regiments was to protect the South from the Israeli attacks and ambitions. The second 
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reason, according to Sadr, was to prevent Palestinian settlement in Lebanon. He also 
believed that the Lebanese State is too weak to protect its own boarders. Imam Sadr 
disappeared in 1978 during a tour he had planned to Libya and Europe. 
 
3.2.6 The development of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon 
Two main contradicting political wings existed in Lebanon. It was known as the right 
wing which represented the confessional Maronite, and the left wing, which was most 
of the other Lebanese. The two streams differed in ideology and in attitudes towards the 
Palestinian cause, and the role of Lebanon towards Arab causes and Palestine. It was 
with the exceptional support of many Lebanese parties and the Southerners that the 
Palestinian resistance against Israeli started from South Lebanon. The resistance was 
highly supported after the visit paid by the Egyptian president Jamal Abed Al-Nasser in 
1958 to Lebanon. In the same year, Syria and Egypt were united, which raised high 
hopes of the South in joining the Arab State. The Southerners did not only explain that 
guns were in every house in the South, but also explained their readiness for the big 
fight. However, to their great disappointment the union between Syria and Egypt was 
ended in a coup that was declared in Damascus on September 28, 1961. 
Regional development have subsequently affected Lebanon, starting with the Egyptian 
revolution in 1952, to the Tripartite Aggression until reaching the First Civil War in 
Lebanon in 1958 that led to the American intervention. Actually, it was not until Faud 
Shihab the Lebanese President met with Jamal Abd Nasser that the siege was broken; 
and in return the movement of the Fedayeen was facilitated. The meeting between the 
two presidents took place on the Syrian- Lebanese borders, during Nasser’s visit to 
Syria.  
The Arab people were highly affected by the loss of Palestine in 1948 (Al-Nakba), the 
Exodus and then again in 1967 (Al-Nakssa), the Setback. The Israelis practiced an 
expulsion policy, driving the Palestinians in huge masses outside their lands and 
houses. Many voices called for armed resistance to fight the Israeli. As a result, the 
Arab youth from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Algeria compelled to the call. It was 
a time when all the Fedayeen from different Arab countries came together and gathered 
in South Lebanon. The Palestinian Diaspora headed first to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; 
and then they spread in different Arab countries, such as Iraq, Egypt, and the Arabian 
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Gulf.  In conclusion, all the Arab States and the Arab nation lived the disastrous 
experience of losing Palestine. On the other hand, the creation of the Israeli State 
caused a massive Palestinian immigration towards Lebanon in 1948. This was due to 
historical and geographical interaction between Palestine and Lebanon (Halaq, 1993, 
p.187), especially the South. Between 100-130 thousand Palestinians refugee entered 
Lebanon in 1948. This was a dilemma for the Lebanese confessional demography. 
Accordingly, the Lebanese government took severe measurements, amongst them was 
preventing the Palestinians from practising seventy five kinds of official occupations 
such as medicine, engineering, law...which put the Palestinians under difficult social 
and economic situations (Al-Nator, 1993, p.8).   
 
3.2.6.2 Cairo agreement 
The decision to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO, was taken in 
1964. PLO took the responsibility of military confrontation with Israel; and it depended 
on the social, political and financial coalition around it. The decision was taken in the 
first Palestinian convention that was held in Jerusalem in 1964. The convention came 
out with important resolutions that emphasised on the right of the Arab Palestinian 
people in their sacred home land, Palestine; and on their right to conduct armed, 
spiritual and fiscal resistance against the Israeli. Finally, agreeing to establish the PLO 
as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Ahmad Al-Shuqaeri was the first 
leader to head the PLO (Ahmar, 2009). 
In 1967, Israel initiated the Six-Days War against Egypt and Syria and occupied Sinai 
Peninsula in Egypt, Golan Heights in Syria, and the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem in 
Palestine. This called for National Arab Resistance, or as it was called “The War of 
Attrition”. The war involved fighting between Israel from one side, and Egypt, Jordan, 
PLO, and Syria from the other. It lasted from 1967- 1970. A real confrontation started 
with the battle of ‘Al-Karamah’, the Dignity, from the Jordanian borders, in 1968. On 
the Lebanese borders, military operations of PLO from within were active as well; 
however, the Lebanese authorities, especially the army, were blocking the Fedayeen 
free movements. During this period Cairo agreement came to existence in 1969. The 
agreement came as a result of a violent incidents that took place in Naher Al-bared, 
which is a Palestinian camp in Tripoli in the North of Lebanon. Negotiations were held 
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between the two representatives of the two parties, the Lebanese army Commander 
General Emile Bustani and Yasser Arafat the head of the Palestinian delegation. 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser helped to broker the deal. Some Lebanese 
parties considered the agreement to contradict with the Lebanese Independence. 
Though the agreement was endorsed by the Lebanese President Charles Al-Hellow, it 
was criticized by him later on. Israel considered the agreement as an end to the Truce 
Agreement held with Lebanon in 1949.  
The Cairo Agreement organized the relation between the Lebanese government and the 
Palestinian resistance. It legalised the Palestinians legal status in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Armed resistance, through organizing the relation with the Lebanese 
authorities. It allowed the resistance to attack from Al-Orqob area in South Lebanon, 
which is located amongst the Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese triangle (Alwah, 2015). 
Later, the resistance was legalised by the Arab League in 1968. On another level, PLO 
settlement in Jordan was terminated in 1970, after the eruptions and the fights with the 
Jordanian authority. The eruptions in 1970 were labelled as Black September. 
Accordingly, the PLO fighters and offices were evacuated into Syria/ Damascus 
(Qurban, 1979, p. 120). 
 
3.2.7 Palestinian Intervention and Operations in Lebanon 
Palestinian involvement increased in Lebanon in the early 1970s, especially after the 
failed coup in Jordan in September 1970, and the Lebanese army was incapable of 
limiting the areas of PLO activity. In April 1975, Civil War broke out in Lebanon 
between the PLO and the Christians and several months later the leftist Lebanese 
National Movement entered the conflict alongside with the PLO. Following the 
military successes of this alliance, the right-wing Maronite president Suleiman 
Frangieh called upon Syria to intervene. The PLO subsequently retreated to the South, 
but continued guerrilla Operations across the Lebanon- Israel borders, which resulted in 
the first Israeli invasion of March 1978.  
The year1970 witnessed three main developments in the Middle East: in Syria the 
defence Minister Hafez Al-Assad came to power in a military coup (the Correction 
Movement); Suleiman Frangieh was elected as the president in Lebanon; it was well 
known that Frangieh had a close relationship to Al-Assad; finally, Nasser suddenly 
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died, which came unexpectedly and affected the Nasserite Movement. Later, in 1972, 
the PLO offices were officially moved to Lebanon. Nonetheless, the existence of the 
PLO and Fedayeen in Lebanon was starting to cause internal conflicts in the country. 
There were contradictions in Lebanon about the work of the Fedayeen, many agreed 
with it, and the others were against it. Henceforward, Israel started assassinations 
operations against the Palestinian intellectuals and writers in Beirut, such as Gassan 
Kanafani in1972, in Lebanon and many others outside Lebanon. Then Verdon 
Operation was executed in April 1973. Verdon Operation was a changing point in the 
relation between the Lebanese government who failed to protect and defend the civilian 
Palestinian intellectuals from Israeli assassinations. Especially that, the Lebanese Army 
prevented the Palestinian fighters from engaging with Israelis who executed the 
assassination of several PLO leaders: Kamal ‘Odwan, Muhammad Yousof Al-Najjar, 
and Kamal Nasser. This led to military escalation between the Lebanese Army and 
Palestinian fighters in May 1972. During the fights, the Lebanese army used all kinds 
of weapons even air forces to contain the situation and declare authority over the 
Lebanese territories. However, it was not only the Palestinians who were bombarded, 
but along with the Lebanese who allied with them (Al-Hassan, 1987, p. 8). On April 
13, 1975, ‘Ain El-Remmaneh Massacre was committed.  
 
3.2.7.1 ‘Ain El-Remmaneh Massacre and the Lebanese Civil War 
The massacre of ‘Ain El-Remmaneh led to internal, Arab, and international meddling 
to stop the escalation of the situation between the Lebanese authority and the 
Palestinians, which failed and led to almost twenty-five years of Lebanese Civil War 
(Nasser, 1977, p. 77). In the same year, in 1975, the Second Disengagement Agreement 
was signed between Israel and Egypt. The Agreement led to a heightening the state of 
chaos in Lebanon, which formed a fertile ground for the struggle amongst the Lebanese 
and the international players (Al-Auobi, p. 231). Neither the Lebanese leaders nor the 
Palestinians understood that the Lebanese Civil War was no longer between two 
contradicting Lebanese parties. It has gone out of context; unfortunately, Lebanese and 
Palestinians were merely the tools for regional and international conflict (‘Alosh, 1976, 
p. 74).  
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3.2.7.2 Litany Operation 
At the end of 1977 Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat’s, the Egyptian President, visited 
Jerusalem, and the signs of “Camp David Agreement” was about to be born. The Israeli 
was comfortable on the Egyptian front, and it was calm on the Syrian front; hence, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 was around the same time of Sadat’s visit. The 
Israeli military invasion was under the name “Litany Operation.” The main aim of the 
invasion was to end the Palestinian operations through the South’s boarders. The Israeli 
appointed Saed Hadad, a Lebanese major, as the leader of the South Lebanese Army 
(SLA). In 1976, Saad Haddad, during the ongoing Civil War in Lebanon, commanded 
the Lebanese army battalion in the South that broke up and formed the Army of Free 
Lebanon. However, the Israeli invasion in 1978 allowed SLA to gain control over 
South Lebanon. On April 18, 1979 Haddad proclaimed the area controlled by his force 
"Independent Free Lebanon." The following day, he was branded a traitor by the 
Lebanese government and was officially dismissed from the Lebanese Army. Part of 
the Free Lebanon Army returned to government control, while Haddad's part split and 
was renamed the South Lebanon Army (SLA), in May 1980. Following Haddad's death 
in 1984, he was replaced by retired Lieutenant General Antoine Lahed. The SLA was 
closely allied with Israel.  It supported the Israelis by fighting the PLO and the 
Lebanese Freedom Fighters in southern Lebanon until the 1982 invasion.  
In the Year 1981, the Fedayeen escalated the situation from the Lebanese borders. They 
heavily shelled Northern Palestine which raised tension inside Lebanon and on the 
Lebanese- Palestinian borders between the freedom fighters groups in Lebanon on one 
side, and the Israeli army, on the other side. Under the pretense of defending itself from 
the Fedayeen, after the assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London, the Israeli 
fighters started bombarding West Beirut; the invasion of 1982 started on the fourth of 
July.  
Afterwards, the Israelis continued to support SLA, whose main task was fighting other 
Lebanese Freedom Fighters until 2000 in the "security Zone” (the area under 
occupation after a partial Israeli withdrawal in 1985). In return, Israel supplied the SLA 
with arms, uniforms, and logistical equipment. In 1985, the SLA opened the Khiam 
Detention Centre. 
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After the second Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982, many Lebanese parties demanded 
cancelling the Cairo Agreement. It was President Amine Gemayel, who signed a law 
that annuls the agreement with the PLO. The termination of the agreement was 
approved by the parliament in 21 may 1987. Later on, the law was signed by Prime 
Minister Salim El-Hoss.  
 
3.2.8 The Lebanese National Resistance Front  
In 1982 once the Israeli occupied Beirut, Jabhat Al-Muqawama Al-Wataniyya Al-
Lubnaniyya or The Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) was established 
against Israeli invasion. LNRF was also known as Jammoul by its Arabic acronym, 
acted as a successor to the Lebanese National Movement, which was established at the 
beginning of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. Jammoul was the result of joined groups 
efforts of the leftists parties that gathered around calling Lebanese people to armed 
resistance, and unite into a “Lebanese National resistance Front” against Israel. The 
parties that established this organization on September 16, 1982 were: The secretary 
general of the central committee of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) George 
Hawi, the secretary general of the Organization of Communist Action (OCAL) Muhsin 
Ibrahim the Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP-L) secretary general Hussein Hamdan,  
the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) 
issued that day a joint communiqué calling for the Lebanese people to raise up in arms 
and unite into a "Lebanese National Resistance Front" against Israel. Jammoul main 
offices were located in the South and Beirut. 
 This group was soon joined by: The Arab Democratic Party (ADP) and the Lebanese 
Armed Revolutionary Factions (LARF) soon rallied to the LNRF banner, which gained 
full support of Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) leftist and Marxist factions based 
in Lebanon, mainly from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The last record of 
Jammoul’s operation against the Israeli and South Lebanese Army was in 1999.  
The Israeli second invasion 1982 reached Beirut. It was considered to be the first Israeli 
invasion that reaches an Arab capital. As a result, many resistance armed groups, 
beside Jammoul, started to operate against Israel. Also, new Islamic resistance groups 
were established, amongst them was Hezbollah. Under the resistance attacks in 1985, 
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Israel withdrew from Beirut and the South until what was known as the “Occupied 
Zone”, in the South of Litany River. The liberation of the South took place in 2000; 
but, the struggle with Israel is still going on.  
On the Lebanese level, in 1989, Taif Agreement took place. The Agreement formed a 
principle of mutual coexistence among the Lebanese sects and parties. It covered 
political reform which ended the Lebanese Civil war. There are still going on reforms 
and reconciliation taking place among the different Lebanese powers, most of which 
are conducted within Taif Agreement frame work. 
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Chapter Four 
The political parties in the South 
 
The movement of the political parties was not peculiar to South Lebanon. The National 
Arab Parties found their way to Lebanon and its South, simultaneously, with some local 
active parties. Regional and sub-regional parties spread in the South and had a 
considerable impact on its political orientation that was in contact with national 
movements, which sprung up in the Arab region. According to Hana (2016), in the 
beginning, the national movement parties were established as clubs, such as, the Arabic 
Club in Hama and Damascus. Those clubs played an important role in reviving national 
feelings against the Ottoman occupation. It called for a liberation movement, and 
resistance of traditional feudal lords’ powers and the powers of their families that 
dominated the political life in the region. The Arab Club established a youth bloc that 
was supported by members of the National Arab League and confronted with the 
National Bloc. This youth club developed its activities until it was joined by Akram 
Hourani, whose father was an active member with the youth club. Accordingly, the 
Arab liberation movement has moved from one generation to another. It has begun 
before the beginning of the twentieth century and was rooted in the nineteenth century. 
This chapter is going to discuss two main topics. The first is about the political parties 
that spread in South Lebanon and have played an important role in shaping its identity. 
The second is about the political orientations that prevailed in South Lebanon. 
The most popular parties in the South were the Socialist Ba’th Arab Party, the 
Communist Party and the Workers Union, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) 
and the National Appeal Party (NAP).Most people, who joined those parties, as Ayyob 
(2008) explains, were very eager for an Arab national unity. Moreover, the political 
parties have contributed in loosening the social ties on Southern women through their 
involvement and participation in political, cultural, union, and even military work. 
Ayyob (2008) emphasizes: 
The traditional familial ties were slowly becoming looser. The community was 
spiritually religious, however, due to cultural, social and political evolvement, 
the expanded immigration and the diversity of work choices, the opening of the 
youth to other societies and their involvement in the Parties’ work and 
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activities, were getting affected by the current modern thoughts and women 
education, all these factors led to improved social conditions (p. 270). 
 
4.1 The Communist Party 
It was first established in Lebanon in 1924, under the name Hisb Al-Sha’eb Al-
Lubnani, the Lebanese Public Party. According to Ayyob (2008), the party first 
celebrated Labor Day on the first of March 1925. After July 1930, the party’s name 
became the Communist Syrian-Lebanese Party. It continued to be united until it was 
separated in 1965. The party’s ideas came to the South through Palestine. The workers 
there gathered with intellectuals and embraced the party’s ideas which called for social 
justice and the rights of the people. Accordingly, one of the Einata’s habitants, who 
died at the age of 90 around 1990 mentioned that he was among the first communists in 
Einata. Ayyob (2008) documents this fact in her study as well. This person is Ahmad 
Bassam, who was a believer in God and did all his religious duties: praying, fasting, 
reading the Quran periodically, and a heavy reader for all books. He was a ‘Shi’i Shu’i, 
[a communist Shiite]. He worked in trade in the early years of the century trading in 
used clothes between Palestine, Houran, and South Lebanon. He was one of those who 
were introduced to Communism during his stay in Palestine. He finally left Palestine in 
1948. Communism also came to the South with the immigrants who went to South 
America and returned to South Lebanon as well (Jurdi Abissab & Abissab, 2013). 
The Communist Party since its early stage was very active in the South. According to 
Ayyob (2008), in 1934, in the memory of the battle of Mysalon, two party leaders 
visited Einatha: Mustafa Al-‘Arissi and Fouad Qazan. Speeches, in the occasion, 
condemned the mandate and many slogans against it were professed. In 1936, the 
communists of Einatha and the rest of the South participated in the revolution of 1936 
and many of them were imprisoned. Ayyob (2008) explained that although the parties 
attracted women and men, women were the major participators in the revolution of 
1936 against the monopoly of tobacco prices by Regie. It is comprehendible that they 
were followed by men since these women constituted the cheap labour in tobacco 
industry.  
The Party leaders paid attention to the relation with the Southerners. The name, Fraja-
Allah Al-Helo, was repeated in many of the tales of the Southerners, especially in 
towns like Hula, Bint Jubeil, and Eitaroun. The Communist party had many supporters 
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in the South. In 1937, the first Farmers Convention was held in Einata in the house of 
‘Abed Hussein Fadlullah and 150 people attended the event.  People came from 
different villages, Christians and Muslims, such as Einatha, Kawnin, ‘EinEbel, 
Rumaish, Eitaroun…and many others (Ayyob, 2008). It is clear that the Party paid 
close attention to the people’s demands, whether they were related to lightening the 
streets, providing water to the villages, collecting garbage, and initiating a Syndicate 
for the Tobacco farmers to enable them to challenge the mandate authorities and local 
political authorities represented by the monopolizing feudal lords. 
The Party was one of the oldest parties in Grand Syria. It lasted longer than any other 
party, and still exists. In 1944, the Party in Syria and Lebanon became two different 
Parties with different anthems and different flags. On the other hand, it was not until 
1964 that the two parties were practically split into two, with two different central 
committees and two different political offices (Turkumani, 2002).  
The Communist party was very active in the South. However, its role declined in the 
late forties and early fifties. This came as a result of the USSR acceptance of the 
Partition Plan in Palestine and the declaration of two states Palestinian state and Israeli 
state in 1947. On the other hand, the party retrieved its position in the late fifties with 
the support of the Soviet Union for Jamal Abed Al-Nasser in 1952. Yet, the Lebanese 
Communist Party’s ideology shifted in 1968. The party reviewed its rejection of Arab 
nationalist movement and decided to support those tied to anticolonial struggle and 
armed resistance against Israel. This shift further popularized Communist political 
programs among the Lebanese youth, including the Lebanese Southerners (Jurdi 
Abissab & Abissab, 2014). The Communists were further supported because the party 
supported at a later point the Palestinian resistance through participating in the National 
Guard. 
  
4.2 The National Appeal Party 
National Appeal Party (NAP) was established by Kathem El-Sulh. One of the NAP’s 
founders was Ali Hassan Bazi (1912-1985), a Southern Parliamentary and diplomat. 
Actually, there is not any information about NAP in the South. Then again, the NAP 
was mostly active in Beirut. 
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4.3 The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP 
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SNP) was founded by Anton Sa’adeh in 1932. The 
French mandate authorities considered the party to be illegal and arrested its founder 
and activists several times. In 1936, Sa’adeh was vanished outside Lebanon, hence, he 
went to South America, where he promoted for his party and ideology among the 
Syrian-Lebanese communities there. 
The party distinguished the specific Syrian nationalism characters from Arab 
nationalism. It emphasized on the Syrian unity, which is in his definition, the Fertile 
Crescent and its star, Cyprus. The Fertile Crescent includes what is known today as: 
Iraq, Kuwait, Syria (with Cilicia and Alexandretta), Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. 
The party called for specific four reforms. The first is the separation between state and 
religion. The second is preventing religious men from interfering in the national 
political and judicial affairs. The third is illuminating all the barriers between different 
sects and religions. The fourth is to abandon feudalism and organize national economy 
based on production, workers’ rights, and protecting the interest of the nation and the 
homeland. Moreover, it called for preparing a strong army that is able to guard the best 
interest of the nation and homeland. 
In 1947, Sa’adeh came back to Lebanon; he faced contradictions with the Lebanese 
government. Nonetheless, the party became to be known as the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party. After a clash with the Lebanese Phalanges members, an arrest order 
was issued in Sa’adeh’s behalf. Hence, he fled to Syria to seek refuge. But, Husnni Al-
Zaem, the Syrian President, handed him to the Lebanese authorities, who put him to 
false trial and sentenced him to death. On the eighth of June, he was executed by a 
firing Squad. As a reaction, one of the party members in Jordan assassinated Riad El-
Sulh the Lebanese Prime Minister, who signed the death sentence. Henceforward, the 
SSNP proceeded its political and parliamentary activities in Syria until 1955, when the 
Syrian army chief of staff, colonel ‘Adnan Al-Malki, was assassinated. The 
assassination caused division in the party, and stopped its activities, and participation in 
the Syrian political life. The party went on resuming its activities in Lebanon. After a 
failing coup attempt in the new year of 1961/1962, during the term of President Faud 
Shihab, the members of the party were followed and imprisoned. It was not until 1969 
when they were released in a general pardon. 
  
68 
 
Though the SSNP holds strong importance in its creed to the Syrian national character, 
it doesn’t alienate the Syrian nation from its surrounding: the other Arab nations. 
Furthermore, SSNP sees that natural Syria is part of the Arab world in which it holds a 
central and leadership importance. Nonetheless, it is significant to realize Syria’s 
distinguished nature among the other Arab Nations, which are the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Nile Valley, and West Arab Countries. Accordingly, the founder of the party called 
for a real Arabism, refusing fake Arabism, and for Arab cooperation against 
occupation, imperialism and retro localisms that contradict with Arabism. In this 
perspective, Sa’adeh states in an article that was published on the SSNP official 
website: 
 Those who believe that the Syrian Social Nationalist Party calls for abandoning 
the Arab issue, don’t understand the difference between the Syrian national and 
social rising and the Arab case; they are very disillusioned.  For they ignore the 
Arab nation personalities and impose theories over them.  
We are not going to compromise our status in the Arab world, nor our massage 
to the Arab world. However, what we want before anything else to be strong so 
that we can fulfil our massage. Syria should be strong with its social and 
national rising to be able to do her greater task. The complete ideology founded 
by the SSNP presents a full concept of how the national life should be. And the 
party would not want to keep this idea within Syria, it would like to spread it to 
the sister Arab nations through mutual cultural efforts, exchange of ideas, and 
working together, not through imposing those ideas. 
The party was trying to convey throughout Lebanon a message to create 
awareness that the whole Lebanese issue was created due to religious partial 
reasons to create a religious state. Still, the principles of the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party have founded the ground rules to eliminate the justifications 
for the Lebanese non-internationalism policy.  
The party sees that conventions and alliances with the Arab Nations is the best 
methodology to create cooperation within the Arab world to create an Arab 
Front that can withhold a considerable weight in the international politics. Yet, 
the principle of the national sovereignty should be protected in all contracts and 
agreements (Sa’adeh, 2007)31.  
 
This is how Sa’adeh defined the relationship between the Arab worlds and the Syrian 
nation. Sa’adeh saw that this ideology would bring together the different inhabitants of 
the Fertile Crescent; the inhabitants of Syria, regardless of being Arabs, Kurds, 
Phoenicians, Aramaic, Armenians, Muslim, Christians, who would come to coexist 
together in harmony. They are the outcome of a culture interaction through centuries of 
                                                          
31This quotation is published at SSNP official website. www.ssnp.net 
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coexistence, regardless of their religion or ethnicity. The right of people should be 
protected through law, social justice, and the separation between the state and religion. 
Sa’adeh called for a pure secular state. These calls were appealing to many Lebanese, 
including many in South Lebanon. This coincides with the SSNP call for fighting Israel 
and protecting Palestine and the Arab world from the Zionist and imperialist threat. 
The SSNP expressed strong national feelings toward Palestine and refused the Jewish 
immigration and the establishment of the Israeli State. In accordance with the party 
principles, Palestine was part of the Syrian nation. Hence, SSNP established a group of 
fighters in 1947 under the name ‘Al-Zaubaa Al- Hamraa’: the Red Tornado. This group 
was led by the SSNP Palestinian leader Mustafa Suleiman. It fought with the 
Palestinian uprising against the Israeli gangs until 1948. Moreover, the struggle against 
Israel did not stop. In 1974, another group under the name ‘Nusor Al-Zaubaa’: the 
Eagles of the Tornado, was established which fought the Israeli occupation in South 
Lebanon with FATEH, the Palestinian organization later in 1975. SSNP ended its 
operations in the South once the Lebanese Civil War started. During the Israeli 
occupation in Beirut in 1982, the SSNP executed one of the most important military 
oppressions, known as the Wimpy Oppression, in which several Israeli soldiers were 
shot by SSNP fighter Khaled ‘Olwan. ‘Wimpy Operation’ was considered as the 
inauguration to the resistance operations against Israel and forced it to withdraw from 
Beirut in 1982.  
SSNP was first known in Tyre in South Lebanon in 1936. Then, it spread to the rest of 
the South’s Area. Its offices were established in Beint Jubeil in 1938. According to 
Ayyob (2008), the SSPN’s ideology found its way to the South. It met with the South’s 
constant yarning for the union with Syria. Though, the SSNP faced a competition with 
the Socialist party, and other Arab ideological parties that prevailed in the area. It was 
notable how the Socialist Party was able to gain more support among the villagers of 
the South. Nonetheless, the two mentioned parties retreated in popularity among the 
people in 1950s and 1960s with the spread of the Baath Arab Socialist Party and the 
Arab National Movement in the region and Lebanon. The second reason for the retreat 
of the SSNP’s popularity was due to the support the party showed to President 
Shamoun and the Lebanese government in the 1958 revolution (p. 231). 
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4.4 The League of National Action, LNA 
The League of National Action (LNA) establishment was announced after a conference 
held in Lebanon on the first of August 1933. It was attended by advocates of Arabism, 
who believed in the sovereignty and independence of the Arabs, and their complete 
unity. Unity is sustained through the factors that constituted in forming nations, which 
are unity of history, traditions, language, hopes, and geography. The two goals 
sovereignty and independence were complementary, and none of them dominate the 
other.    
Though the league was affected with the Arab national movements all over the Arab 
region, its presence remained restricted to Syria and Lebanon. In Syrian it was active; 
however, after the Lebanese independence, LNA had undergone changes. It didn’t any 
longer promote for the establishment of an Arab state, LNA’s Lebanese branch shifted 
to accept Lebanon as an Arab country with its own separate entity. The members of the 
LNA hoped to create a Lebanese state, which would not be based on confession and 
religion. 
A number of movements and parties have started simultaneously in the 1930s as the 
Arab National Youth Organization. The most influential in Syria and Lebanon, 
according to Hourani (1968), was the League of National Action. The organization 
stood for independence and union with other Arab world, gathering the youth around 
its principles. They were not willing to accept any agreement with the west unless they 
renounce their imperialist designs. The organization was not of real significance 
outside Lebanon, neither in Syria, nor in any other part of the Arab world.  
With the outbreak of the Second World War, in 1939-1940, the party seized to 
function. The League activities were stopped along with several political parties in 
Lebanon due to French mandate authorities oppression during the Second World War. 
It was not until 1944 when LNA resumed its actions. Conversely, between the years 
1939-1940 seven political parties and organizations issued a joint statement that 
favoured a union of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, and expressed their 
approval of an Arab Federation in the future. But this proclamation was arranged with 
great secrecy. The Najjadah, Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, and the LNA were the 
most prominent parties in that time” (Ziadeh, 1968, p.201).  
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Since 1944 the LNA seized to exist, though it was the product of prominent group of 
intellectuals, who came back from Europe highly influenced by national ideologies that 
prevailed in Europe the 1930s. Ironically, the first establishment conference was held in 
Mount Lebanon in Qurnayil; though, no Lebanese members attended it back then. After 
the dismantling of the League its members were organized, joined or created new 
parties (Hanna, 1973). On the Other hand, El-Solh (2004) assures two points: (1) 
Qurnayil Conference was attended by participants from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and 
Iraq. (2) In the mist of declaring Lebanon by the pro French mandatory powers was not 
an Arab State, ‘Ali Nasr Al-Din as its leader, who is a Druze from Hammana in Mount 
Lebanon, who participated in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916 attended 
Qurnayil Summit. Then, Nasr Al-Din was arrested several times by the French mandate 
authorities. 
Regardless of ‘Abdulla Hana’s (1973) negative description of the League of National 
Action and his criticism of the League, he formed an understanding of its goals and 
principles. The league called for a definite Arab Unity, the independence of Arabs, and 
their ultimate sovereignty. It promoted for the nationalization of foreign businesses and 
investments in the Arab countries. According to Hana (1973), after the dismantlement 
of the League, three currents emerged from it. They expressed different economic 
orientations within the small bourgeoisie. The three currents were: first, the hope of 
developing into a bigger rate bourgeoisie. The second current is the socialist, which 
eventually meant the end of the small bourgeoisie. The third current is the nationalist 
current represented by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. It was faced with a rising 
current coinciding with the victory of Fascism and Nazism at the beginning of the 
Second World War, which is the Arab national current.  
Though the ideology of LNA was similar to other parties that spread in the South, it did 
not have an establishment there. Still, many of its members established parties like the 
Ba’ath and Arab National Movement and were heavily active in the South. It is notable 
the number of parties that was active in the South and Bilad Al-Sham, nonetheless, 
most of them almost sprung up from the same political ideology, except for the 
Phalanges. 
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4.5 The Phalanges32 
The Party was established in 1936, during the French mandate. On the other hand, it 
was not recognized as a legal organization until December 1943, after the Lebanese 
independence. It was a semi military organization; therefore the Lebanese law of July 
1943 that constitutes to dissolve such organizations was applied on it alhough this did 
not last more than three days, and the party was functioning again. The Phalanges did 
not become a political party until May 1952. The majority of its members are Maronite; 
though, in its constitution, it doesn’t discredit the ability of other sects to join it. Its 
members are of wide range of immigrant Lebanese in Northern and Southern America 
and West Africa, who provide it with a substantial financial support.  
The Party promotes for Lebanese Nationalism. It also demands that Lebanese identity 
should be a secular identity that respects all religions and believes, is humanitarian, and 
rejects isolation or any intruding powers. The Phalanges consider themselves as part of 
the Mediterranean countries and part of the Arab world; these two qualities make 
Lebanon unique as far as the party concerned. Lebanon has a unique message to the 
world, which can’t be fulfilled unless it kept its own characters, which means most of 
governmental jobs and Parliamentary seats are reserved for the Christians and if the 
Muslims refused to comply to those roles and wanted to object then the Christians have 
the right to seek foreign military aid, as it happened in 1860 and then again in 1958. 
Regardless of the number of people who joined the Phalanges, it spread in small 
numbers in Southern Muslim villages, no matter what the sects of the inhabitants were. 
Basically, the party spread mostly among the Maronite and the Catholics in the South. 
Though, it is notable here that those villages also witnessed the flourishing of national 
and Arab parties in them. Its ideology in general was strange to the Southerners, who 
were more of Arab Nationalists, Syrian Nationalist, or Communists. The Phalanges’ 
quarter was in ‘Ein Eble, a Catholic and Maronite village in the South. Nonetheless, 
Southerners who got to join the party were mostly residing in Beirut, especially those 
who lived in Burj Hamod quarter (Ayyob, 2008).  
Though the Phalanges were present in the South, they did not have a considerable 
effect even within the Christian villages. This is due to several reasons: First, it was not 
the only dominant party in those villages because the National parties were of greater 
                                                          
32The Phalanges is the party known as Al-Kataeb in Arabic. 
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influence. The Phalanges were a minority in the South, which was not involved in the 
Lebanese Civil War. The third reason is related to the regional political situation: The 
South was more involved in the fight with Israel next to Fedayeen. The area was in 
constant conflict with Israel. It was first invaded by the Israeli, in 1972 who then 
retreated. This was followed by the 1978 invasion ‘Litany Oppression’ and the 
occupation of the area till the Litany River. Afterwards, Lebanon was invaded in 1982. 
The Israeli withdrew to Litany River line in 1985 and the South remained under 
occupation until the year 2000. The Phalanges, who were a minority in the South, were 
major players on the ground during the Lebanese Civil War. Since the South was 
involved in its own struggle, the Lebanese Civil War did not spread to the South. 
Furthermore, it was clear that the Israelis favoured the cooperation with the Lebanese 
Southern Army, led by Sa’ed Hadad since 1978. They even supported the declaration 
of the establishment of the state of Southern Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. 
Moreover, the Palestinian revolution fighters, supported by the leftist Lebanese parties, 
were active in the South resisting Israeli occupation. The Lebanese left wing consisted 
of national and transnational parties which were in conflict with the Phalanges and 
other right wing Lebanese during the civil war. Nonetheless, the Phalanges were mostly 
Maronites, whose demographic presence was concentrated in Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon. 
 
4.6 Al-Talae’ Party 
Al-Talae’ was established in 1944, which believed in the establishment of Lebanon as 
an independent state and in cooperation with other Arab states. Nevertheless, according 
to Ayyob (2008), the party was labelled as a Shiite constructed party. Rashid Baydon, 
the founder of the party, was elected to the Lebanese Parliament in 1937. The party was 
established with the aim to improve the social and political situation of the common 
people. Although the Party was intended to weaken the traditional leadership in the 
South, it was highly promoted there and many people joined it. It sought to protect the 
farmers’ interests, and their rights in their own lands. The party was dismantled after 
five years. However, it enriched the disciplinary experience of the Southerners, its 
members were disciplined and organized. They played sports and took care of their 
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physical appearance and worked hard on educating themselves. They even bought law 
books, especially about Lebanon.  
According to Qobaissi (2005), the Lebanese government represented by the president, 
whether it was Bechara Al-Khoury or Camille Shamoun, would ally with the strongest 
Shiite in the parliament, which was one of the two Al-Assad or Hamadah. In order to 
be in a stronger position, Baydon established Al-Talae’ Party. It was notable how quick 
the young Shiite men and women were to join the party. Qobaissi (2005) describes the 
number of crowds, who were organized and uniformed and formed a sweeping army 
with its own band and flags. The government saw threats with this organization; 
therefore, Al-Assad was persuaded to form another Shiite party to confront Al-Talae’, 
which was Al-Nahdda. The two parties members came into conflict, fought with arms, 
and there were many casualties. This forced the government to interfere and cancel the 
parties’ licenses. Hence, the Shiite threat as a rising power in Lebanon was ended in the 
sixties and Baydon lost the elections in favor of Abed Al-Majeed Al-Zein in 1968 
elections in Beirut. 
 
4.7 Al-Nahddah Party  
It was established by Ahmad Al-Ass’ad in 1944. Its establishment, according to several 
people in the South, came as a contrary response to the establishment of Al-Talae’ 
(Ayyob, 2008, Qubaisi, 2005). The party entered the villages of the South with the men 
who were known as the supporters of Al-Ass’ad. Therefore, the party did not really 
spread among the majority who were farmers and low social class people and 
supporters of Al-Talae’. Yet, the last two parties soon dissolved. They were associated 
with the political leaders that founded them, Al-Nahddah by Ahmad Al-Ass’ad and Al-
Tala’eh by Rashid Baydon. The people inclined towards one party rather than the other 
depending on the ideologies and the practices the party conveyed. Ayyob (2008) 
reveales in her study the social, economic, and political life of the Southern town 
Einata, which is located in Bint Jubeil Casa. In her study, she reveals that Al-Nahddah 
was of limited effect among the people, while Al-Tala’eh was very influential because 
it dealt with the people’s problems and concerns. They dealt with issues related to 
livelihood, legal, and economic conditions in the South. Al-Tala’eh party was also 
concerned with the Palestinian issue and fought against Al-Nahddah members’ 
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attempts to smuggle cattles and small heard of cows to Palestine (Ayyob, 2008, pp. 
222- 252). It was known back then that cattle and eggs were smuggled to the Zionist 
settlements in particular. In the same context, Ayyob (2008) explains the social and 
political role of the parties and the effect each one of them had on the community in 
Einatan, in specific, and the South, in general. 
 
4.8 The Arab Renaissance Socialist Party- Al-Baath, ARSP 
The 1940s have witnessed the birth of several parties that this study is going to enquire. 
One of these parties was the Arab Baath Party, which was established by Michel Aflaq 
and Salah Al-Bitar in 1943. In the beginning, the Party started as a national movement 
in Syria in 1932, when its leaders came back from Paris to Damascus. Both men 
descend from the middle educated class.  The movement was highly promoted in Iraq, 
where both Bitar and Aflaq were able to start a gathering with the Marxist in 1934. 
They issued their own magazine Attali’ah (Avant-Gard), and they characterized 
themselves as the Group of the Arab Resurrection.  
The Arab Resurrection, or Renaissance, Party (ARP) was first established in Syria in 
1947 and issued its magazine Al-Baath. The Party’s main goal was confronting the 
French interference in the region and promoting for Arab nationalism. ARP became 
active in several Arab countries. Among them were Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and 
Yemen. This popularity of the Party in Iraq explains the return of many Southern 
Lebanese from Al-Najaf in Iraq as members in the Baath Party. Among them were the 
sons of distinguished religious families, such as Al-Amin and Sharaf Al-Din.  
The second part is the Socialist Arab Party (SAP). It was established by Akram Al-
Hourani who was the Minister of Defence in Syria. As a Minister, Hourani always 
supported the Communists in the parliament. Hourani was not newly active in the 
political parties; he joined along with his father in the youth club. He was also 
influenced by the Syrian Nationalist Socialist’s secular principles and joined it in1936 
when he was a student in Beirut (Hanna, 2016). In 1950, Akram Hourani got the 
permission to establish the Arab Socialist Party. Its main quarter was in Hama in Syria. 
Hourani promoted social justice and provoked the peasants against the Feudal Lords in 
Syria. His campaign reached its peak in 1951 during Aleppo convention. It was during 
the rule of Shishakli, the Syrian President. When Hourani escaped to Lebanon with a 
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group of his comrades, he met with Bitar and Aflaq, who both escaped Shishakli’s 
persecution. In 1953, the three men decided to join efforts and merge the two parties to 
become the Arab Renaissance Socialist Party, (ARSP). ARSP formed a strong front of 
school teachers, peasants, and intellectuals in the face of Shishakli and the Muslim 
Brotherhood party. 
Baath is an Arabic word, which means resurrection. It symbolized the resurrection of 
the Arab Nationalism; a concept that was not new in the 1940s. ARSP’s ideology was 
the outcome of intellectuals’ efforts to organize the youth in the liberation movement of 
the Arab region, and to create a national unity based on ideology rather than religion. 
The party emphasized on the importance of the Arabic language and culture as a 
unifying ideology for the people of the region no matter what their religion was. The 
party called for the revival of the Arab culture in the sense of language, history, 
geography, and several other factors. In its ideology, the party regards religion, whether 
it was Islam or Christianity as a unifying power and a base of regional collective 
culture. 
ARSP extended from Syria to Lebanon. Then, South Lebanon received the Baath’s 
ideas and slogans. It called for a one united Arab nation with an immortal message. 
Unity, freedom, and socialism were its basic slogans. In 1951, the party established its 
first cell in Bleda; a town in Marjeon Casa. Afterwards, its partisans and members 
spread to Bint Jubeil in 1952. In the same year the party spread in Tyre and in 
particular in Al-Ja’fariah School. According to Ayyob (2008), one of the reasons that 
led to the popularity of Al-Baath and the retreat of the Communist Party in many 
villages in the South was the decision the Communist Party took in supporting the UN 
resolution which called for the partition of Palestine in 1947. The Communist party 
took its decision in accordance with the Soviet Union’s decision back then. Therefore, 
the Baath gained the Southerners’ trust by supporting the Palestinian cause and refuting 
the Partition of Palestine. In addition, the Baath’s members were very organized and 
their leaders paid regular visits to its members in the South. Social conditions have 
played important role in gathering partisans around the Baath in the fifties. The Party 
was newly born and its ideology held enormous consideration to the disadvantaged 
groups of farmers. This was due to two reasons: first, the majority of the people was 
peasants looking forward to the change that would result from facing the feudal lords’ 
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oppression and exploitation. Second, people had high hopes in improving their social 
and economic conditions after the long duration of negligence and deprivation they 
suffered from the consecutive Lebanese governments.  
Actually, the hopes the Baath held were very high. The dream of the Arab union 
reached its peak with the declaration of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. It 
was clear to the Southerners that they were about to reach the dream of becoming part 
of the Arab State they were looking for since the Arab Revolution led by Sharif 
Hussein in 1916. Then again, after the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria in 
1961, there was a division inside the party in 1962. Many of its leaders withdrew from 
it. The division and its effects were described by Ayyob (2008), in particular, in the 
village of Einata. However, the division consequences reached the town, after the coup 
in Syria in 1966. Most of the Baath leaders in Einata were in favour of the new 
leadership in Syria even in 1970. Still, a small minority favoured the old leadership in 
Iraq. On the other hand, other members departed the party to join other parties, such as 
the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, and the Palestinian 
organizations, Al-Sa’eqa in particular, which was affiliated with the Syrian government 
since 1970. Consequently, Hassan Fadlullah, a Southernern, who was a member in 
Baath party in Tyro, explained his and his comrades’ great disappointment, which they 
felt after the disassociation of the UAR. He expressed: “The disappointment was 
shocking. I don’t believe in what is called Arab unity anymore. As a result of the 
disassociation, I joined the Iraqi section of the party because the Syrians let us down 
(2016)”. It is essential to explain here that one of the promoters for the union between 
Syria and Egypt was Akram Al-Hourani, who later on opposed the union and described 
it as an Egyptian occupation to Syria.   
During the Lebanese Civil War, the Iraqi part of ARSP joined the National Lebanese 
Movement under the leadership of Kamal Junblat, the head of the Progressive National 
Party, besides many other leftist parties such as the Communist Party, the Progressive 
Nationalist Party, the Communist Action Organization, Al- Murabiton, the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party, and the Syrian part of ARSP. Nonetheless, the latter withdrew 
from the Lebanese National Movement due to differences that arose between the 
Movement and the Syrian Leadership. This branch of ARSP participated in the fight 
against Israel under the leadership of the Arab Liberation Front; the Palestinian section 
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of ARSP associated with Iraq. The Iraqi branch of ARSP was legalized in Lebanon 
after the end of the Lebanese Civil War as Hisb Tale’aht Al-Lubnani Al-Arabi Al- 
Ishtiraki; the Lebanese Vanguard Arab Socialist Party. 
 
4.9 The National Arab Movement 
The National Arab Movement was one of the most influential movements, not only in 
the South but also in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world as well in 1950s and 
1960s. It is a movement that swept over the whole Arab region and emphasized on 
Arab unity as a mean to free Palestine. The movement could only see the possibility of 
freeing Palestine from the Zionist occupation as a joined Arab duty and efforts.  The 
nuclear movement of the National Arab Movement started simultaneously in Jordan 
and Lebanon. George Habash, the founder of the movement, wanted it as a movement 
not as a political party because he considered that the movement can contain the whole 
Arab Nation. In that sense, it was a movement that confronted the Zionist Project in the 
area. The response to the Arab National Movement began in the Palestinian Camps. It 
then spread to the intellectuals’ milieus; most of the NAM members were AUB 
students. Since NAM was an organized movement, it was highly organized on the 
leadership level. Yet, on the popular level there were popular leaders such as Wade’e 
Hadad on the Arab National level and Muhammad Al-Ziat in Tyre-Lebanon. The 
Movement was meant to include beside its members a wide variety of clubs and 
associations. 
The formation of the Arab National Movement was interrelated with previous 
movements. As it was mentioned before, the members of the dissolved parties or 
members, who withdrew from parties, came to establish other parties. It was a 
continuous movement. For instance, the Arab Redemption Corps was formed in a 
meeting that aimed to unite three nationalist young Fedayeen groups. The first one was 
Beirut Group led by George Habash and Hani Al-Hindi and it included a group of 
activists in Jamiyat Al-‘Aurwa Al-Wothqa [the Strong Bond Association](SBA). The 
group consisted of a group of AUB students. The second group was the Syrian Group 
that was led by Jihad Ddahi, a law student in the Syrian University. The group 
members were also students of the Syrian University. The third group was the Egyptian 
group. It was led by two Egyptian Fedayeen Hussein Tawfiq and ‘Abed Al-Qader 
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‘Amer, the grandson of Ahmad ‘Aurabi. The last group included political Egyptian 
refugees in Damascus and a group of Palestinian, Iraqis, and Syrian Youth. In Lebanon, 
according to Barout (1997), SBA is a group of activist who were students at AUB. The 
Association was established in 1936, and issued its monthly edition, Al-‘Aourwa [the 
Bond]. The magazine was edited by a group of Arab students at AUB, and was 
supervised by one of their teachers. One of the most important of those teachers was 
Qustantin Zrieq33.The movement affected and influenced other Arab thinkers through 
opening dialogue and discussion groups with a group of elites, such as Micheal Aflaq, 
Sate’e Al-Hussari, and Kathem El-Sulh. After Al-Nakba in 1948, SBA was established 
as a military group to face the Zionist danger. 
The first convention of NAM was held in Amman in 1965, and the most distinguished 
people who attended were Mohsen Ibrahim, Muhammad Al-Ziat, Alhakam Daroaza, 
Adnan Faraj, Thabet Mahaini, and Mustafa Baydon.   
 
4.10 Syrian Unity Party, Hizb Al-Wahdaal_Suriyya 
According to Jurdi Abissab & Abissab (2014), Syrian Unity Party (SUP) was advanced 
by the Southerners because it called for unity with Syria, they explain: 
[SUP is] a political organization that emerged in 1935, attracted clerics and 
leading scholars such as Rida Zahir, Ahmad ‘Arif Al-zein. It emphasized on the 
cultural and economic links between the South and Syria in opposition to the 
Lebanese Unity party (Hizb Al-Wahda Al- Lubnaniyya), which promoted 
Libanism and defended the polity of Grand Liban (p.20). 
 
Ayyob (2008) in her turn stresses on the same issue, the Arab Unity and the people’s 
supportive attitude towards it. Accordingly, the Southerners supported the call for Arab 
Unity for all the mini states the French established. The unity slogan was raised, 
basically by the Syrian National Bloc at the beginning of the thirties of the last century, 
and supported by the national forces in Lebanon. The French Mandate authorities took 
extreme measurements against the supporters of the unity, especially in the area of Bint 
Jubeil. The people expressed their resentment for the French written identity cards that 
were given to them, which forced the mandate authority to redistribute IDs written in 
                                                          
33He is one of the most important professors and consultants of the Arab National thinkers at the end of the 1930s 
and the beginning of 1940s. In 1939, he published his book “the National Awake”. Soon after the publication, 
dialogue circuits addressed the Arab national awareness all over the Arab cities. He also was the first to use the term 
Al-Nakba and called for fighting Zionism through building a united, strong, progressive Arab State. 
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both languages Arabic and French. In this atmosphere, the Southerners joined SUP in 
Bint Jubeil in 1935. The party was supported by Sayyed Sadr Din Fadlullah, a 
distinguished religious figure in the South, who participated in all conferences related 
to unity with Syria and supported the Palestinian cause. Sadr Din Fadlullah is a Marja’ 
in South Lebanon and there are Makrumat (honourable and supernatural deeds) related 
to him. He was also the first Marja’ to issue a Fatwa in which he discriminated selling 
lands to the Jews and the Jewish Agency in Lebanon and Palestine. His Fatwa directed 
people’s attention to the risks Jewish Agency and its collaborating Southerner and 
Palestinian agents brought to the region.  It was the party members in the South who 
demonstrated against two main issues: the first was against the declaration of the 
mandate authority to nominate Bahig Al-Fadel, instead of Abd Latif Al-Ass’ad, and 
refuted him. In this respect, people still recite until today the two verses of poetry that 
were recited in 1935: 
Pechkoff inform your government, our Sultan is Abdllatif 
Paris is our horse stud, and our bullets passed Geneva [in the meaning that 
voters’ bullets in the South will reach Geneva and beyond it]. 
 
The second issue was the declaration of monopolizing the Tobacco trade and farming 
by the French authority. This issue in particular started the revolution on the second of 
April 1936. However, after signing the Franco- Lebanese Treaty on November 13th 
1936, the population in the South retired on their demands especially about the Unity 
with Syria. This attitude came as a result to the oppression enforced by the French 
authority and the South State’s Men who were in support now of the separated 
Lebanese State from Syria and the rest of Bilad Al-Sham. SUP members, as well as 
other parties’ members, were followed and persecuted, especially during the Years of 
the Second World War. Hourani (1968) explains the reasons behind the 1936 
revolution, which started in Syria and extended to Lebanon: 
At the end of 1935 nationalist feelings in Syria came once more to a head. This 
was due not so much to internal events as the general unrest in the Easter 
Mediterranean, arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian34 war; this unrest appeared 
                                                          
34The Second Italo-Abyssinian War was Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, a process it began after the 1885 Partition of 
Africa. Italy was defeated in its first attempt at conquest at the battle of Adwa in 1896, allowing Ethiopia to become 
the only African nation to remain free of European control. 
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also in Palestine and in Egypt, where it led to the signature of the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, a measure which stimulated the demand for the conclusion of 
similar treaty between Syria and France. The immediate occasion of the 
outburst was the death at the end of 1935 of Ibrahim Hananu, the leader of the 
National Bloc. At his funeral, incendiary speeches were made; and in the first 
days of 1936 a general strike broke out in Damascus in protest against the 
failure of the French Government to grant Syria her independence. The strike 
spread rapidly to towns and soon took on an organized character. It was directed 
by the National Bloc, which issued a ‘National Pact’ demanding independence, 
equality of rights between members of all sects, national unity and co-operation 
with nationalist movements in other Arab countries, and risingof social, 
economic, moral and cultural standers among all classes, as well as the 
abandonment of the policy of Belford Declaration in Palestine (p. 199). 
 
4.11 Communist Action Organization in Lebanon (OACL)  
As it was noted before, many of the political leaders and parties’ members came from 
other parties that attraction have faded among its followers, due to regional or political 
change of concept. The OACL is one of those examples; it was established by different 
founders who came from different political parties. OACL came to exist in 1970. It is 
the result of the unity of two organizations. The first was Lebanon the Socialist, a 
Marxist oriented movement, it was found in 1965, its members, Fawwaz Traboulsi, 
Waddah Shrerrah, and Ahmad Baydon were active members in the ARSP. This group 
was known to public in 1968 when they started a series of demonstrations against the 
Israeli air-ride on the Lebanese airport. It was notable how this ride temporary diverted 
the attention of the group for claims of social justice to concentrate national political 
issues. The main partner of the organization was leftist members of the ANM, mainly 
Muhsin Ibrahim and Muhamad Kashli. The two were the founders of the Lebanese 
Socialist Organization (LSO) which was found in 1968 and before that they were in the 
ANM.  In 1970, the two organizations emerged to form the Communist Action 
Organization in Lebanon. The chief meeting of the parties took place after the riots of 
23-24 of April in the same year, when the Lebanese government took the initiative to 
embargo the Palestinian Fedayeen action and terminate it. Accordingly, the main goal 
of OACL was trying to create committees to support the Fedayeen in their liberation 
movement. It also considered that the troubles of 1970 in Jordan and afterwards the 
engagement with the Lebanese Army have resulted in frustrations, which considered 
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that the retreat of the Palestinian Revolutionary role caused the defeat of the new 
revolutionary powers (Taqi Al-Din, 2013). 
Muhsin Ibrahim along with George Hawi released the Front of the Lebanese National 
Resistance after the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982.  
 
4.12 Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniah [The Lebanese Resistance 
Regiments Movement] (AML)  
AML Movement was associated with the coming of Imam Moussa Sadr, who came to 
Lebanon for the first time visiting in 1955. He was welcomed by Sayyed Hussein 
Sharaf Al-Din. The second visit was in 1957. He finally came back in 1960 and resided 
in the South. Sadr is a clergy man who was invited from Qom in Iran to come to Tyre 
in South Lebanon to fill the void as a Marja’ (Shiite Clergy) after the dearth of Said 
Hussein Sharraf Al-Din in 1957. When he first came to the Tyre he started establishing 
Charity associations that worked with people on the ground. He started women’s role 
awareness programs and illiteracy courses. His main concern was revolving around 
social, political, and religion issues (Muhamad, 2016). 
In 1966, Sadar held a conference in which he clarified the rationales for organizing the 
Shiite sect. After many studies, consultations and an intense movement the Parliament 
asserted the law for establishing the Islamic Shiite Supreme Cancel on December 16, 
1967, and Sadr was elected as the President of the Cancel on May 29, 1969. Actually, 
Sadr movement in the early years was not very acceptable. The traditional politicians 
saw in him a competitive to the Parliament, while the people were in a different 
political mode from Shiite confessional one. The political parties were active and at 
their peak, the involvement with the Fedayeen operations from the South gained every 
house’s attention, they gathered the South’s, young men and women, to fight for 
Palestine and defend the South from the Israeli attacks as well.  
In 1970, Sadr established the South Support Association [Hayyat Nasrat Al-Janub]. He 
was the president of the association and Bishop Antonius Khress was the Vis President. 
As a result, thousands of people gathered in support of the South against the Israeli 
attacks, and consequently, the South Cancel was established in 1970 (Hijazi, 2013, 
p.150). In 1974, Sadr started the Disinherited Movement, which called the Lebanese 
government institutions to hold its responsibilities towards the disadvantaged 
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Southerners. At that point, when Sadr called his followers to gather around in Baalbek 
square, his call was answered by one hundred thousand people. This was a direct 
allusion that he has become the absolute leader of the Shiite sect (Badawi, 2015). It is 
true that Sadr has gained popularity among not only the Shiite in Lebanon, but also 
among the other sects. However, how much this affects the South remains to be 
discussed. In many tales of the South, Sadr was considered to have betrayed the South 
because he left to Beirut once the High Shiite Council was established though the 
people needed him more to face the disturbances they had to face with Fatah, and its 
fighters, who crossed all the red lines. The Southerners said: “He abandoned us!” 
In 1975, following an explosion in one of the Palestinian training camps, in which 35 
men were dead and over a hundred injured. Badawi (2015) interprets that most of the 
casualties were from the Shiite. For that reason, Sadr had to declare the establishment 
of AML which is an abbreviation for Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniah [the 
Regiments of the Lebanese Resistance]. The word Aml means in Arabic: the hope. 
Sader declared that Amal was found as a trained regiment to fight the Israeli in South 
Lebanon and defend its land.  
In August 1978, Sadr went on a tour that included several countries in Africa. He was 
received in Libya. However, he disappeared there. After his disappearance, AML 
witnessed three splits. The first was, AML main branch, which was led in 1980 by 
Nabeh Berri (the head of the parliament), and still is until today. The main brunch of 
AML refused to make commitments with the Iranian revolution or to embrace wilayat 
alfaqih.  
The second group split from AML was in 1982. It was religiously tied to Iran and 
accepted Wilayat Alfaqih after the victory the Islamic revolution in Iran was 
accomplished.  It was under called AML Al-Muemenah [AML the believer]; it was led 
by Hussein Al-Mussawi. The second group was under the name Afwaj Al-Muqawamah 
Al-Muemenah [the Regiments of the Believers Resistance] under the leadership of 
Mustafa Dirrani. The first two groups were joined together and formed Hezbollah in 
1985 under the leadership of Sheik Subhi Al-Tuffaili. After Al-Orqob fights between 
Aml and Hezbollah, Tuffaili steped aside and Sayyed Abbas Al-Mussawi was elected 
as the leader. Al-Mussawi was assassinated on February 1986 by an Israeli commandos 
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operation. Al-Mussawi was succeeded by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and still is until 
today. Finally, in 2006, Afwajn Al-Muqawamah Al-Muemenah joined Hezbollah. 
 
4. 13 Political Parties’ Contradictions and Criticisms 
Lebanon was a stage for a wide diversity of the political parties. Since the 1930s, many 
political parties were established. There were right wing parties and left wing parties. 
The right wing parties were mostly Maronite oriented parties that called for the 
separation of Lebanon from the Arab world. The left wing parties were the secular 
parties, which called for two main identities for Lebanon: the first one is the Syrian 
nationalist, and the second one is the Arab nationalist. Among the most popular parties 
was the Communist Party. It began as one party in Syria and Lebanon, in 1924, thought 
it has aimed to be linked to universal causes, the Communist party had to adapt into an 
Arab environment in Lebanon. Although there were different parties in Lebanon that 
called for unity with Syria, the only parties that found its way to the South are the listed 
ones in the top. El-Solh (2004) describes how LNA promoted for the unity of the 
Syrian, especially the unity of the rest of the Syrian regions that were separated from 
Syria to create the Grand Lebanon. Mount Lebanon was not within the equation; it was 
a separated sanjaq and was not included in the demands for Syrian Unity. The aim was 
to create an Arab state rather than a Grand Syrian State. The LNA ideology on this 
particular matter came into conflict with the Syrian Nationalist Party (SNP) that 
promoted for the Bilad Al-Sham which included Syrian, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, 
Iraq, and Kuwait. Nonetheless, SNP, or SSNP had partisans in the South but LNA did 
not. 
The South, unlike most of Mount Lebanon, entered the era of independence loaded 
with contradicting ideologies about the nature of the Lebanese political system. For 
most of the people, the Lebanese citizenship was not enough to define their identity. 
The Southerners in particular embraced the belief that they were Arabs and the South 
should be part of an Arab State. On the other hand, though the political parties which 
we have seen embraced ideologies the Southerners shared with, they had many 
contradictions and struggles amongst them. ‘Akel (2004-2005) wrote about the attitude 
of the political parties, in particular the SSNP towards two main parties which are the 
Communist Party and the Lebanese Unity Party (LUP), which was established in 1936 
  
85 
 
by Tawfiq Lutof and ‘Allaa ‘Awad. The LUP called for the unity of the Lebanese 
territories as we know it today.  At the end of 1937, Pier Al-Jmael established the 
Phalanges Organization. It aimed to create a Lebanese nation that is able to realize its 
duties and rights as a complete independent state. Conversely, the Phalanges insisted on 
Lebanon’s need to cooperate and ally with France. The Phalange Party was publishing 
and promoting for its ideas in a Jesuit supervised newspapers. In a response to the ideas 
promoted by the Phalanges, Al-Najjadah Party was established in 1937. Al-Najjadah 
was the contradictory to Phalanges. Its aim was to unite the youth to join forces with 
other Arab youth to enable Lebanon to be a stronger state joined in a confederation 
with other Arab State. The SSNP refuted these ideas and considered the socialist-
communist to be arbitraries who mastered the art of cheating and lost all sense of 
Nationalism and personal dignity. On another level, Al-Nahddah described Al-Najjadah 
to be a sectarian political party and that its newspaper Beirut was established to defend 
the rights of the Muslims in a Christian state. Al-Nahddah also considered the Lebanese 
Phalanges to be a sectarian party that was established with the encouragement of the 
Maronite clergy to support and promote for certain personals and to fight the SSNP. Al-
Najaddah directed the same accusations to Lebanese Unity Party (‘Akel, p.132-133).  
Amen Al-Siba’y (1970) presents this in a book, in the form of group of articles, which 
are interviews with the orientation of the political Lebanese party leaders towards 1970. 
The book represents the political attitude in relation to the people’s political orientation. 
This point was explained earlier in relation to the Southerners attitude towards the 
Communist party’s popularity in 1948, when this popularity retreated in favour of the 
Ba’ath and ANM when the Communist encompassed with the USSR and supported the 
declaration of the Israel State in Palestine. However, in 1968, the Communist party 
shifted ideology on the question of Arab nationalism, which was a land mark in the 
party’s history (Jurdi Abisaab & Abissab, 2014). Mahdi ‘Amel wrote criticizing the 
Lebanese Communist Party for failing to be up to the needs of the masses because 
isolated itself by withdrawing from the right national path, and from the nationalist 
popular masses, the Communist Party was unable to play its role in leading the national 
struggle of these masses (as cited in Jurdi Abissab &Abisaab, 2014). 
There was a wide diversity of parties if compared to the total number of population in 
Lebanon and the South. Even each party has at least one representative in the 
  
86 
 
parliament. Al-Siba’y (1970) explains this fact in a sarcastic norm in his introduction of 
his book The Lebanese Parties facing 1970: “Lebanese parties are similar to Lebanese 
trade. It is a ‘supermarket’ to all parties’ goods in the region and the world.” (as cited in 
Al-Siba’y, 1970, p. 34). However, this idea explains the difficulties related to create a 
Lebanese identity separated from its surrounding because the parties had brunches or 
were ideologically connected in different parts of Arab region. In principle, the right 
wing parties agreed on issues such as preventing Fedayeen operations through Al-
‘Orqob area in South Lebanon and described the Palestinian attacks on Israel as to be 
dangerous to Lebanon and to the South. On the other hand, the left wing parties were 
calling for the support of the Fedayeen and the armed Palestinian resistance operations 
against Israel. Actually, the division of the parties among each other as internal, 
external, and regional were of the main reasons that caused the split between the two 
wings and two political orientations which eventually ignited the Lebanese Civil War 
in 1975. Al-Siba’y (1970) described the Parties as folk parties: local, national, 
international (or foreign).  He sees that the positive benefits derived from the diversity 
of the parties were in keeping the country safe from the dominance of a certain cult or 
group over the others. The leftist parties’ attitudes were summed-up in an interview 
with Kamal Junblat, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in 1970, Junblat 
believed:  
PSP pursued a liberal methodology in the Arab political and national level. He 
[Junblat] insisted that there should not be any reservations or hesitations 
towards supporting the liberation movements. There should be a call to 
eliminate all foreign military bases in the Arab countries and establishing a 
Common Arab Market (Al-Siba’y, 1970, p. 34). 
 
Besides, Junblat realized that there is a need to advocate a certain amount of oil 
revenues to improve the defence system and executing developmental projects in the 
Arab region. The PSP has also confirmed the demands for initiating compulsory 
recruitment in Lebanon to support the South against the Israeli attacks, and the 
Fedayeen operations from the South and not to impede them. Junblat was later on the 
head of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which presented the Left in Lebanon 
and faced the Right which represented the right Maronite wing in the Civil Lebanese 
War in 1975. Actually, LNM was consistent of fifteen parties, among them were: the 
PSP of Kamal Jumblat, SSNP, LCP, the Communist Action in Lebanon Organization 
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of Mohsen Ibrahim, the Baʿth Party of Abdul Majid Rafei, the Independent Nasserite 
Movement of Ibrahim Koleilat, the Union of Nasserite Forces, the Lebanese Fatah 
Support Movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party Organization, the Arab Socialist 
Union, the Arab Socialist Organization, the Christian Patriots Front of Suleiman 
Franjieh, the Socialist Action Party of Hussein Hamdan, and the Union of the Forces of 
the Working People. Many Southerners of those who lived in Beirut joined these 
parties. On this issue elaborates Hassan Fadlullah, who started to believe in slogans’ 
Hisbu Al-Ba’eth (ARSP) has risen and in its message, the Arabs should be one united 
nation like all the nations in the advanced world, such as France, Germany, Italy, 
China, and all the worlds that found leaders to fight for the unity of their nations and 
fought to achieve it. Secondly, the Arabs should fight for their freedom from the 
occupation and achieve independence. Finally, they should seek for a just system, 
similar to the socialist countries, and accomplish equal opportunities and social justice. 
It was July 1951, when Fadlullah went to attend with his friend Nabih Berrry [the head 
of the parliament from 1992 till now] and a group of students from Sidon to attend a 
public festival in Al-Maqassed school yard. For the first time he saw the Arabic flags 
everywhere, it was an over whelming feelings for him. We can go on describing the 
engagement with the session of actions that hit Lebanon and the Arab regions, from the 
1953 demonstrations against Bshara Al-Khouri. 1953 was the year of political action 
starting in which the call for Arab Nationalism among the Southerners has begun. 
Fudlullah recalled in his memoirs that he was telling the story of generations in the 
South. In 1954, the students and wide range of riots filled the air against Shamoun and 
Baghdad Pact.  
One of the major actions that happened was in the years 1954-1955. In these years, a 
military trainer, Hassib, came to Al-Qulaila and was trained with Lebanese Army. He 
was responsible for training the youth on arms in Sidon and Tyre. The youth looked up 
to him and thoroughly followed his directions and training. Consequently, the serious 
military training started, and with it came the dream of liberating Palestine. Ali Zayyat, 
Kamel Faraj, and Munif Faraj illustrated, about the interviews, of the military training 
in the South, which started in 1954. The South before that was free of weapons. The 
Southerners were attacked several times and were subjected to the attacks of the Israeli 
gangs. Furthermore, they asserted about the importance of Muhammad Al-Zayyat as a 
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political figure in the Arab National Movement in the South in general and in Tyre in 
particular. Al-Zayyat was a football player. He and others founded a football team in 
Al-Jafariah school, which consisted of many young men from all sects in the South. 
The idea was to bring the youth together through sports and start political awareness 
programs.  
Fadlullah, on the other hand, declared the importance of many political parties that 
were active in the South, such as ANM, ASNP, ARSP, and the dean of the whole 
parties in the South, the Communist Party. He also emphasized on the role of parties, 
military training, the preparation for the revolution on Baghdad Pact, Shamoun, and the 
smuggling of arms and military training in Syria. Furthermore, Sharaf Al-Din (2014) 
asserts that the two most important parties in the South in the early fifties were ANM 
and ARSP  
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Chapter Five 
Political Orientation 
 
5.1 Introduction to Arab National movement 
The years of the 1930s were an active era in the Arab region and the South. The youth 
were discontent with both their foreign masters and with their older generation. This is 
how Hourani (1968) explained the situation during 1930s in Syria and Lebanon. The 
youth were torn between the attraction of western ideologies, and the suppression they 
suffered with the foreign occupation. They were active in two domains during that 
period. One domain is concerned with the national resistance against mandate, 
sometimes in a paramilitary form, but this doesn’t necessary mean that they were 
fascist. The second domain reflected their activity in the voluntary organizations that 
expressed their need to be organized and their hunger to social justice. Hourani (1968) 
considered the political parties as organizations that the youth were attracted to. The 
youth were, firstly, attracted to those parties as an expression of their need to shift away 
from traditional familial, tribal, and religious leadership of the society. Secondly, it was 
the need for free Arab States from occupation, the call for Arab national unity, ending 
the Zionist immigration to Palestine, and the need of more opportunities for the 
intellectual youth and social justice. These needs swept over many major and minor 
cities in the region including Lebanon and its South. Actually, Lebanon and Syria were 
considered as the main birth place for Arab national movements and parties. 
Accordingly, Taha (2006) explains that the political parties were not active in Lebanon 
until the dawn of the twentieth century. Hisbu Alfatat (Girl Party) was the first 
established after the Turkish coup in 1908. The party promoted the supremacy of the 
Turkish nationalism. As a response, the Arab intellectuals and youth, who were still 
under the Ottoman occupation, started an Arab nationalist movement among the 
Muslims of Syria. They met the Christian movement that called for Arab Union, based 
on common heritage and language, which are to be considered as the basics in any 
national unity. A new association was established, Al-Arabia Alfatat (the Arab Girl), in 
1912. In the beginning, the association called for decentralization of the Arab States 
under the Ottoman ruling. Another movement or party was established in Egypt in 
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parallel to the movement in Syria. It was active and in accordance with the Syrian 
ideologies and demands. It was named as Decentralization Party. It consisted of a 
joined group of, both, Muslim and Christian intellectuals (Taha, 2006, p.47). Indeed, it 
was the revival of the Turkish nationalism that gave space for the revival of Arab 
nationalism. Subsequently, they called for independence from the Turkish occupation. 
Actually, the immediate response to Hisb Alfatat by creating Al-Arabia Al-Fatat 
Association [the Arab Girl Association] exposed that the Muslims in the Arab countries 
were freed from the heavy burden that was imposed on them by the Ottomans under the 
pretends that it was basically an Islamic State. Once the Turkish nationalism was the 
basis for the new state of Turkey, the Arab nationalism rose from ashes. These 
sentiments actually found their way to the surface towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, among the Muslims as well as the Christians as mentioned before. According 
to Kawtharani (1982), in a document that was written by Munah El-Sulh35and was 
published later by Adel El-Sulh36 under the title Lines from a letter: History of 
independent movement that rose in the Arab East in the Year 1877, Munah El-Solh 
describes: 
The disturbed situation of the state, and the growing national -Arab- feelings are 
two incentives that compelled the people of the country to deliberate of what to 
do in order to protect their homeland from the worst fate and the ugliest results, 
which is falling under the foreign occupation (as cited in Kawtharani, 1982, p. 
135). 
 
Kawtharani (1982) also adds:  
Through this testament we conclude that a group of the distinguished people in 
Beirut, Sidon, and Damascus (mostly merchants and lands owners) in 
cooperation with the ‘Ulama of the Shiite sect from Mount ‘Amel, established 
several connections and meetings to discuss the fate of Belad Al-Sham (p.135).  
 
Associations were rapidly established in Beirut and called for independence and the 
movement spread the regions. The associations saw that they needed to take a proactive 
step because the Turks were calling for compulsory recruitment. They needed more 
soldiers to fight in the Egyptian Canal, and later, in the First World War. The point 
from stating these facts is to establish that the Arab national movement, even if few 
                                                          
35One of the Beirut’s political scholars promoted for the freedom and the independence of the Arabs from the 
Ottomans in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. 
36The son of Munah El-Sulh, promoted for the independence of Lebanon and Arab Unity and coordination. 
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scholars consider that it begun as a Christian one needs to fight religious discrimination 
as it was deeply imbedded within the Arab Muslims as well.  
 
5.2 The Revival of Arab Nationalism 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Secret revolutionary societies were established 
and they began to discuss the future of Syria. However, the roots of the Arab National 
Movement was not the product of the Christian intellectuals in Grand Syria alone; it 
was first initiated after the French campaign on Egypt in 1798. Hazem Nesbieh, by 
quoting Khairallah Khairallah in the early twentieth century, asserted Bonaparte’s 
campaign role in raising national Arab awareness:  
It was not only Egypt that was awakened from its long slumber. The Campaign 
awakened national Arabism in the Arab countries and provoked westernization 
movement, which led to Arabic printing and reviving Arabic culture and Arab 
national (as cited in Najarian, 2005, p.19).  
 
Albert Hourani, Kamal Salibi, and Ahmad Sudani acknowledged that the French 
campaign of Egypt has caused changes among the Arab intellectuals who were in 
contact with the campaign. Moreover, the fights to expel the French from Egypt have 
led to the rise of political and national awareness in it37. In addition, Bonaparte 
established the first newspaper ‘Al-Teeh’ in Egypt in 1800, arabicized the government 
offices in Egypt, and improved educational system, among many others. Conversely, 
Bin Hassan Mubarak (n.d.) in his article reveals that the French did not train any 
Egyptian on the use of the print. The printers were two Christians who came from Al-
Sham. Their names were Elias Fat-hallah and Yosef Masbaki, who left to Al-Sham 
once the French departed Egypt. Accordingly, whatever the French occupation of 
Egypt’s aim was, it had led to the revival of Arab nationalism and the spread of printed 
books among the population.  
In Accordance, Muhaftha (1985) emphasizes on the importance of Muhamad ‘Ali’s 
campaign on BiladAl-Sham 1811-1832 in awaking the Arab nationalist awareness. He 
considers that the age of the Arab renaissance has started in Egypt. Ali’s campaign to 
Al-Sham, according to Muhaftha (1985), was considered as the first attempt at creating 
an Arab Unity, which did not only raise suspension in the Sublime Port, but also 
                                                          
37 http://www.marefa.org/index.php?title=رصم_ىلع_ةيسنرفلا_ةلمحلا&oldid=1712592 
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worries among European super powers. Accordingly, the British foreign minister, 
Palmerstone, wrote in 1833 explaining that: “Muhammad Ali’s real goal was to 
establish an Arab Kingdom that would include all the states that speak Arabic’” (as 
cited in Muhaftha, 1985, p.30). National feelings were growing for Arab unity, which 
was developed through the need to accomplish the political independence. However, 
the political independent, which was closely related to national feelings, was expressed 
in several attitudes: the first one was the autonomous independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. It called for discarding the Ottoman Caliphs [leadership title in Islam] and the 
Caliph should be from Quraish, which is Prophet Muhammad’s tripe. This attitude was 
expressed in the mid of the nineteenth century by Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kwakibi and 
Nagib ‘Azori. The two men established the Arab Land League, ‘La Ligue de Partie 
Arabe, in 1896. The aim of this movement was to free the Arab states from the 
Ottomans. The second one was directed towards decentralization from the central 
government in Istanbul by guaranteeing Arabs political rights and the adaptation of 
Arabic as the official language in Arab land. This attitude represented most of the 
educated Arab Muslims who were against the Ottoman Empire’s corruption and 
tyranny. For this purpose the Arab- Ottoman brotherhood association was established. 
The third one was calling for an Arab independent kingdom. This attitude has 
expressed the primer attitudes towards complete independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. Al-Jami’ia Al-Kahtaniah was the first association to express this attitude. The 
association was secretly established by a group of Arab officers in the Ottoman army in 
1909.  Later on Al-‘Ahed Association was established in 1913, which has played an 
important role in the Arab Grand Revolution led by Sharif Hussein in 1916. Finally, 
few separate nationalistic movements have appeared. The first was calling for a 
national state in Egypt by Rafa’ah Al-Tahtawi. The second one was calling for a 
Maronite Christian state in Lebanon. This movement basically started as an Arab 
movement towards independence from the Ottomans, under the name ‘Beirut Secret 
Association’, which was established in 1875 (Muhaftha, 1985; Hourani 1968; Halaq, 
2010). 
Tawfiq Al-Natur in an interview with Zein (1973) explains that “Arabism was not as 
strong as it is now among us” (Zein, 1973, p.84). Yet, Al-Natur continues to clarify that 
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in the beginning there was not a call for an independent state from the Ottomans. 
Though, he still stresses on the fact that Arabs were different from the Turks 
All that we, as Arabs, wanted to have the same rights and obligations in the 
Ottoman Empire as the Turk themselves and to have the Empire composed of 
two great nationalities: Turk and Arab (Zein, 1973, p. 84).  
 
The policy of Turkification began at the beginning of the 20th century, which aimed to 
substitute the Arabic language with Turkish language in the Arab vilayets. However, 
this policy has failed. Arabic was the chosen language of the Quran, which was an 
added spiritual value to the language. In addition, it was a language that was spoken for 
moreover than one thousand years in the region. On the other side, Zein (1973) 
elucidates that the first call for the Arab nationalism was the demand of the Christians 
to establish a state that they could belong to as equal citizens with Muslims. However, 
the call for an Arab state was initiated in in 1896 in Egypt as Muhaftha (1985) 
elucidated before. 
 
5.3 The Revival of Arab Nationalism in the South of Lebanon 
The South of Lebanon was in historical relation with Egypt as Sharaf Al-Din (2014) 
clarified. The relation began after Ibrahim Basha’s campaign on BiladA-Sham. Ibrahim 
Basha built a fabric factory in Der Qanon Ras Al-‘Ein (a town in Tyre Casa) for 
producing clothes for the Egyptian army in (1831- 1840). Additionally, the trade 
expanded between Egypt and the South for tobacco, olive oil, and silk. Furthermore, 
there was a religious relation between Al-Azhar and the ‘Ulama of the South. However, 
at the beginning of the 20th century the trade between the South and Egypt ended. 
Therefore, the people in Tyre [actually in the South] moved towards Haifa in Palestine. 
Furthermore, the relation with Haifa has started earlier in the late 19th century (Sharaf 
Al-Din, 2014). 
The political mode of the South was in favour of the Arab State. The Arab revolution 
raised the hopes of accomplishing the dream of independence. However, this did not 
last for long. The French mandate over Syria and Lebanon was declared and the French 
troops entered Damascus in 1920. Yet, this did not lessen the National Arab feelings. 
Fayyad (1998), confirms that:  
There was a hope ‘among the Southerners’ that the area of Jabal ‘Amel would 
become part of the Arab State. This hope was ended when the alliances ‘the 
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French and the British’ entered, occupied and eventually divided BiladAl-Sham 
‘Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan’.  Hence, in 1920,  The thinkers and the 
intellectuals of Jabal ‘Amel refused to abide with the new status de facto 
applied by General Henri Gourdaud, the French troops commander, when he 
declared the establishment of Grand Lebanon. They refused the division of 
BiladAl-Sham into sectarian mini states, and kept fighting for their own 
national Arab identity, refusing to give it up (p. 5). 
 
 Furthermore, Fayyad (1998) confirms the intellectuals’ commitment to the Arab 
ideology through attending conferences that took interest in the Arabs and Muslims 
Issues, and through joining the “Scientific Gathering in Damascus, ‘Al-Mujama’a Al-
‘elmi fi Dimashq’. Their writings were published in different Arabic newspapers 
especially the Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian ones. The writings circulated among the other 
Arab intellectuals. Halaq (1993) explains the general climate, in which the groups 
gathered from different sects, even among them were Maronites in 1936 in a 
conference that was held in 1936, under the title ‘Muatamar Al-Sahel and Al-Aqdiah 
Al-Arba’ah’ [The Coast and the Four Casas Conference]. They all demanded not only 
unity with Syria, but rather an Arab unity. Halaq (1993) asserts that many Shiites 
figures have participated in the conference; except for Said Abed Hussein Sharaf Al-
Din [Sharf Al-Din was back then held in house arrest by the French mandate (Sharaf 
Al-Din, 2014)]. Consequently, there are many writers and researchers who have 
confirmed that the call for Arabism reached its peak in the thirties of the 20th century 
(Zein, 1973; Hourani 1968; Halaq, 1983). In other words, when Lebanon got its 
dependence in 1943, it was difficult, especially the South’s people, who are the core of 
this study and who considered themselves as the decedents of the Arab tribe ‘Amelah, 
to make a major shift in its political orientation.  
Solidarity with the Arab revolutions continued even after the mandate. In addition, 
Hourani (1968) describes the common political issues that disturbed the calmness of 
the area. He elucidates that the spread of revolutions in the area once the Syrian Great 
Revolution led by Sultan Basha Al-Atrash in Druze Mountain in Syria expanded in 
Syria and in South Lebanon: “By the end of 1925 the conflict had reached its greatest 
extension. It covered Jebel Druze, the district of Damascus, part of the district of 
Homos, and part of Southern Lebanon (p. 188)”.  According to the stories of the South, 
many Southern leaders who led the revolutionary men in the South were directly 
involved with Sultan Basha Al-Atrash. The French enlisted air raids to restore authority 
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in the region, and the Southerners still remember the raids. Basically, the restlessness, 
as Hourani (1968) describes it, was due to instability of French policy, “These were 
further causes of disquiet: the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the 
Palestinian Arabs to the Zionism and to British policy (p.188)”. As it has been 
mentioned several times, the nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with 
general Arab problems: the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local 
matters, it had two main purposes: First, it advocated union of French Mandate 
Territories. Jebel Druze and Alawi region, as it was claimed, should be wholly 
incorporated in the State of Syria. Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a 
Syrian or Arab State, and it was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920 
(Kirk, 1949; Hourani, 1968; Zein, 1973). 
The escalation of the situations did not only relate to Lebanese- Syrian issues. Any 
Action in the Arab countries, especially in relation to the struggle with occupation or 
the mandate authorities found its reaction in the rest of the Arab countries. On 
September eleven 1931, the resentment against the Italian Fascism in regard to Omar 
Mukhtar hanging after a formalism trail did not take more than one hour. The 
Barqanian (Baraqa citizens/ Libya) were forced to attend the execution of their leader. 
In Jerusalem Sheik Muhammad Amen Al-Hosseini announced his death. As a result, 
the partisans declared boycotting the Italian goods. Hence, objections and 
demonstrations continued to rise in Lebanon, Egypt and Damascus (Shu’aib, 2007). 
However, the objections spread in wider Arab and Islamic atmospheres. Furthermore, 
the oppression that fascist Italy practiced against Libya in January 1939 led to 
demonstrations against the Italians. The occupational intentions against Libya swept 
over in more than twenty Arab cities, which forced Mussolini to assure the Arab 
leaders that he will adjust the Italian plans and stop the Italian immigration to Libya 
(Shuaib, 2002, p. 147). 
In 1941, there was an official call to revive the Arab Kingdom establishment led by 
Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. El-Solh (2004) explains that the attempt was looked at 
with suspicion because it was British- inspired and tended. Whether the aim of the call 
was to create a new Arab order, or a British- inspired one, it was doubted by the French 
because in either cases it demanded the elimination of the French influence on the 
Orient. Subsequently, there were two other reasons to object on the idea of the unity 
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and independence of Bilad Al-Sham including Iraq, which were the promise to create a 
Jewish state in Palestine, and the Maronite’s objection on the idea because they wanted 
an independent Lebanese state. Therefore, according to El-Solh (2004) the idea was 
rejected, even by Riyadh El-Solh, the Lebanese Prime Minister. El-Solh went to visit 
Prince Abdullah of Jordan and convinced him otherwise. As a result of discussions, the 
idea to establish the Arab League came into surface, and it was established in 1945.  
In the south, Sayyed Sharaf Al-Din had two declarations one in 1936 and the second 
was on October 1941. In both declarations he denounced the declaration of the 
independence of the Arab countries as separated. He considered that the independence 
was accomplished in a dark atmosphere, and the Arab politicians naively trusted in the 
allies. He declared that the ‘Amili’ people demanded the following: first, the total 
independence of Syria in her natural boundaries before the First World War, which 
were known through history as bar Al-Sham. Second, the Syrian Arab State out of 
geographical, historical, economic, linguistic, and national factors should seek in 
cooperation with the other Arab States to cancel all Trade Barriers. Third, Palestine 
always had its special status in the Arabs conscious, it should be protected, and the 
Belford Declaration should be condemned. Fourth, Alexandrite and Amouria 
Governorate should be retrieved as part of Syria. And finally, general pardon should be 
granted to all those who were exiled. By these declarations, Sharaf Al-Din, actually, 
was expressing the attitude of all the people of the South who were in total agreement 
with the two declarations (Sharaf Al-Din, 2014).  In an intreview, Fakhory (2016), one 
of the citezens of Tyre claims that: “It was proven that it was not possible for Lebanon 
to exist on its own. It should have been part of either Palestine or Syria. Nontheless, to 
join Syria is the only logical solution until today”. 
 
5.4 The Age of independence and the political orientation 
Through history, South Lebanon was not isolated from the historical movement of the 
Levant. According to the dictionary definition, history is a continuous systematic 
narrative of past events as relating to particular people, country, period, and person etc.; 
usually written in chronological account. In addition, Oxford dictionary defines history 
as a collective recollection of the events of the past, whether it was political, social, and 
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demographic etc.; however, it should be written in relation to people, family, and 
groups of people, hence it can’t be written excluded from the human experience.  
In 1943, Lebanon entered the age of independence. Compromises among the two main 
sects, the Maronite and Sunni, were coordinated to lead Lebanon through the era of 
independence. However, the South entered the new era with the hope that after the 
independence it would be possible to accomplish the unity with Syria. This was the 
general political and social mode, which did not change the South. In addition, this was 
clear in Sharf Al-Din’s previous declaration. Nonetheless, in Lebanon as a state, the 
three main political orientations remained the same. The first was called the Right 
Isolationist Wing, and they called for the independence of Lebanon from all the Arab 
states and that Lebanon was not an Arab State. The second called for the independence 
of Lebanon along with maintaining the right relations with Arab countries. 
Accordingly, Lebanon was a state with an Arab face, and a member of the Arab 
League. The third orientation, which prevailed in the South of Lebanon, accepted, with 
difficulty, the independence of Lebanon from Syria. Yet, they carried on the historical 
social relation with Palestine and Syria. It was not until 1967 that the Southerners 
stopped their trips to Houran and to Jerusalem through the Golan Heights because 
Golan Heights was occupied by the Israelites.  
To understand the depth of the movement toward the call for a united Arab state, it is 
important to understand the course through which the political and ideological changes 
occurred. The Arab region was in a state of stagnation until the French campaign on 
Egypt in 1778. Bonaparte’s goal to expand the campaign to Bilad Al-Sham drew the 
British attention to the importance of the area as the main trade road between Europe 
and India. Furthermore, for 300 years of Ottoman occupation, as Hourani (1968) 
explains, though the Ottoman occupation had lasted since 1516- 1918, it did not 
seriously affect the racial composition of the people of Syria, their language, or their 
way of life. Also, the ottoman conquest did not greatly affect the political structure of 
Syria. Syria remained as it was known. It was the area stretching from Taurus 
Mountain in the North to Sinai Peninsula in the South, and from the Mediterranean Sea 
on the West to the Syrian Desert on the East; “this area constitutes in many ways a 
single geographical unite, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense single 
people” (Hourani, 1968, p.4). Following the First World War, Bilad Al Sham was 
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divided into two political areas, the southern and the northern.  The southern area 
included Palestine and Jordan. It was under the British mandate.  The northern area was 
under the French mandate. The term ‘Syria’, according to Hourani (1968), is sometimes 
used to refer to the whole northern area. On the other hand, even after the division of 
the Northern area into Lebanon and Syria, the separation of the Southern area was not 
active in the year 1943, the Southerners were still dealing with Syria in its original 
political structure.  
 
5.5 Lebanon and the independence  
Reinforcing sectarianism in Lebanon was the total responsibility to the French mandate 
until the year 1943, (Hamadan, 1998; Daher, 2016; Halaq, 2010). This atmosphere 
continued with the age of independence. The two main leaders of the independence 
Bshara Al-Khouri and Riyad El-Solh laid the basis of the National Pact which was an 
unwritten agreement that laid the foundation of Lebanon as a multi-confessional state 
in 1943. Since that day onward, the pact has divided the three highest political positions 
as the following: First, the president should be Maronite. Second, the Prime Minister 
should be a Sunni. Third, the Speaker of the Parliament should be Shiite. However, it 
did not change the absolute authority that was given to the President during the 
Mandate. In addition, the National Pact stated that the Christian Maronite will not seek 
foreign intervention, and accept an Arab- affiliated Lebanon instead of being a 
Western- affiliated state. In return, the Muslims should abandon their aspiration to unite 
with Syria. Certain positions were assigned to the other sects, which stated that the 
Deputy Speaker in the Parliament and the Deputy Prime Minster should be Greek 
Orthodox, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces should be Maronite, the 
Commander of the Lebanese Army should be Druze, and finally the Parliament 
members are in a ratio of 6:5 in favour of Christians to Muslims. This division 
remained in action until 1989 in Ta’ef Agreement, which laid the foundations to end 
the Lebanese Civil War which started in 1975. The political positions remained the 
same. However, the Parliament members’ ratio became 50% Christians and 50% 
Muslims. On the other hand, the Lebanese constitution, which was laid in 1926, didn’t 
constitute the confessional division between the sects or religions in regard to political 
positions in Lebanon. Furthermore, since the declaration of the state of Lebanon until 
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independence in 1943, the president and the Prime minister were either Maronite or 
Orthodox. Also, the French mandate was in control of naming the person who would be 
assigned to these important positions.  
Daher (2016) describes the two men of independence by being the two prisoners of 
pure sectarian principles. Each one of them remained purely a loyal representative of a 
certain Lebanese sect, or one certain religion in best case scenario. On the other hand, 
Daher (2016) acknowledges that the main political gain in the process of independence 
that all the Lebanese sects for the first time met to achieve one certain goal, which is 
the independence.  
 
5.6 The Economic Situation of the South 
Lebanon was witnessing what was called ‘the miraculous Lebanese economic’ boom, 
between the years 1950-1974. The economy was largely flourishing due to the field of 
services, such as tourism, banking activities, transit, petrodollar cash inflows, and 
triangle trade etc. This bloom witnessed more investment in the field of construction, 
transportation, infra-structure, industry, and agriculture. However, in the mid-sixties of 
the 20th Century, Bank Antra, the first bank in Lebanon, collapsed. As a result, there 
was an interest in the field of industrial investment, which grew 10% during the Sixties. 
Still, this development remained to be limited on the Lebanese National level (Hamdan, 
1998). Hamdan (1998) elaborates more on the consequences of the economic with-
drawal on other fields of production, in particular agriculture. This caused massive 
immigration from the rural areas to Beirut, which had severe social and economic costs. 
Hence, until 1975, 75% of the Southern farmers were ripped off from the South to 
Beirut or immigrated outside Lebanon. As a result for the deterioration of agriculture, 
Lebanon had to import most of its nutritious supplies. On the South’s level, the only 
agriculture that had brought a considerable income to the Southerners was Tobacco; 
however, this farming was controlled by the Regie, which did not only assign the 
prices, but also the area each farmer is allowed to plant in. According to the interviews 
that were conducted, the farmers were not only subjected to the exploitation of the 
Regie but also were subjected to exploitation by other farmers who were more 
advantaged with a larger number of permissions for tobacco plantation areas. 
Therefore, the working farmers would rent the permissions and pay fixed amount in 
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return of it. If the season was poor, they would pay the same rent for the extra 
permissions for their owners. This exploitation is still ongoing in the same manner. 
Hamdan (1998) explains the social differences among sects in Lebanon. According to a 
study, which was conducted during President Faud Shehab’s period, in 1960- 1961, 4% 
of the Lebanese population controlled one third of the national income, while more 
than 50% of the population got around 18% of the income. The study also revealed that 
the large share of this income is limited to Beirut and Mount Lebanon. The study also 
investigated life conditions in Lebanon. It turned out that development had started in 
Mount Lebanon, the north was non-developed, and the South lacked development. 
Ironically, Halaq (1983) explained the social and economic situation in Lebanon during 
the mandate. He elucidated that the people of the coast and the four districts in Lebanon 
paid 82% of the taxes and 80% of the revenue were spent on Mount Lebanon. In 
addition, the high posts were run by the old leaders of the old Lebanon (Mutassarifiat 
Lubnan), which contradicted with the constitution. 
Southerners, who live in Hula and Einatha, expressed that it was not until 1950s that 
the first bathroom was built in the villages. The people, who built them, were those 
who went to Kuwait and the Gulf area in general. The first one was built in 1954; 
consequently, it needed several years before the people started building bathrooms 
inside their houses. A man, who was around his late forties, and a member in SSNP 
informed me in 2009 that as a kid he watched his neighbour taking a shower under the 
rain water drain because there were no water pipes. The electricity did not come to the 
border villages in the South until 1969, whether it was in the Christian or the Muslim 
villages. Furthermore, the water system was developed under the Israeli occupation, 
1982-2000. In Einatha, the first village tank was built in 1984. It was constructed by the 
UNICEF. The First school was built in 1964 in Hula/ Marjeon, after considerable 
negotiations with the district parliament Ahmad Al-Ass’ad who stated that he was 
teaching his son Kamel on behalf of the entire South (Sulaiman, 2009). In Etaron, a 
village in Bint Jubeil Casa, a man, according to his daughter (2016), had to take his 
own Tin box with him to use as his chair if he were to go to school. Her father’s age is 
around late seventies. According to the interviews, the different districts in Lebanon 
were deprived of services and developmental projects. Even the elections were 
carnivals that were limited to certain traditional feudal lords. Qubaissi (2005) describes 
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the change comparing the elections in 2005 to the elections after the independence. 
Qubaissi (2005) wrote: “There were not so many Shiite families involved in the 
Lebanese politics in Beirut. The Parliament representation was excluded since the 
thirties to Baydon Family, with little exceptions…” then she continues: “The Shiite 
presence in Beirut is related to two factors, economic and social, since all life 
dependents were poor in the South. The power was divided between two men Rashid 
Baydon and Kamel Al-Ass’ad, who established his competitive party Al-Tala’eh in the 
face of Al-Nahddah, which was established by Baydon.”  In the Forties and the Fifties 
many of the Shiites immigrated to Africa because of the economic situations. They 
thought that Africa was the American continent, Qubaissi (2005) comments. One of the 
interviewed Old men in 2004 was the mayor of Mansouri, which is a village in the Tyre 
Casa, explained to me that they were supposed to go to America, whether it was North 
America or South America nobody knew. They gathered the men in the ships and told 
them that they were going to the land of opportunities. However, they dropped them at 
the first harbour, which the ship reached in Africa. None of them were in America 
before, how could they tell back then which country they had reached. Furthermore, the 
difficult living situations in the South made the Southerners accept any place they 
found work in.  
 
5.7 The Palestinian Cause 
The South is located to the North of Palestine. The border line length is 75 km, which is 
directly connected to Palestinian villages and plains. Actually, Mount ‘Amel is 
considered to be the distinction to Essba’a Al-Jalil [Galilee Panhandle]. Therefore, the 
declaration of Lebanon’s independence in 1943 was of no consideration to the 
southerners because their movement around the different districts in Bilad Al-Sham, 
especially to Palestine and Houran, was still accessible. There were several stages that 
marked the course of history in the South. The First one was the French and British 
mandate that prevented the establishment of the Arab state, led by King Faisal. The 
second was the occupation of Palestine and the declaration of Israel, which brought 
with it the greatest disappointment in the Arab Leaders. The third was the failure of the 
Arab union between Syria and Egypt in 1961. The fourth was the war of June 1967, 
when Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, and Sinai were all occupied. In 
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spite of the fact that this war was of a great disappointment, the Southerners stood by 
the Fedayeen and joined the fight with them against Israel. The South at this stage 
hosted the Fedayeen, who came from different Arab countries in the hope to liberate 
Palestine and the occupied territories. The major disappointment was the Camp David 
Agreement on September seventeen, 1978. Particularly, the agreement came after the 
victory of the October war in 1973, which brought with it the hope of liberating 
Palestine and the occupied Arab territories. The South understood that the Arab states 
and the Palestinians had lost their strategic depth when Egypt was alienated from the 
Arab-Israeli struggle. The South was suffering from constant, Israeli attacks. The 
immediate result that came after Al-Sadat speech in front of the Knesset on the 
twentieth of November 1977 was the occupation of the South in March 1978. However, 
the immediate cause of the occupation was Kamal ‘Odwan Oppression, which was led 
by Dlal Mughrabi on March eighteen, 1978, in which 37 Israelites were killed and 100 
were wounded.   
The calls for a peace agreement began with Anwar Al-Sadat, the Egyptian President, 
and Menachem Begin on September eleven, 1977, followed by Al-Sadat visit to 
Jerusalem on the nineteenth and twentieth of November in 1977. Invitations were sent 
to Syria, Jordan, PLO, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United 
Nations to attend the preparation conference in Cairo on fourteen December 1977. The 
attendants of the conference were the USA, Israel and Egypt. After isolating one of the 
major players in the Arab area, Egypt, Israel invaded the South to the Litany line except 
for Tyre in March 1978. It would be comprehended that a new age was born which 
marked the course of events in the Arab region. 
Israel wanted to create a buffer zone, from which it could control the attacks led by the 
Fedayeen, or even stop them at all. The invasion was titled as ‘Litany Operation’, 
which was supposed to limit the Fedayeen attacks on Israel. Instead, Israel was 
bombarded from behind the Litany lines. The resistance operations also took place in a 
form of gorilla operations against both, the Israeli troops and the Southern Lebanese 
Army (SLA) that was led by Sa’ad Hadad. SLA was founded on the fourteenth to the 
twenty-first of March, 1978 and was armed and financed by Israel. SLA’s members 
were not only Christians; they were a combination of Christians and Muslims.  
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Fedayeen are the Guerrilla Palestinian fighters, a group that did not take its organized 
form until 1964 when the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] started its 
operation from the West Bank until 1967, when the West bank was occupied. PLO was 
established to represent Palestine in the Arab League. The idea was first presented by 
Jamal Abed Al-Nasser, the Egyptian president to organize the Fedayeen actions. 
Consequently, Fedayeen gained a sweeping support and popularity in the Arab 
countries as the heroes that would free Palestine, especially after 1967. Fedayeen 
oppressions were organized in 1969 within Cairo Agreement, which was officially 
certified by the Lebanese president Charl Al-Helo. By the Agreement, the Palestinians 
were allowed to conduct fights against Israel through Al-Orqob area.  
The relation between the South and Palestine, as it has been explained before, is very 
old. The occupation of Palestine and then the declaration of the state of Israel is one of 
the most important factors that formed the political orientation of the South. It came as 
a result of the historical relation with Palestine. Furthermore, it was part of the dilemma 
the people of the dispatched region suffered. The political mode of the South and its 
attitude towards Palestine and the regional issues were thoroughly described by Hassan 
Fadlulah. He is a Southerner originally from Einatha. His youth and childhood were 
divided between his hometown and Qulaila, where his family lived. What Hassan 
Fadlulah wrote in his unpublished biography and stated in the interview with him in 
2016 matches. Fadlulah begins with explaining the situation in his early childhood, in 
the year 1948. It was a year full of events. He remembers the British Army spreading in 
the Qulaila plain and in the plains of the other villages of Tyre Caza. He was six years 
old, when he recalls the sounds of the machine guns, and the sight of people running to 
hide in their houses. As a child, he did not know who was fighting with whom and what 
was really going on; however, he remembers that the people were wishing that the 
Germans would win the war because they were against the Jews. Obviously, Fadlulah 
indicates the Israeli or the Zionist when he says the Jews who occupied Palestine. 
Logically, the term Israel was not known yet. It was the Jews. Then, they became to be 
known as the Zionist gangs. Furthermore, in the same period, many villagers hoped that 
the British army would stay in their villages because it brought work, food, and 
clothing to the South.  
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In the year 1948, many families began to arrive from Northern Palestine to Qulaila and 
other villages in the South. They used to say that they were going to stay for a little 
while, and then they were going back to Palestine. Fadlullah came to understand as a 
child that Palestine was under the British mandate. Nonetheless, it was the British who 
facilitated the Jewish immigration to Palestine and armed them with all sorts of 
weapons so that they can defeat the Palestinians and take over their land. The 
Palestinians who came to the South thought of themselves as tourists, who came in a 
semi trip for a few weeks. They said that they have left the Palestinian freedom fighters 
along with their Arab brothers, who formed the Salvation Army against the armed 
Jewish gangs that was attacking and brutally killing Palestinian villagers. Qulaila was 
soon full of Palestinians, though the people in the town were living mostly in one room 
or two, but they managed to find a place to shelter the Palestinians. It was an 
overwhelming period because everyone was waiting for the Arab armies to enter and 
retrieve Palestine and cleanse it from the Zionist gangs. The fifteenth of May 1948 
arrived; all the families went to the main road, which was leading to Naqoura. The line 
of the attendants extended from Burak (ponds) Ras Al-‘Ein to Qulaila. Four kilometres 
were condensed with those who were waiting for the news from Palestine about their 
men and sons who stayed there to fight the Gangs. Suddenly, the crying and welling 
sounds began to get louder and louder. The news of the death of their families and 
beloved ones was intensifying. “Nobody knows how this day came to an end, but what 
I know”, said Fadlullah (2016) that “many of my friends with whom I was playing 
became orphans”. He continues 
The Arab army lost the war, the guns they had was inadequate and did not 
function. The fifteenth of May remained in our minds and hearts. It was a 
moaning day; demonstrations every year filled the Arab world and the South 
(2016).  
 
The loss of Palestine has caused a great dilemma in the South of Lebanon. The blame 
was directed towards the shaky and weak Arab governments whose loyalty towards the 
Arabs and the Palestinian issue were questioned. Political and social movements were 
initiated to free Palestine. They were supported by the Arab population and the 
Southerners. Right after declaring the establishment of the state of Israel, many 
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movements found their way to the South, especially, after the Cairo Agreement in 
1969. In Hula, after the Fedayeen had come to the town, they were welcomed in the 
South. They were hiding during the day in Sluqi Valley, between Hula and Shaqra. The 
Southerners said ironically “we used to go to them as shepherds with their herds during 
the day, so that the Israelites would not know in which caves they were hiding. We 
brought them food, water, blankets, whatever we could afford”. Before 1967, most of 
these movements found quarters for them in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and they 
started their operations to liberate Palestine from those countries. One of the first 
movements was Kata’ib Al-Fida’ Al-‘Arabi [Arab Martyrdom Phalanges]. However, 
this movement started attacking the Jewish synagogues and Jewish properties in 
different Arab cities, such as Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut and many others. After 1948, 
a Palestinian activist, George Habash, who was a doctor from Java, witnessed Jewish 
gangs brutally conduct attacks against many Palestinians; among them were his sister 
and aunt. Habash (1998) came from a financially comfortable family; therefore, he 
went to study medicine at the American University in Beirut. As a student, Habash 
(1998) with a group of Friends, established a movement that was called ‘Al-Urwa Al-
Wuthqa’ [the Close- Knit Association]. In 1954, Habash (1998) renamed the movement 
to become the Arab Nationalist Movement. He wanted it to be a movement that would 
sweep all over the Arab countries because he believed that it is the Arab unity that 
would liberate Palestine. It is up to the people to free Palestine since the Arab regimes 
have proven themselves as none worthy of such a task.  
 
5.8 The Fedayeen in the South 
The Fedayeen operations became very excessive in the South and the Israeli attacks 
were constantly repeated. The Fedayeen were not leading the operations only from Al-
‘Orqob area, they were initiating their oppressions from all across the borders. And 
Israel retaliated all over the South. Hence, the Southerners’ living conditions became 
increasingly difficult. Qubaissi (2005): “After the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1967, 
Jerusalem, and the West Bank, the Fedayeen operations began from the South in 1969, 
which was legalized in Lebanon after Cairo Agreement in 1969. The South was called 
back then’ Fateh Land’. The Israeli bombarding of the South was extreme. It shocked 
the stability of the South, consequently, many families fled to Beirut; it was a kind of 
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‘compulsory immigration’.” Sweid (1998) describes the situation in the South. He 
emphasizes that the age of suffering in the South is as old as the Arab Israeli war. In the 
beginning, his young civilian men enlisted in the Salvation Army led by ‘Fawzi 
Qawiqji’ to defend Palestine. However, fifty years have passed and the South is still 
burdened with its fights against Israel. This war has changed and marked the life of its 
people. Then, Sweid (1998) continues describing the attacks and the Palestinians and 
on the Southerners. It is because they have welcomed the Palestinian and fought with 
them for Palestine. He counts the years 1967, 1968-1969 the years, in which the 
Palestinians floated to the South. All the Fedayeen by the years 1970- 1971 were in the 
South because they were liquidated in Jordan. Then, Sweid lists the attacks on the 
Lebanese villages and the massacres, from Hula in 1948. Salha was occupied in 1948 
the people were killed or deported by the Israeli.  
Unfortunately, in the second half of the seventies, the situation in the South became 
more difficult. This situation, in fact, was expressed by the Southerners in many 
occasions. They say that they received them and sympathized with them. They had seen 
how comfortable the Palestinians were in their homeland and houses. However, things 
got to be more difficult. The Palestinian Militia in the South sought to control the life of 
the Southerners. One man said: “the Palestinians got involved in every detail of our 
lives. They even interfered between the man and his wife. And they began to attack our 
women and assault them in the fields”. However, the man went back to saying,” but we 
still support the cause of Palestine, and we support those who fight in Palestine for 
Palestine!”  
In 1969 a conference was held in Beirut, under the title ‘Lebanon and the Fedayeen 
Actions’ (1969) in Lebanon, it was held by a ‘Nadwat Al-Dirassat’ [The Study 
Seminar]. The main issues the Seminar addressed were the following issues: The first 
was establishing a political national foundation on two levels Arab national level and 
international level. The second was how to adapt a secular system in Lebanon instead 
of the sectarian system. The third was about modernizing the electoral law. The fourth 
was to renew the political parties system. The sixth was to adapt a modern system to 
run the government administrative structure. The seventh was about adapting new 
appropriate pedagogic education. The eighth was to renew the legislative law and 
equally applied on all Lebanese citizens. The ninth was to renew the taxation 
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methodology, and finally to improve the role of the state. From that day on, and till 
today, and even after fifteen years of Civil War the Lebanese are still raising the same 
demands. It is clear that after forty-nine years of establishing the Lebanese state and 
twenty-six years of independence and the demands were still the same. 
The Seminar came to the same conclusion that the left parties and the right parties in 
Lebanon revolved around the problem of the Arabism of Lebanon or the Lebanism of 
Lebanon; the Palestinian resistance and its presence in Lebanon; in addition, the means 
to defend Lebanon against Israeli attacks. Also, they revolved around the Lebanese 
struggle for social justice and balanced development in the different Lebanese regions. 
The same demands had been raised by the different political parties in the Lebanese 
South and was adapted by the people. The conference expressed the same fears the 
Southerners held since the Zionist intentions were clear about Palestine, which 
basically manifested in the Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
The conference raised four main topics that were discussed, and they stamped the 
political orientation of the South. The first one is related to the Arab State and the 
dream of independent Arab State from the Ottoman occupation or any other foreign 
occupation, the same topic was discussed before the independence of Lebanon, and 
now after the independence of Lebanon. The second was social justice and providing 
basic infrastructure in the South, which include schools, electricity, sanitations, water, 
and economic developments. The third topic was the Jewish immigration to Palestine 
before 1948 and the struggle with Israel and the Fedayeen resistance after 1948, and the 
Israeli threat to Lebanon in general and to the South in particular. These topics were not 
the only major topics that were discussed in the Seminar on Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Fedayeen Actions. They also included the topics of the daily conversations 
of the South. These topics discussed the core of the everyday conversation in the South. 
The sectarian issues and sectarian political orientation were far from their thoughts and 
their struggle process. People’s choices to join a certain political party were on the 
bases of the parties’ political agenda.  
 
5.9 Political orientation in the Fifties 
In the 1952 crisis, it was a success to the opposition in mobilizing public opinion that 
led to the resignation of President Bechara Al-Khoury. In the end, Junblat saw that 
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Shamoun had led a coup on the coup occurred and the Lebanese Document that was 
written in 1943, which was actually a sectarian document. The agreement basically 
started with Shamoun was to put an end to the sectarian system in Lebanon, which he 
eventually broke (Al-Siba’y, 1970). Junblat, in 1952 revolution, was against the policy 
of to Beshara Al-Kouri. He also labelled the Phalanges as a sectarian party. He believed 
that all the leftist parties are progressive parties, and the rest are a sectarian 
organizations, blocks, or movements. Regarding the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, 
Junblat considered that the problem with the Fedayeen was created by president Charl 
Al-Hilo causing disagreements among the different Lebanese parties. The best way to 
handle the issue would have been by organizing and cooperating with the Fedayeen. 
Then he describes Al-Hilo as if he was sitting on the Moon’s surface looking at things 
from his American rocket (Al-Siba’y, 1970). Hence, the coup was ultimately 
considered as movement that steered the population for the interest of the traditional 
leaders all over Lebanon and its South.  
In the meantime, the South was facing the Israeli attacks and the Lebanese Army 
oppression. In Hula, the Lebanese border villages in Marjeon did not have electricity, 
water system, or proper schools; above all, it had to face the oppression of the Lebanese 
state, which was practiced with sever measurements. The checkpoints of the Lebanese 
Army were basically established to stop weapon-smuggling to the Palestinians, or 
smuggling the Fedayeen. A curfew was put in action, and the Southerners couldn’t 
leave from one village to another after 6:00 in the evening. Furthermore, guns’ nozzles 
were pointed towards the South instead of towards Israel. 
Additionally, in 1952 the Egyptian revolution led by the Movement of the Free Officers 
was a success; and Egypt knew stabilization. In the South, Sharraf Al-Din (2014) wrote 
a combination of a memoire of his life with his grandfather Hussein Sharaf Al-Din, 
documenting at the same time the incidents that took place in his city Tyre. The Fifties 
and the Sixties of the 20th Century were full of political and social movements and 
engagements. For Sharaf Al-Din (2014) the political engagement that brought Camille 
Shamoun to presidency was a political display:  
It was a spectacle that brought Shamoun to presidency because he got what the 
job needed [to involve Lebanon in Bagdad Pact]. It was the beginning of a 
political battle, in which local and regional parties were involved, especially 
after the political success and the stability Egypt enjoyed since 1952 (p.80).   
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The beginning of the revolution against Shamoun, as Sharaf Al-Din (2014) remembers 
was in the year 1954. Everything started with a student demonstration in March 1954, 
which sprung from the American University in Beirut. The demonstration was faced 
with bullets, as a result two students from Hula: Hassan Abo Ismail was killed, and 
Mustafa Nasrallah was crippled. In this period the two parties, Resurrection Arab 
Socialist Party [RASP] and the Arab National Movement (ANM), were newly active. 
The two groups were papering for a demonstration that was delayed till May 15 1954. 
The spark of the political actions always sprang from the students’ milieus. The 
demonstration’s date coincided with the alleged war the Arab regimes led and lost 
against the Zionist gangs. The students of Al-Ja’farieh organized this demonstration 
every year since 1948; conversely, in this year in particular the cheering was against the 
occupation of Palestine and Baghdad Pact at the same time. For the first time in Tyre, 
the clashes between the demonstrators and the government forces took place, and the 
authorities shot at the crowds (Sharaf Al-Din, 2014, p. 80-82). The escalation did not 
end here. The revolution against Shamoun did not stop until his presidential period 
ended in 1958. There was a public refusal to extend Shamoun’s presidency. In that year 
a huge demonstration was sweeping through the South. Harbiah (n.d.) discusses that 
period of the history of the Arab nation that inflamed the crowds and their ambition for 
liberation and unity. They were demanding the unity of the Arabs and retrieval of 
Palestine.  
In the tales of the South, Nasser was the most popular leader in the Arab countries, 
even in the remote villages of Southern Lebanon. Villagers sat around the radio in 
Cafés or small shops to listen to his speeches. The Arab Nasserites Movement widely 
spread in the region and Lebanon. The South was deeply involved and the people 
gathered around the leaders of the Arab National Movements, such as Ma’rof Sa’ed in 
Sidon and Muhammad Al-Zayyat in Tyre. There were demonstrations in Tyre and 
Sidon, from almost all sects; the crowds were calling for the change of regime in 
Lebanon and the acquisition of social justice. Based on the stories in the South, guns to 
fight Shamoun were in every house; moreover, the men of the revolution against 
Shamoun resorted to Syria to get military training. 
When Egypt signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to build the damp on 
December twenty-seven, 1958, it was considered a political gain for the Arab countries. 
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The building of the damp was completed in October 1967. However, the High Damp 
was officially opened in January 1971. The celebrations were in all Arab states. The 
ceremonies were transmitted through the radio in the South, and the song ‘Qulna 
Hanibni we Banina alssad’ [we said we will build and we build the damp] was in every 
house. The Southerners expressed, with passion, the importance of the radio to connect 
them to the outside world, “we all went to the little shop in the village, the owner had a 
radio, which we listened to. It was tuned on Sawt Al-Arab [voice of Arabs]. And we all 
applauded to Nasser”.  
Sharaf Al-Din (2014) described the situation and the responses in the city, which 
summarizes the general political mode that prevailed in the South. However, the youth 
and the religious leader Abed Hussein Sharaf Al-Din, who supported the Arab 
Kingdom led by Sharif Hussein and promoted for it in Al-Hujeir conference in 1920, 
were in harmony regarding the Arab national attitude against Baghdad Pact. In his 
narration of the events of the Fifties, Sharaf Al-din (2014) recites what happened with 
his grandfather once he heard that he was shot:  
I was explaining the situation for the demonstrators, my brother Mohsen 
approached me and said that the family thought I was dead. Therefore, I hurried 
back to them to tell them that I was fine. Later, I understood that when my 
brother when he went to deny the news of my death, my grandfather yield at 
him ‘go and fill your brother’s absence’ (p.82).  
 
The attitudes towards Arab national causes were unified between the political attitude 
of the people, their leaders, and their religious leaders. The people interviewed in Tyre 
asserts that the demonstrations were of the two religions Muslims and Christians. One 
of the demonstrators was a Maronite of the family Abo Gamrah, and he was a 
Communist. Abo Gamrah was imprisoned by the Lebanese authorities for a long 
duration in Beirut.  
The 1958 crisis, though it was different in its higher intensity and duration from that of 
1952, it was marginally linked to social mobilization as well. While the two crises 
started from similar internal sources, the crisis of 1958 had considerable external 
extension (El-Khaze, 2000). The Lebanese system could not elevate its standards to 
modernize its political and institutional system. It was guided in the same policy it did 
during the Ottoman occupation in the age of the Mutasarrifiah. It was not only the 
political slogans that drove the people to rise in the face of the state, but also the social 
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needs. In addition, political rights were as Abed Al-Ghani Al-‘Arissi states that “it is 
the right of the people according to the philosophers in politics without exception, the 
right of any group, the right of any citizens, and the right of any nation” (as cited in 
Halaq, 2010, p. 34). Then, Al-‘Arissi express the worries among the Muslims because 
of the Christians’ demands in Lebanon for a foreign protection which might lead to the 
occupation of Grand Syria. Al-‘Arissi’s worries proved to be true because Syria and 
Lebanon fell under the French mandate for another twenty five years. Accordingly, 
when Shamoun joined the Baghdad Pact, it was a call for another foreign intervention 
that raised the fear of the other Lebanese leaders; especially that it was history 
repeating itself in Lebanon. Harbiah (n. d.), who was an employee in Social Security in 
Tyre and he also a leader in ANM, declares that 
[I]t is one of the strangest coincidences that Israel and the Arab retro (meaning 
Shamoun and his Right Wing Supporters) understand the dangers of such 
mobilization of the people and what it could achieve for the nation (p.109). 
 
The memory of the first demonstrations in 1943 for independence and then 1953 led by 
Shamoun and Junblat against Bshara Al-Khouri, and later on against Shamoun and the 
Bagdad Pact, were also present in the memories of all the interviewed people, such as 
Hassan Fadlulah [He was active in RASP], Kamel Faraj [He was active in ANM], his 
brother Munif Faraj [The head of the ANM in Tyre after the death of Muhammad 
Zayyat after 1960], and Ali Zayyat, the brother of Muhamad. Suliman (2009) tells 
about the incidents that happened in Hula, and eventually the massacre, in which 
around 120 men were killed by the Israeli gangs in 1948 as revenge for their losses 
after the fights with the Arab Salvation Army. The villagers fled to Beirut and to the 
villages around them after the massacre. They came back after signing the Armistice 
Agreement in 1949. They found their house destroyed and robbed. It was a difficult 
time. Suliman (2009) explains:  
Simply, these were the conditions in which different political awareness was 
born in Hula. Most of the men and the boys used to work in Haifa. Very few of 
them knew Beirut. Many of them were introduced to members of the Palestinian 
Communist Party, such as Taofiq Al-Tibi. Muhammad Ahmad Mazra’ani met 
Al- Tibi in Palestine… 
After the massacre, Hula was a good ground for the spread of the Communist 
party, and the first seed came with Ibrahim Ayyob, who met with the 
Communist journalist Zuher ‘Osseran in Beirut. In 1954, when Khaled 
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Bakdash, who was the head of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon, won 
in the Parliamentary elections in Syria, celebrations and fireworks filled Hula’s 
and Tibnin’s skies. With the first break of the down, the next day the Lebanese 
Army was in the town looking for the Communists, who were vanished to thin 
air and the army couldn’t find them (p. 143-145). 
 
Many examples can be given from the South, which would explain the political attitude 
of its people. Most of them were illiterate in 1948 and simple, yet they were open to the 
Palestinian cause and felt the need to face the struggle against Israel. They were aware 
that their salvation was in creating new leadership and creating new political 
atmosphere outside the traditional leadership in the South; henceforth, the municipality 
election in Hula, in 1961, in spite of all the pressure practiced on the people to vote for 
Al-As’ad list, was one of the best examples for change, when the Communist list won.  
One of the Southerners explained the situation in regard to the political parties in the 
South; his name was Abo Khalil Fakhouri. Fakhouri demonstrated with the National 
Arab Movement and was a great supporter of Al-Zayyat. It seems that Zayyat’s 
personality was amicable for the people in Tyre; unfortunately, there are not any 
statistics to rely on in regard of the partisans or supporters of certain party. The party’s 
popularity differed from one district/Casa to another, and sometimes from one village 
to another. Fakhouri explained that parties’ slogans were not the issue. It was the need 
to make changes and improve living qualities in the region. However, he stressed on 
the parties’ ability to move the masses when the issue involved two subjects: the first 
was changing the political system. The Lebanese system needed to change in regard to 
two major points which included the attitude from the Arab causes in regard to freedom 
and liberation from occupation, especially Palestine. However, the South demonstrated 
for the freedom of Algeria. And the second issue is social justice, education, and health 
care. Fakhouri (2015) explained that it was not the internal rules or slogans of each 
party that moved the masses; it was the calls for the people’s needs. Consequently, it 
was clear that the parties’ political aims had to be in harmony with two aims, the first 
aim was the fight for the freedom and liberation of Palestine and the second is the Arab 
unity. Nonetheless, the parties, in ordoweverer to approach the Southerners closer, they 
had to deal with critical issues such as improving infrastructure, education system 
which was of great convenience, and the Regie monopoly of Tobacco production. 
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Lebanon entered the age of independence loaded with the ideologies, historical 
burdens, and social and political disorder. Consequently, the South was also heavily 
burdened with results of the two World Wars, which are: the struggle the area has been 
living, the cause of Palestine, and the national ideas that prevailed in the region and 
Lebanon. The effect on the South was by two secular political opinions; this wave 
consisted of two ideologies amongst them Syrian Nationalisn and Arab Nationalism. In 
a later stage, the Socialist Progressive Party, established by Kamal Junblat, was active 
in the South as well. There were a few individuals who were enlisted; however, the 
effect of Junblat was on a larger scale as the head of the Lebanese National Movement.  
 
5.10 The revolution of 1958 and the coming years 
The revolution of 1958 put forward the attitude of the left powers and eventually the 
South. But, on another level, it has clarified the involvement of Shamoun and the retro 
Maronite leaders with the western powers. According to Siba’y (1970), Junblat had 
specified the reasons behind the revolution of 1958. First, he considered that the 
revolution came as the result to Shamoun’s failure to keep the obligations he signed on 
with the Popular Socialist Front. He pledges to embrace an internal and external policy 
that harmonized with the aims of the Front, but he did not. This is what basically 
initiated the difference with him after his election as a president. On the internal level, 
the Front demanded separating religion from the state and abolishing the sectarian 
system in Lebanon. Secondly, the front demands the organization of the general 
authorities and advocating the principle of monitoring constitutional laws. Third, it 
demanded the establishment of public freedom, and held the government officials the 
total responsibility for any aggressive behaviour. Fourth, it should organize the 
economy and build a better society. Fifth, it was essential to confirm the neutrality of 
Lebanon towards the international struggle. Finally, it should provide all social grantees 
to all citizens. In regards to the regional political issues, Junblat supported Egypt’s 
attitude in the fights in 1956 and called to fight Eisenhower doctrine and the 
commitment to the political neutrality. The demands that Junblat had put forward was 
adapted by the national parties in South Lebanon, and eventually by the people. In a 
question for Siba’y (1970) about, who would Junblat nominate for a president? Junblat 
declared:  
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We want an Arab oriented nominee, who is open to cooperation, a progressive 
in his thinking, non-committed to the foreign powers policies, and above all, we 
want an honest man. This country is debilitated because of its lying rulers and 
their opportunistic (p. 38). 
 
A considerable number of parties emerged and split from the main movements or 
parties after a series of set backs. The first set back was in the collapse of the Union 
between Syria and Egypt. The second major collapse was in 1967, the Setback that 
created a great disappointment in the region, Lebanon, and the South in particular. The 
fifth of June 1967 is still present in the memories of the Southerners. Fadlullah recalls 
the day, when he entered the school. His friend from Beirut, Sa’ed Zaglol, took his 
book and threw it against the wall, murmuring: ‘what is the use of schooling, it is the 
war, it happened’. Fadlullah was surprised, the war started on all fronts: Egypt, Syria, 
and Jordan. Everybody was following the news on radio station Sawt Al-‘Arab, which 
was heard all over the South, and the anchor Ahmad Sa’eed was famous around the 
region. The news of the advanced Egyptian army was followed by the news of the 
losing later in the evening. On the tenth of June, all the Arab world was waiting for 
Nasser’s speech expressed Fadlullah. When Nasser declared his resignation all the 
Arab cities went on demonstrations. Consequently, all the youth, including the 
Southerners, declared their willingness to fight to the death. After the heat of the 
demonstrations, Fadlullah, his brother Yousef, and their friend Ibrahim Saleh went 
back to the house. The friends started remembering the incidents through which the 
area have went, from the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt in 1956, which ended with 
victory to the Arabs with the interference of the great powers USA and USSR. In 
addition such interference led to the withdrawal of Israel, France and Britain. In 1958, 
the union between Egypt and Syria was established (the United Arab Republic [UAR]), 
which brought with it hopes that did not last more than three years and a half. The 
dismantling of UAR occurred on the 28th 1961.  
Subsequently, Fadlullah remembered their visit to Syria with his brother a few days 
after dismantling of UAR. During their stay, they visited Akram Al-Hourani, as young 
people, who needed to understand the reasons behind the separation. Hourani 
understood that the young men were coming to understand his point of view on 
dismantling the union. He spoke of deadly mistakes that were committed in Syria by 
the Egyptian intelligences. He said to them: “try union with the Egyptians for six 
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month, we tried it for three and half years”. “In that sad night”, said Fadlullah, “we 
cried for our dreams, and we stayed late remembering the hope we lived through our 
work with Ba’ath’s party. We recalled the hours we spent next to the radio ‘the Arabs 
Voice’ calling for denouncing aggression and injustice of the people and uniting around 
the slogans: Wahda, Huriah, Ishtirakiah [Union, Freedom, and Socialism]”. However, 
the second morning after the tenth of June 1967, Nasser withdrew his resignation and 
we became more assured and comfortable. Soon afterwards, the young people were 
demanding the Lebanese government for military training, which it did not respond to. 
Still, many young men went to Syria for military training. Afterwards, we were asked 
to go back to Lebanon because the Fedayeen operations were about to begin from the 
Lebanese South. Hence, it was clear that the hope still existed until 1967. It came with 
the armed resistance and the Fedayeen and the comfort that the tied with Syria still 
exists. On the other hand, the death of the comrades and friends who were fighting 
Israel remain to be a painful memory. Among them was the death of Al-Akhdar Al-
Arabi, his real name was Amen Saad. Al-Akhdar Al-Arabi [the Green Arab, in the 
meaning that he is a live always] was a known name all over the South. His death was a 
great loss for the liberation movement, at least for all the people, who were 
interviewed. They mentioned him with painful dignity and respect. Many men have 
died in the South in the fight with Israel, especially during Harb Al-Estinzaf [Attrition 
War], which lasted for one hundred days, until it was finally stopped after one hundred 
days by Rogers Plan. Nasser agreed to implement a trial period on the seventh of 
august 1970; however, he died on the twenty eight of September in 1970. Nasser did 
not even have the chance to see were this plan would lead to. In the same year the 
Palestinian Fedayeen were expelled from Jordan. Al-Sadat who became the Egyptian 
President after Nasser extended working with the plan until October War 1973. 
Furthermore, in 1970, a new coup occurred in Syria and Hafez Al-Assad became the 
president. The Fedayeen oppressions from that time on were directed from South 
Lebanon, while, the Training Camps were in Syria. 
On the public level in the South, the date of tweintieth of September 1970 is 
unforgettable for the people, who lived that period. It was marked with grief in the 
South. The men were crying everywhere. Fadlullah remembers that Nasser was the 
man that everyone thought he is going to free Palestine and the Arab land. He was the 
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man to revenge for the loss of 1967. Moreover, through the South’s memory, the events 
became almost similar since the 1970s. The South was living in instability, from one 
side it was the support for the Palestinian cause and Palestine; from another, it was the 
Israeli raids and attacks on the South; and from the third it was the suffering from the 
mal practices of Fatah (PLO) members. Southerners comments were: “it was a state 
within a state”. The situation escalated in 1975, on March of the same year, one of most 
known figures Ma’rouf Sa’ed was killed in Sidon during demonstrations, which were 
calling for the rights of the fishermen and the disadvantaged people. Among the 
Southerners, there was a feeling that things started to loosen in regard to the Fedayeen 
actions after the death of Sa’ed. Moreover, in the same year, the Lebanese Civil War 
erupted and the chaos was even in its worst forms in the South. According to different 
testimonies given in the South, until today, sentiments of resentments and 
disappointments still exist in the South because they believe that Fatah and the 
Fedayeen lost their compass in the South in regard to the Arab-Israeli war. In 1978, 
after the disappearance of Imam Sadr, there was a conflict between the political parties 
and in particular AML and the Communist party. Communist members were 
assassinated everywhere. Fadlullah comments on the speech given by one of AML’s 
important officials in the South, who is Abed Al-Majed Saleh. Saleh was 
commemorating the director of the school in Tyre, Suhail Majdalani, who was a 
communist and was killed by AML.  
The rise of Imam Sadr ideas came within a political frame work. At the end of 1950s, 
the Arabs and Communists wave reached its peak in the South. Many of the books and 
articles have discussed the back ground of the coming of Sadr. He came to restrain the 
Arab and Communist movement among the Shiite sect in general and not only in the 
South (Jurdi Abissab & Abissab, 2014).38 In the process, it was clear that the Shiite 
needed to distinguish themselves as one of the major sects in Lebanon. This could be 
described as the third leg so that the table can firmly stand. The table, clearly, is the 
Lebanese State. However, Sadr couldn’t win the South if he first started his move by 
initiating a sectarian movement. Hence, he did start establishing his presence by the 
visits he paid to religious men in the region, such as Fadlullah family, Sharaf Al-Din… 
                                                          
38 The same information was also epeated in other writings such as Ajami (1986), Norton (1987), and Qobaissi 
(2005). 
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and many others. Then, he constituted beneficiary associations, such as Al-Bir wa Al-
Ihssan, which offered the Southerners medical and social services. The Association also 
initiated illiteracy programs, which was one of the South’s essential needs on the 
popular level. The third, the movement was supporting the Fedayeen and the 
Palestinian oppressions against the Israeli, and then the call for the protection of the 
South from the Israeli constant attacks. Even though, it was difficult for Sadr to divert 
the community to identify itself through sectarianism. Few of the people that I have 
interviewed in the South came from religious families. However, they participated in 
the secular parties and identified themselves as Arabs even if they were Communist or 
Nationalist Syrians in smaller numbers.   
The second wave of ideology was very limited amongst the religious men; however, 
even on this level, it did not mark the South’s national orientation, which was still 
living the hope of establishing a united Arab state. Although the religious men went to 
Iran and Iraq to study Feqh and Ijtihad (theological studies), their political orientation 
was not stamped by religion. Najaf was a meeting place for attending religious studies; 
it was the centre for the Shiite Marja’a. This developed familial and social relations that 
are going to prove itself as the core of the political role in later stages. Though, 
according to Chehabi et al (2006) the relation was on the governmental level during the 
days of the Shah and it was with PLO on the religious level, especially amongst the 
Iranian Revolution leaders who came to be trained on using arms in the Palestinian 
Camps in Lebanon. Since the coming of Imam Sadr the relation on the religious level 
increased and reached its zenith after 1982. Though, the Iranian revolutionary men had 
always worries about the anti-Palestinian speeches given by religious men even during 
the Sadr days. For them, the only beneficiary from this radical attitude towards the 
Palestinians was Israel.  
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Chapter Six 
Political Identity Formation in Theory 
 
Identity as a concept in political studies is relatively new. Wendt (1994) explains that 
the concept in political science is basically Western; it came to existence with the rise 
of the concept of nationalism at the end of the 19th century. It is important to understand 
the concept of identity through the way it is formed and the construction factors. On the 
other hand, it is important to establish the relation between individual and group 
identity in relation to each other and the environment in which it has developed. In this 
chapter, we are also going to relate theoretical understanding of identity to its 
application on Arab, Lebanese, and South Lebanon’s identity. 
 
6.1 Identity as a concept 
To begin with, the concept of identity is rooted in sociology, psychology, and other 
humanities studies. Seul (1999) studies identity from a socio-psychological perspective 
since there were many theories that were derived from social and psychological studies, 
or social studies derived from religious studies and the sociology of religion. In 
addition, Parker (2000) explains that:  
All politics is identity politics. Political activity is—and, at its best, is—
animated by efforts to define and defend who I am, or we are, or you are, or 
hope to be, or hope to be seen to be. By extension, it is motivated by our 
imagination of what is or ought to be mine or ours or yours. It is not only about 
self‐government, nor does it always involve much in the way of public debate. 
What structures it, often beneath the surface, is the always unfinished enterprise 
of self‐construction and self‐presentation (p. 53). 
 
Yet, these choices and commitments that we make in politics are ones with which 
mean- or by which we cannot help but- identify ourselves (Parker, 2000). Muhammad 
Al-Salaeli (2011) in his article -the Concept of Identity in Anthropology- elucidates 
that ethnic identities are forms of responses to oppression and external struggles. 
Identity is no longer identified by a certain description during a certain period of time. 
It became a relative concept connected at the same time to conflicts, the balance of 
powers, and the construction of the personalities. This construction develops through 
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time. It is a historical development, which is related to the emotional and psychological 
dimensions of identity formation in the process of raising the child and his social 
environment. Though identity concept though is internal, it reflects externally. Al-
Salaeli (2011) also explains that this concept is not arbitrary. It is related to realizing a 
series of facts on how to build and organize these constructions, how much it is rooted 
in the religious depth, in values and art, what connects one to another, and what level of 
awareness it reflects. Accordingly, the constructivist argument is built on the fact that 
identities are not made.  
 
6.2 Arabism (Al-‘Oroba) and Arab Identity 
It is notable how the ideas in Arabism evolved and spread in all Arab speaking 
countries, and from one generation to another. Furthermore, the founders of the Arab 
parties in Bilad Al-Sham were actually the sons of Arab activists and intellectuals who 
were promoting for an Arab State and for freedom from the Ottoman occupation. 
According to Al-Jabiri (2006) the Arab concept was formed through the renaissance 
concept, with the calls ‘Al-‘Oroba tunadikum’ [Arabism is calling you], or ‘Ayuha Al-
‘Arab itahido’ [Oh Arabs rise up]. Though the two concepts ‘Al-‘Oroba’ [Arabism] or 
‘Arab’ [Arabs] are relatively new, they were only common after the mid of the eighteen 
century. This movement started in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and it was a reaction to 
the Turkification movement that has started with Hisb Turkiah Al-Fatat in 1889 
[Young Turks Movement], which aimed to Turkify all the nations under its role that 
were under the Ottoman occupation. Many movements appeared in the region at the 
beginning of the 20th century were calling for local or regional identities, such as the 
nationalist Syrians, Lebanese, or Egyptian.  
The call for the Lebanese identity in particular was led by the Elite Maronites in Mount 
Lebanon. It was a reaction to the Ottoman decision to cancel, in 1914, the privileges of 
independent management given to Sanjaq of Lebanon. They refused to be considered as 
part of the Arab nation. They even linked Arab identity to Islam under which the 
Ottoman’s ruled for over than four hundred years considering the Christians in their 
Empire as Zimmis. However, Al-Jabiri (2006) considers the comparison between 
Islamization and Arabization is fake, whether it was to show contradiction or 
completion. He reveals: “Arabism in the sense given by the heritage references or by 
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the renaissance references is something and Islam in all concepts is quite a different 
thing” (Al-Jabiri, 2006, p. 52). The Maronite refused the unity with Syria under 
pretending that they will be ruled by Muslims because the Muslims are estimated as the 
majority of the population. On the other hand, this consideration was not accepted by 
the majority of what is now known as Lebanese citizens. Many Lebanese refused the 
establishment of Lebanon separated from the rest of the Arab region.  
The Christians in Bilad Al-Sham had another discouraging experience which was under 
the role of Midhat Pasha in Damascus (1878-1880). According to Saliba (1978), 
Midhat Pasha submitted a reform plan to Sultan Abed Al-Hamid. Midhat Pasha led 
tremendous reforms in the Damascus vilayat. He built schools, roads, reformed the civil 
service and dismissed corrupted officials. Then he recruited qualified personnel for 
regional and district heads from Arabs, whether Muslims, minorities, or Christians, for 
the first time. In Midhat Pasha’s time, he adapted an open policy, allowed freedom of 
expression (the number of newspapers reached twelve), and he controlled security. In 
the sense, it was a safe era during which trade flourished. He even encouraged the 
Notables’ participation in public projects, such as, financing the Tram in Tripoli and 
established the Chamber of Commerce in Beirut…etc. The experience was discouraged 
because Midhat Pasha was transferred to Izmir in Turkey, and was accused of calling 
the people against the Ottomans (Saliba, 1978, Al-Dori, 1986, and Tibawi, 1969). 
Midhat Pasha came at a time when the secret societies were calling for independence or 
the decentralization within the Ottoman Empire. However, the result was obstracting 
the reforms in the area that were granted during the early days of Abed Al-Hamid. 
Explaining the historical construction of the area is essential to understanding the 
historical memory and cessions of event. Hence, it is important to understand that Syria 
as a term has been often used to refer to the whole area stretching from Taurus 
Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the South, and from the Mediterranean 
Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the East. This area which constitutes in many 
ways a single geographical entity and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a 
single people (Hourani, 1968). Hourani (1968) continues that after the First World War 
(1914- 1918), this geographical entity was divided into two political sections: the 
Southern, which includes the region now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was 
placed under the British Mandate, and the Northern, Syria and Lebanon, under the 
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French Mandate. The term ‘Syria’ is sometimes used to refer to the whole Northern 
Area. However, many presume that the people of the area did not come to be familiar 
with Arabization till the dawn of the twentieth century (Zein, 1973; Hourani, 1968; 
Khashan, 2000). However, Khashan (2000) explains: “identity is an inherent property 
of mankind (p. 18)”. Then he explains that the loss of identity leads to social 
marginalization, and political ineptitude in open and competitive society. On the other 
hand, Abo Al-Tayeb Al-Mutanabi, one of the most famous Arab poets (915-965), 
confirmed Arabism in two different verses from two different poems. In the first one, 
he was describing a valley known back then as Sh’eeb Bowan which was located in 
Persia, Iran today, he says: 
Songs of Sh’eeb Bowan are glorious songs 
It is the symbol of spring in every time  
But the Arab Boy in it 
A stranger in face, hand, and tongue 
 
In another poem he writes: 
Nations are defined by their Kings 
And never would the Arabs rise with foreigners as their Kings 
 
There are many examples within Arab poetry and writings that hold within honorable 
descriptions of Arabs. However, what is different about the choice of Al-Mutanabi in 
particular is that he was in the age of the beginning of the decline of the Abbasid Period 
and the countries that spoke Arabic within the Arab-Islamic States were defined in the 
same area by the Arabic language, which was the official language of the state. To 
clarify, the Arabs distinguished themselves as a nation in their innate historical 
identification.  
 
6.3 Reviving the Arab Nationalist Identity 
The demands for reviving Arab Nationalism were basically due to two reasons. The 
first was the French Campaign on Egypt. The second came as a response to the 
Turkification Movement in 1908. The Movement has provoked many nations that were 
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under the Turkish occupation to call for liberation and to establish their nation states, 
among them were the Arabs.  
The Arab National awareness came as a result to the increase of the level of education, 
which came with the French Campaign to Egypt. The campaign carried with it new 
advanced technology and most important was the printing press. The campaign alerted 
the Arabs of their declined status in sciences and education. The question asked here, 
why it was the Arab Nationalism that these Arab intellectuals have called for. What did 
provoke the call for an Arab identity, and not another one? If it is the Christians who 
first promoted the Arab identity, then why did not any another European nation relate 
its nationalism to Christian oriented state. This can be justified within the logic Rother 
(n. d.) explains: “Jepperson et al. define identity simply as “the basic character of 
states” but acknowledge the possibility of identity change by referring to a concept 
common in social psychology: “It refers to the images of individuality and 
distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified 
over time) through relations with significant “others”. Thus the term (by convention) 
references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other (as cited in 
Rother, n. d. p.7)”. According to Benedict Anderson (2006) 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific origin of nationalism, it may 
be useful to recapitulate the main proposition put forward thus far. Essentially, I 
have been arguing that the very possibility of imagining the nation only arose 
historically when, and where, three fundamental cultural conceptions, all of 
great antiquity, lost their axiomatic grip on man’s minds. The first of these was 
the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological 
truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of the truth (p.36). 
  
Accordingly, the call for Turkification has made it possible for the Arab region to go 
beyond the grip that was forced on them in the name of one Islamic nation. Therefore, 
the possibility to imagine free Arab nations is not contradicting or to consider Arabism 
contradicts with Islamism or Christianity. Furthermore, Benedict (1991) emphasizes the 
importance of language in determining the political identity of a certain nation. He 
gives an example:  
The fate of the Turkic-speaking people in the zones incorporated into today’s 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and the USSR is especially exemplary. A family of spoken 
languages, once everywhere assemblable, thus comprehendible, within an 
Arabic orthography, has lost that unity as a result of consciousness at the 
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expanse of any wider Islamic identification, Ataturk imposed compulsory 
Romanization (as cited in Benedict, 1991, p. 45-46).  
 
Hence, it is not only the language that counts, but also the script with which it is written 
in creating an or affirming a certain identity. In accordance with Benedict (1991), the 
written Arabic language, which did not change over centuries, has protected the unity 
of the Arab sentiments in the Arab States, and the South of Lebanon. In South 
Lebanon, the language in addition to other factors, has played an important role in 
directing the national feelings and drawing the public identity. This was manifested in 
the evening tea sessions. Poets read their poetry and the tales of the ancient epics, Al-
Zanati Klalefa, and the tales of Thousand Nights and One Night, etc. while people 
listened and interacted. 
The second lost grip was the belief that society was naturally organized around and 
under high centres-monarchs who were persons apart from other human beings and 
ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation. Human loyalties were 
necessarily hierarchical and centripetal because the ruler, like the sacred script, was a 
node access to being inherent in it (Anderson, 2006). Hence, Arab nationalism rose in 
concept as an idea that called into for solidarities of Arabic speaking countries 
regardless of their religion and sect. This was manifested in the call for separating 
religion from the state. It was also manifested in the decline of the traditional religious 
power displayed in the Caliph or any old related figure. 
The third lost grip was a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history 
were indistinguishable. The origins of the world and of men are essentially identical. 
These ideas rooted human lives firmly in the very nature of things, giving certain 
meaning to the everyday fatalities of existence (above all death, loss, and servitude) and 
offering, in various ways, redemption from them (Anderson, 2006). However, this idea 
is neither rooted in the Islamic concept which speaks of creating different nations so 
that people met and interacted nor in the concept that states the more the person is 
divined, the closer he is to God. Accordingly, Cosmology and history were separated 
and lost their importance. People started gathering around the Arab leading 
intellectuals, who were more influenced in the western ideas. Accordingly,  
The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties, first in Western 
Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic change, ‘discoveries’ 
(social and scientific), and the development of the increasingly rapid 
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communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history. No 
surprise then that the search was on, so to speak, for the way of linking 
fraternity, power and time meaningfully together. Nothing perhaps more 
precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalist, which 
made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about 
themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways 
(Anderson, 2006, p.36).  
 
6.3.1 Reviving Nationalism in the Arab Region 
Subsequently, we must think how much this sense applies in the Arab region in general 
and South Lebanon in particular. As a matter of fact the newly created Arab countries 
were considered to be a burden on the general Arab population that was hoping for an 
Arab Unity. South Lebanon before the eighties was not identified by a sectarian 
ideology neither by the people nor by the leaders, who expressed the people’s needs. 
They wanted to emerge in the Arab world. This state which will include all the Arab 
speaking areas will not distinguish between its citizens according to religion or sect. 
This ideology was articulated in the literature of the different political parties that 
dominated South Lebanon, as it was explained in the third chapter.  
Oddly, Anderson sees that nationalism is the product of imperialism, the concept which 
most of the political parties that was active in South Lebanon, were fighting against it. 
But the interesting explanation he gives is in the relation between literacy and the 
growth of national feelings, which he emphasizes on 
The visionary drudged who developed years to their complications were 
necessity drawn to or nurtured by the great was no less inevitability university 
and pre-university students. Hobsbawm’s dictum that ‘the progress of schools 
and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially 
universities became its most conscious champions’, is certainly correct for 
nineteenth century Europe, if libraries of Europe, above all those of the 
universities. And much of their immediate clientele not for other times and 
places (Anderson, 2006, p.71).   
 
 It is notable because most of the political ideological parties’ founders were students, 
who studied in Europe. They came back holding new ideas and thoughts of nationalism 
and they wanted to implement them in their homeland. The people well received these 
ideas because they must have expressed something that was essential to them.  
For example, one of the most important figures that was a socialist and promoted to 
Marxism and Communism was Faud Al-Shimali the founder of the Communist Party in 
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Syria and Lebanon. Al-Shimali received his education in Egypt where he was first 
introduced and embraced Communism. Because of these activities, he was deported to 
Lebanon and continued his political and intellectual work. When he came back, he 
founded two newspapers, ‘Al-‘Amal [The Work]’ and ‘Al-Marikh’ [Mars]. He 
established the first union for Tobacco workers. He was one of the first intellectuals 
who spread Marxism in the Eastern Arab part. In addition, Al-Shimali visited the 
Soviet Union in 1928 and reported what he has seen there. Then he published books 
about Socialism in a simple language, in his book ‘Al-Ishtirakia [Socialism] (Hanna, 
1973). The point emphasized here, education was the reason that brought someone like 
Al-Shimali to promote such international ideas and carry them to a society that has 
witnessed in the twenties of the last century the rise of literacy whether it was in Great 
Syria or Iraq, and later on into the South of Lebanon. Ayyob (2008) in her book has 
pointed out the growing interest of the population of the South to elevate their 
educational level by reading all kinds of books, especially the books promoted by their 
parties. In 1939, in Damascus three researches written by Stalin and one by Morris 
Tories were published by Khaled Bakdash, the head of the Syrian and Lebanese 
Communist Party. Bakdash wrote an introduction under the title “Al-Arab wa Abhath 
Stalin, [the Arabs and Stalin’s Researches]. The researches’ main topic was 
nationalism. It was written during the First World War and then it was published in 
Arabic under the title “Tareq Al-Isteqlal Al-Masalah Al-Wataniah: Nushouha- 
Tattaworuha- Hululuha, [the Road to Independence- the National Issue: It’s 
Development- Its Evolving- Its Solutions]”by the end of the thirties of the 20th century. 
Many of the Arab readers became familiar with the goals and objectives of socialism 
(Hanna, 1973).  
 
6.4 Creating Political Identity 
The growth of nationalism goes side by side with the rising number of literacy. It is 
important to note that the last wave of nationalism was at the end of the First World 
War. Nonetheless, the evidence from historical state systems strongly suggests that the 
situational incentives of anarchy have significantly shaped strategic behaviour in ways 
that transcend culture. It is important to note that if the creation of the political entity of 
Mount Lebanon was based on sectarian structure, this concept didn’t apply in the other 
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parts of Lebanon. Mount Lebanon was first educated by the missionary schools that 
spread at the end of the eighteenth century. It was an attempt by the French in particular 
and other European rising powers to create a foothold within the Ottoman Empire 
regions to spread its influences. In other words, the colonial powers exploited the 
Christians by creating the need to differentiate Christians, or Catholics in particular 
from other inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. Manipulating minority groups was not 
excluded to Mount Lebanon. The British worked on attracting the Syriac Christians in 
Iraq, the Assyrians, in particular they allotted the Nestorian Christians to emigrate from 
Anatolia to Iraq. The Nestorians used to live by the Lake Van in Turkey, where they 
enjoyed better position than other minorities in the Ottoman Empire and enjoyed a 
large measure of political autonomy under the role of their hereditary Patriarch. The 
Assyrians, (in general, all the Christian minorities were defined as the Syriac 
Christian), expelled the Kurds from Northern Iraq. They were favoured by the British 
as garrison- troops (Kirk, 1949). This relation with the British made the Muslims in 
Iraq blame them for being the tools of enforcing the British control in Iraq. After the 
declaration of the independence of Iraq in 1933, 800 Assyrians crossed Tigris into 
Syria on the hope that the French would allow them to settle in, but the French did not 
(Kirk, 1949). In the same year, the Iraqi Army was engaged in policy making alongside 
with the young King Gazi, the son of Faisal. Henceforth, the Iraqi troops, led by the 
Kurdish leader General Bakr Sidqi, killed 400 civilians of them. The Iraqi army back 
then was the best organized army in the Arab countries and the Arabs, whether Iraqis or 
none Iraqis, had the hope that it was going to liberate Palestine from the British and the 
Zionists (Kirk, 1949; Bogle, 1996). Actually, according to Kirk (1949), the British had 
encouraged: “the young and inexperienced Assyrian Patriarch Mar Shimun and some of 
their secular chiefs to presume too much, and to isolate themselves still further from the 
other inhabitants of Iraq” (p.177). By creating a vertical crack between the different 
Iraqis, perhaps the British were hoping to create a Christian Assyrian state dependent 
on the British under the Anglican Church protection. This state would have been 
similar to Lebanon. However, the British had to leave Iraq and they were already 
occupying Palestine, Trans Jordan, and Egypt and they were about to face the rising 
power in Germany. The dispatch the British has created led to social differences 
between the Assyrians Christians and the rest of the Arabs which eventually resulted in 
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social marginalization of the Assyrians. Kashan (2000) declares: “Loss of identity leads 
to social marginalization and to political ineptitude in open and competitive societies” 
(p.18). Actually, that was the dilemma of the minorities that was tempted to initiate 
independent states, which were something like Quasi State. It was a series of political 
preparations led by the European main powers. Basically, among the Arabs velayets in 
the Near East were Mosul, Baghdad, Aleppo, Sidon, and Sham. In Arabia, there were 
the vilayets of Hijaz and Yemen. Hourani (1968) elucidates that after the Civil War in 
Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, the vilayet of Al-Sham [Damascus] did not 
include any more Mount Lebanon. According to the ‘protocol’ for the Lebanon, 
submitted by the Ambassadors of the five powers- Great Britain, Russia, France, 
Austria, and Prussia- and accepted by the latter, Mount Lebanon was detached from 
Syria and became an autonomous sanjak ruled by an Ottoman Christian Mutasarrif, 
“The ‘protocol’ embodied the ‘Regalements Organique’ of 9 Jun 1891, replaced by that 
of 6 September 1864, and amended by protocol of 28 July 1886” (p. 25-26).  
The other division that came to existence in the vilayet Al-Sham, in 1887, because of 
the growing importance of Jerusalem, the Ottoman Sublime Porte created the new 
administrative unit of the independent sanjak of Jerusalem in Palestine, the sanjak was 
detached from the vilayet Al-Sham as well, and was put under the direct control of the 
Sublime Porte39. Meanwhile, the town of Beirut was expanded, and its commercial 
prosperity was increasing rapidly. Consequently, the Ottomans decided to establish, in 
1881, the new vilayet of Beirut to which sanjaks of Lattakia, Tripoli, Acre, and Nablus 
were included. Thus from 1888 onwards, the province of Syria was divided into three 
vilayets (Aleppo, Al-Sham, and Beirut) and two separated sanjaks (Lebanon and 
Jerusalem). To clarify, it is the interference of the powers in Europe and in their attempt 
to control areas in the region, especially in Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon. It was easy 
to claim their right to interfere based on religious pretends, such as, the pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem, or the right of the Maronites in particular in Mount Lebanon. Accordingly, a 
certain protocol was adapted in the Arab region by the winning powers after the First 
World War in rooting the division of the Arab region later on. As a result, new made 
identities were created, and new nations would rise. Nonetheless, as it was explained in 
Chapter Five, new states were created, but the identity did not witness changes and the 
                                                          
39The Port, or the Sublime Port was the title which the Ottoman central power in Istanbul.  
  
128 
 
call for Arabism reached its peak in the late 1930s (Hourani, 1968; (Zein, 1973; Kirk, 
1949), except for certain political rising groups. 
Whereas, South Lebanon on the other hand never sought to be isolated from the 
societies around it. On the contrary, it found its identity among them. Accordingly, 
Kashan (2000) explicates: “The formation of identity normally corresponds to the 
patterns of population distribution, and living together eventually generates distinct 
group values” (p. 18). 
 
6.5 Language and Identity 
Zein (1973) in his book, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, explains the Arabic 
language position under the Ottoman rule. He clarified that since the early days of the 
Empire’s establishment until the emergence of the Arab national movement, the Arabs 
were proud of their language. The Ottoman Sultans did not really learn Arabic, nor did 
the Turkish population. However, Arabic was the spiritual language of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Arabs were proud of this fact. This was even more defined in the 
different titles given to the Sultan, such as Khadim Al-Haramain Al-Sharifaen [the 
Servant of the Holly Quarters, mainly Mecca and Al-Madena]. On another level, 
Arabic language was phenomenally accepted and adapted by the people who inhabited 
the region after the Arab Muslims have conquered Bilad Al-Sham, Iraq, Egypt, and 
North Africa. On the other hand, they did not change their tongue even after four 
hundred years of Ottoman occupation. 
Different missionary schools came to Syria and Lebanon during the Ottoman 
occupation. In these schools, Arabic grammar, history of the Arabs, history of religion, 
languages, arithmetic, algebra, and above all the biblical education, were mainly taught. 
Every mission was trying to convert Muslims and other minority sects into Christianity. 
Accordingly, Zein (1973) argues that: 
…if such schools were established all over Syria, especially now that the cry for 
them is like a hurricane blowing over the land, who can estimate the results 
from them to the rising generation- a generation growing up in the ‘admonition 
and the nurturing of the Lord? Or who will doubt the happy results of Syria 
socially and emotionally? (p. 41)”.  
 
For sure, the activities of the missionary schools aroused the suspicions of the Muslims 
in the area and they began to establish their own schools; however, the result was the 
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growth of a new literate generation that was educated and started reading and writing in 
its own language, the major factor which played a role in changing the area. Zein 
(1973) emphasizes that: “the great contribution of most of those schools was to teach a 
small proportion of the rising generations to read and write” (p. 45). Nonetheless, these 
missionary schools were also trying to establish the love of their countries in the Arab 
region; nonetheless, missionaries couldn’t import much of their literature to read in the 
Arab Near East countries because the Ottoman government imposed a rigid censorship 
on all foreign books (Zein, 1973). 
In comparison, Khashan (2000) explains different national attitude in building the 
national identity. It was since 1908, the date of the Young Turks’ military coup 
signaled the triumph of pan-Turanism put Ottoman Arabs on the track of ethno 
nationalism almost by default. From that date until the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, it was 
nationalism, especially Arab nationalism that captured the souls and minds of the vast 
majority of the speakers of Arabic. Yet, the writer explains that:  
Despite of the restlessness efforts of the Anglo-French missionaries who 
propagated secular and ethno-national ideas, their impact remained minimal and 
limited to a few Christian Arabs converts such as Nasif Al-Yazigi, Butrus Al-
Bustani, and Najib ‘Azuri. Joel Carmichael interpreted the pioneering role of 
Christian elite in the Levant in championing the cause of Arab nationalism as an 
effort ‘to burst out its ghetto’. Understandably, Christians advocated Arabism in 
the hope that it would redeem them politically and put them on a par with 
Muslim Arabs (p. 7). 
 
Subsequently, the power of education is central in forming identity. It creates 
awareness of the history and the culture a certain society belongs to. It leads to changes 
in the consciousness of nations and societies. Clark explains the great faith in reason 
and the power of education as means toward social changes as Kramnick and Godwin 
claims. Kramnick enlists in his beliefs that: “…the enlightened segment of society, the 
intelligentsia, must bear to the major responsibility for spreading truth to the great 
majority who are still under the spell of society’s authoritarian institutions” (as cited in 
Clark, 1975, p. 162). It was the elite that came to the conclusion that the Arabic 
language, along with other factors, is a determinant factor of the political identity, in 
the region and most certainly in the South of Lebanon. 
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6.6 Arab Nationalism 
It is difficult to go back in history because there are not real studies on the essence for 
the call for Arabism or about the use of the concept before the eighteeth century. And 
yet, it is a substantial fact that Arab, Arabism and Arabic as terms are very ancient, as 
we clarified above. In addition, the term was used by the old Egyptians and in their 
writings about the Assyrians’ writings and documents that have also included more 
than forty names of important figures (Al-Boni, 2013; Al-Dori, 1986).  
 
6.6.1 Arabic as a cultural Awareness  
The term Arab and its derivatives are found in the old Greek writings and Herodotus in 
particular (Al-Boni, 2006; Al-Dori 1986; Al-Boni, 2013) conveys the definition of 
Arabism in the French encyclopaedia, Encyclopedie Universalis as  
The Arabs are people or ethnicity (race). They speak the Arabic Language, 
which is a Semitic language that has its own properties”, and the encyclopedia 
editors add that: “Arabs in the past and in the present, are only the groups and 
individuals that speak Arabic, and related to the old history of the Arabian 
Peninsula, starting from the Islamic Conquest (in the eighth century). The 
expansion of the Arabs to include (Arabicize) a huge group of people from the 
boarder of Zagreus Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean. The Arabs don’t include 
one race and they have ethnographic and sociologic features that are common 
with other ethnic groups, and their awareness for a united states was recently 
declared (as cited in Al-Boni, 2013, p. 27). 
 
Based on this definition Al-Boni (2013) concludes that: 
The Arabs are a nation. Its people’s identity is defined by their Arabic language, 
which is their mother tongue. The Arabization movement has included different 
groups of people who grow to speak Arabic and adapt it as part of their culture. 
And they share a defined area which is now called ‘the Arab Homeland’ (p. 28). 
 
Though Arabic is the language of Islam identifies Muhammad ‘Abed Al-Jabiri (2006), 
he also recognizes that in the renaissance concept of the Arabism is not defined by the 
race of Adnan or Qahtan, or any by ethnicity. In the age of renaissance, the concept of 
Arabism was defined through the objective awareness of the people of the Arab region. 
The concept was first known in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine; it was a reaction to the 
Turkish tendency to melt all nations into their own identity and to distinguish 
themselves as superior to the nations they have occupied for centuries. It was first in 
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Bilad Al-Sham that the reaction to preserve their own identity inserted and was 
expressed in their language and culture. 
6.6.2 Arab Identification in Other Cultures 
Al-Boni (2013) refers to the Greek Sophist, Isocrates, to explain identity: “those who 
share with us our norms and ethics, the Greece, more than they share our blood (as 
cited in Al-Boni, 2013, p. 28)”. According to Al-Boni (2013), Isocrates defines identity 
of the Greece regardless of their race:  
The only two bounds that matter are the cultural norms and common ethics. 
Even religion was not an important factor, it is not a basic and independent 
factor by itself in constructing national identity, as it is understood from the 
Isocrates observation” (p. 28).  
 
The second speech Al-Boni (2013) declares identity and in particular the Arab identity 
can be explained in what Prophet Muhammad clarified: “Oh people, Arabic is not of 
you a mother nor a father; it is the tongue, whoever speaks Arabic is an Arab’” (as cited 
in p. 29). Al-Boni sees that prophet Muhammad has given the Arab identity a new 
civilized and cultural dimension. Wendt (1994) explains that he shall define self-
interest and collective interest, in regard to collective identity formation, as effects of 
the extent to which and manner in which social identities involve an identification with 
the fate of others (whether singular or plural). The identification will never be 
complete, although some people do sacrifice their lives for others. This will construct a 
basis for feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty, and thus for collective 
definition of interest. This does not mean that actors are no longer calculating costs and 
benefits, but rather it is done on a higher level of social combination (Wendt, 1994).  
Consequently, it is as Al-Boni (2013) continues to explain the relation to social identity 
formation in relation with the Arabic language would be in a form: not whoever speaks 
Arabic is an Arab, otherwise all the orientalists are Arabs, which is not true. However, 
Arabic is a language for individuals or groups of people, this means that it is a culture. 
Through this culture the groups view of life can be formed, which means that their 
identity is formed through time. In addition, Dr. Nadim Bittar40 explains that: “the 
identity of a nation is a historical identity, and it is formed through history” (as cited in 
                                                          
40 A Lebanese Arab Nationalist thinker 1924- 2014. He was born in Acre, and studied in Paris’s and the United 
States’ institutes until he got his Ph. D. in social and political sciences. Most of his writings revolved around the 
Arab National Thought. He was described as the prophet of the Arab unity. He died in the US. In his well, he asked 
to be cremated and his ashes would be spread on the Egyptian- Libyan boarders. 
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Al-Boni, 2013, p. 29). Accordingly, Al-Boni (2013) elaborates that identity cannot be 
formed isolated from society and history. It is part of the nation’s assets. Within this 
understanding, individuals cannot be separated from their own groups or form his/her 
identity. “It is like ‘home land’ for the people or the nation; it is a common ground and 
no one have the right to compromise it or waiver it” (p. 24). 
In addition, John Clark (2000) believes that the local community must be rooted in the 
nature and the culture realities of the region. “Strong regional centres of culture” are the 
basis for “an active and securely grounded local life.” So, “Regionalism is not only an 
ecological concept, but also a political and cultural one, and is the crucial link between 
the most particular and local dimensions and the most universal and global ones” 
(Clark, 2000, p.5). In the relation to social communities, the earth or the biosphere 
without its inhabitants that interact with each other cannot be described as a 
community: 
 A community is sometimes though to include not only competent adult human 
beings (moral agents), but infants and children, the mentally incompetent, adult, 
past generations, future generations, domesticated animals, artefacts, 
architecture, public works, values and ideals, principles, goals, symbols, 
imaginary significations, language, history, customs and traditions, territory, 
biota, ecosystems, and other constituents that are essential to its peculiar 
identity. To be remembered of community though to imply responsibilities of 
many kinds in relation to some or all of the categories listed (Clark, 2000, p.8). 
 
6.6.3 Economic Relations between South Lebanon and Its Surrounding 
Consequently, we can apply what has been explained so far about Southerners41 and its 
relation to its surrounding. It is going to be difficult not to see the South in isolation 
from its surrounding: Syria (Damascus and Houran) and Palestine. Even the relation to 
Egypt as it was clarified before. The South of Lebanon is a hilly area that is connected 
through geographic landscape to the rest Lebanon and Houran in Syria through Golan 
Heights, the Southerners from all sects used to trade with Palestine, where they sold 
their products of grape, raisin, fig, dried fig, and many regional products, and bought 
citruses products, olive oil, fabrics…etc. After the British mandate on Palestine, the 
Southerners went to Palestine to work in building Barricades and in Haifa’s refinery. 
                                                          
41 This term will be used to designate the population of South Lebanon. 
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Many of them worked as farmers in the ‘Kibbutz’ [the Jewish agriculture associations]. 
Those who were educated taught in the schools in Palestine.  
In addition, in the harvest seasons, the Southerners went towards Houran through 
Golan Heights. Then, they crossed Banyas River. The same story and description were 
repeated by everyone I interviewed in the South or even socialized with. Men and 
women went to Houran, where the men harvested the wheat and they were paid two 
Ottoman Golden Liras (according to tales in 2003), and the women collected the left 
out of wheat stalks behind the men after the men have collected and pilled them for 
threshing. Hence, the women were able to bring back home for the whole year supply 
of wheat to make floor and Bulgur (in Arabic: Burgul, is a wheat product). In addition, 
the South had several weekly markets in which merchants and farmers from the South, 
Damascus and North Palestine came to trade. The Most two famous markets were in 
Al-Nabatieh and Bent Jubeil. The relation between the three areas exceeded trade and 
exchange of goods, there were familial and social ties. They spoke the same language, 
shared the same history, customs, traditions, foods, and even worries and fears from the 
different conquerors and occupations. Many Southerners expressed the fear of leaving 
their land and houses after the Israeli occupation of the South so that what happened to 
the Palestinians would happen to them. 
 
6.6.4 Arab Nationalism and Mutual Faith 
The general atmosphere the region shared or suffered has played an important role in 
growing a common national feeling and faith. The identity awareness grew in the 
region and in Arab countries in general as a result of the Western invasion to the Arab 
countries as Al-Dori (1986) explains. Furthermore, it has resulted in the division of 
those countries, whether it was in Egypt, Eastern Arab countries, or the Arab North 
African countries. This has led to diversity of awareness between facing the Western 
invasion by asserting Islam and then Arabism as in Egypt and North Africa, and 
asserting Arabism in relation to Islamism or Arab legacy as in Eastern Arab countries. 
However, this did not result from different awareness in Arabism in depth, but it came 
as result of the general circumstances. One of the most important pioneers that Al-Dori 
(1986) relates to were Muhamad Abdo and Abed Al-Rahman Alkwakibi who both took 
an Islam- Arab approach, but, they have stressed on the importance of the Arab 
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language and culture. In addition, Alkwakibi considered the Arabs as a nation. This 
nation includes: “The Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Great Syria, Egypt, and North Africa (p. 
173)”. Alkawakibi in a later stage sought for nationalism which cannot be based on 
religion. Furthermore, it was ‘Abed Al-Hamid Al-Zahawi who took a clear cut Arab 
national approach. He called for an Arab Nation joined by Arab ties across the Arab 
land, accordingly, he was the first to use the terminology ‘Al-qawmeia’ (nationalism) 
which is taken from the word ‘qawm’, which means interrelated group of people. He 
stressed on the language as the basic tie:  
The Arabs today have a great unifying power, honoured by a language 
supervised by religion and sociology. It is the language of 50-60 Million Arabs 
whose country is spreading separated by one brook, the Suez Canal, it is the 
great language of the Arabs (as cited in: Al-Dori, 1986, p.175). 
 
At the end of fifties of the twentieth century, it was clear for many powers that the 
instability of Lebanon was coming through the South and the growing power of both 
the Arab National movement and Socialist/Communist parties. There was a need to 
change the growing secular atmosphere that started to prevail in the South. The South 
has witnessed a change of attitude towards religion, the growth of interreligious and 
sects marriages. The sons of religious scholars who went to study in Najaf in Iraq and 
came back were influenced by the political and secular ideologies. Such as Hussein 
Mroueh, who became one of the communist distinguished thinkers, who promoted for a 
secular state, and was assassinated in 1986, or the sons of the Marja’ (religious 
reference) Mohsein Al-Amen who embrace Ba’ath's socialist and Arab national 
ideology and his youngest son was a communist. The sons of Marja’ Abed Hussein 
Sharaf Al-Din who also came back from Iraq as Ba’athists and promoted the Ba’ath’s 
Arab national ideology in Al-Ja’farieh School, which was basically established to limit 
the effect of the ideas promoted of the Anglican missionary school in Tyre. In this 
atmosphere Moussa Al-Sadr, a religious man from Qom (Ajami, 1986) came to Tyre, 
invited by Sharaf Al-Din himself, especially after the death of son who died in Najaf, 
which left void in the Marja’.          
As a result, we notice that there are two sources of identity formation of the states, as 
Wendt (1994) explains that there are domestic interests and exogenous interest that 
define the state identity. Nevertheless, in the case of Lebanon, there were different 
identities that have constituted in the nature of the political and economic interests of 
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the state. Paradoxically, those interests of the state were different from the public 
interest in many regions if we take the claims that states are socially constructed. 
Wendt (1994) argues that interests are dependent on identities. In case identity was 
motivated- which is a distinct phenomenon- then, it is cognitive and structural. As such, 
it plays different roles in explaining actions. In order to overcome action problems, this 
depends in part on whether actors’ social identities generate self-interests or collective 
interests. Moreover, Wendt (1994) believes that social identities involve an 
identification with the fate of others (whether singular or plural); however, it is the 
nature of boundaries that determines whether self-identification is drawn. In case of the 
absence of positive identification, interests will be defined without regard to the other- 
who will instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for the gratification of the 
self. Accordingly, Seul (1999) expresses the same concept positive identification, 
which comes with agreement:  
Compliance behaviour contributes to identity formation to the extent that one 
progressive incorporates aspects of the one’s compliance- induced self-
presentation into one’s self concept. Identification involves adaption of the 
behaviour of the other person or a group because association with that person or 
group help us to satisfy the individual’s need to establish a positive self-concept 
(p. 555).  
 
Within this concept it is easier to understand the need of the Southerners to identify 
them-selves as part of the Arab nation. In addition, in their participation within the 
Arab struggle against Israel and in joining the Fedayeen in their battle to free Palestine 
from Israel gave them satisfaction on both personal and group level. Satisfaction 
fulfilled their need to establish a positive self-concept. The same thing happened in 
1916 when they fought next to Arab Revolution against the Ottoman Empire. 
Consequently, the group identity content according to Seul (1999) can be understood as 
Kelman explains: 
The group identity consist of the members’ shared ‘conception of its enduring 
characteristics and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and 
fears, its reputations and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, 
its past and history, current purposes, and future prospects (as cited in Seul, 
1999, p.556). 
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6.6.5 Arab Identity Formation in the South 
Subsequently, Wendt’s discussion focused on the case of collective identity formation 
and the international states. He explains that action between states is a form of positive 
or negative image of the state. In the same concept, whether the South of Lebanon was 
a state or not, it is a group of social group within certain boundaries that have its own 
self- image and self- interest, which did not fit with the self- interest of the Lebanese 
political system presented by the Christian Maronite political elite. This elite 
cooperated with the French mandate authority and constructed with its mutual 
definition of the identity of the state of Lebanon. This image identified Lebanon as a 
non-Arab state. Its official language during the mandate period was French until the 
second half of third decade of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the South identified 
itself within a different identity, which was the Arab identity, an identity that is 
portrayed in positive self- image and self-interest. 
If one considers the circumstances through which the state of Lebanon was created, it is 
clear that Lebanon was created to fulfil the interest of a group in Mount Lebanon. The 
elite Maronites wanted Lebanon to become a Christian state, in which they enjoyed 
political and economic privileges (Halaq, 1988; Halaq, 2004; El-Solh, 2004).Within 
this set of goals that Patriarch ‘Arida, Emile Eddeh and many other Maronite and 
Catholic Lebanese figures, such as Michel Shiha, portrayed their self-image and self-
interest. This coincided with two facts: First, the Christian elites were discontent with 
the Ottoman treatment as second degree citizens. Second, major political changes took 
place after the First World War. These changes led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
As a result, the Western colonial powers occupied and divided Bilad Al-Sham. The 
First World War winners, Britain and France, aimed to protect their interests in the 
Levant regardless of the people’s needs. Accordingly, there was no referendum except 
for the King-Crane committee’s report which was published in 1919 and was ignored 
by the great powers (Bassam, 2011). Accordingly, the people of the South and many 
Muslim and Christian citizens, especially the Greek Orthodox Christians, were aiming 
to be part of Syria. As a result, the South was dispatched from Syria against the will of 
its people. The South was publically in favour of the Arab State led by King Faisal and 
joined the troops in the Arab Revolution Army in 1916 (Hamadan, 2017). Although the 
dispatch of the South was official in 1923, this couldn’t change its identity for another 
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sixty years. As Wendt (1994) claims, “Regimes cannot change identities and interests if 
the latter are taken as given” (p.393). Thus, the Lebanese regime was unable to change 
the South’s identity. 
Whether the rise of Arab nationalism has faded or not, there are several reasons that 
have caused its retreat. Moreover, this has resulted in disappointment for supporters of 
Arabism. This was manifested in the negative attitude towards Arabism in various parts 
of the Arab world, even in the South of Lebanon. There are several factors that have 
caused this frustration. Khashan (2000) explains:  
The past still survives in Arab societies because they did not produce the 
equivalent of a Martin Luther to break religious monopoly, a Niccolo 
Machiavelli to free politics from metaphysics, a Nicolaus Copernicus to 
emancipate the natural sciences from theology, or an English gentleman to 
provide a link between the aristocracy and the masses (p. 133). 
 
The majority of Arabs could not integrate the values of nationalism which were brought 
by the elite theorists with their traditional and holistic beliefs. Khashan (2000) 
attributes this to the growing gap between the elite and the masses, and the incapability 
of the elite to reach the masses which widened tension among classes causing 
subnational resentment to intensify.  
 
6.7 The Language and Identity 
One of the prominent Arab thinkers who promoted the Arab identity and Arab 
nationalism was ‘Abdullah Al-‘Alaili. According Hana (1973), there is a difference in 
regard to the Arab Nationalism between pre-mandate period and pro-mandate period. 
He also considers that European colonialism first arrived to the Arab countries in the 
form of missionary schools. Independent national movements were in direct contact 
with the European rising ideologies on nationalism. Al-‘Alaili claims that before the 
mandate, Arab national awareness revolved around Islam; though, after the mandate, it 
revolved around Arab nationalism alone (as cited in Hanna, 1973, p.63). Furthermore, 
Al-‘Alaili, who was one of the scholars who distinguished between the Islamic Cause 
and the Arab Cause in order to prove the Arabism of the Arab land, adapted Descartes’ 
methodology which states ‘I think, then I exist’. Al-‘Alaili explains that as language is 
one of the means of thought, every resident in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Al-Hijaz, Yemen, and 
Maghrib (Arab North Africa|) can say using the same reasoning ‘I think in Arabic, then, 
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I am an Arab’(as cited in Hanna, 1973, p. 64). In addition, Hana (1973), based on the 
writings of people like Qustantin Zuraiq or Micheal ‘Aflaq, asserts that Arabism is 
deeply rooted in history.  
Many Arab scholars have asserted the importance of the Arab language in asserting 
Arab Nationalism. Henceforth, language is an essential factor in determining a group 
identity. Pable et al. argue that  
Group identity does not emerge on non-linguistic 'social practices' and descent-
based attributes only, language is still seen as the most important variable in 
defining membership, the sense of community and in social and group 
identification since it is intrinsic and generally descent-based (as cited in 
Engelmann, 2013, p.19).  
 
Accordingly, Engelmann (2013) explains that identity formation and group formation 
are based on many factors such as social interaction, a common history and homeland, 
and a common language. Furthermore, Pable et al. emphasize that: “language is the 
most important factor in identity formation and one of the foremost factors determining 
group membership” (as cited in Engelmann, 2013, p.22). 
Since the language is the mean to express in words, the “meaning of the word [is] 
constituted by the ideas, images, emotions, or simply by the education,” (Erel- 
Koselleck, 2004, p.16), and the combination of the word express are common among a 
certain group. Therefore, identity refers to the common experiences of the people.  
[T]he words express facts, ideas or events that are communicable because they 
refer to a stock of knowledge about the world that other people share, which is 
expressed as “language’s expressing cultural reality in ‘Language Studies’(as 
cited in Erel- Koselleck, 2004, p.16). 
 
 For that reason the words are the means in which people introduce themselves and 
interact with others (Erel- Koselleck, 2004). Hence, Hall (2012) explains that: 
Language use and identity are conceptualized rather differently in a 
sociocultural perspective on human action. Here, identity is not seen as singular, 
fixed, and intrinsic to the individual. Rather, it is viewed as socially constituted, 
a reflexive, dynamic product of the social, historical and political contexts of an 
individual’s lived experiences. This view has helped to set innovative directions 
for research in applied linguistics (p.31). 
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In addition, Erel-Koselleck (2004) explains that even though the relation between one’s 
language and his/her social, cultural and/or national identity- is not being a sufficient 
and necessary condition in the formation of nations, as has been commented by 
Hobsbawm, “yet language is the most sensitive indicator of the relationship between an 
individual and a given social group” (p. 34). As a result, Erel-Koselleck (2004) deduces 
that language usage comes in a double symbolic reference. Therefore, it would not be 
difficult and strange to say that the speaker’s viewing of their language as a symbol of 
their social identity. This leads Hall (2012) to conclude that: “Language use is tied to 
individual identities and provides a window into the micro processes by which such 
cues are used in the accomplishment of communicative events” (p.41). 
 
6.8 History and identity 
What establishes the historical reality of the identity of Lebanon as an Arab state relies 
in the facts that constitute it. These facts are related to the language, common history, 
common interests, and its geographic unity. The Arab region was established when it 
was conquered by the Arab Muslims. They have accepted one unified state that spoke 
the Arabic language from the North, Zagreus and Taurus Mountains and the 
Mediterranean Sea, from the South the Indian Ocean, the Arab Sea, and Grand Desert, 
from the East Zagreus Mountains, the Arabian Gulf, and Oman’s Gulf, and from the 
West the Atlantic Ocean. Muflih (2013) consider that the unity of the Arab land is one 
of the factors that constituted a strong bond among the Arab people. It is defined in the 
Geography books as one Motherland, not as one Arab World. He goes further on 
explaining the importance of the unity of the land:  
It is known that the geographic unity in the Arab Motherland has contributed in 
rooting the interaction among the Arab Nation. In addition, it facilitated the 
formation of the linguistic, historical, and cultural unity, even before the coming 
of Islam (Muflih, 2013, p. 381).  
 
Additionally, Muflih (2013) emphasizes the power of art which brings all the Arabs 
together when it comes to theater, music, singing, television series…etc. However, this 
unity was broken with colonialism, which brought with it as Sreedhar (2010) explains 
mass deportation and the coercion of indigenous people. Furthermore, Sreedhar (2010) 
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brings up the issue of historical injustice and structural injustice that comehand in hand, 
according to Simmons: 
Simmons [also] claims that the distinction between historical illegitimacy and 
structural injustice occurs in actual political practice and not only in theory, and 
he demonstrates this by appeal to grievances against governments grounded on 
the wrongness of the subjection itself as opposed to current structural injustice.  
He mentions the lawsuits brought by various Native American tribes against the 
United States government where the complaint was “the historical illegitimacy 
of state subjection [of territory], not appeals to any structural injustice”.as well 
as the charges of (some) Palestinians against the government of Israel. In the 
latter case (which he admits is problematic), he says:  Their principal charge is 
not that Israel’s basic structure is in itself deeply unjust or that its government is 
(for that or for any other reason) illegitimate with respect to all who live in 
Israel’s claimed territories.  It is rather that the subjection specifically of 
Palestinians and their homeland to Israeli rule was historically, and, 
consequently continues to be, illegitimate (as cited in Sreedhar, 2010, 1839).  
 
What Sreedhar (2010) explained comes to consider the necessity to know that creating 
states at the expenses of other nations is not justifiable because the end result might be 
amplifying or forceful effect on identity and group membership anywhere. In addition, 
identity is set up by: 
The historically grounded, socially constituted knowledge, skills, beliefs and 
attitudes comprising our various social identities – predisposing us to act, think 
and feel in particular ways and to perceive the involvement of others in 
certain... We approach our activities with the perceptions and evaluations we 
have come to associate with both our ascribed and appropriated social identities 
and those of our interlocutors, and we use them to make sense of each other’s 
involvement in our encounters. That is to say, when we come together in a 
communicative event we perceive ourselves and others in the manner in which 
we have been socialized. We carry expectations, built up over time through 
socialization into our own social groups, about what we can and cannot do as 
members of our various groups. We hold similar expectations about what others 
are likely to do and not do as members of their particular groups (Hall, 2012, p. 
32-33). 
 
The previous combinations of identity clearly are not easy to achieve. It is an 
accumulative process, just like learning a new language. It never comes at once, but in 
process. We learn about who we are through time and experience, not only our 
experience, but the experience of the generations who come before us. According to 
Adams (2015) that many of us feel the need for ancestors, or when he express that: 
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“We are all, more than we often think or know, what the past has made us” (as cited in 
Adams, 2015, p 91).  
On the other hand, states can define and develop their interests by using a certain 
identity as reference. These identities carry with them certain sets of norms - adhering 
to a “civilized” identity, for example, would mean to accept norms like the ban on 
chemical weapons etc. Besides norms, interest of states can be generated or redefined 
by collective identities. According to Acharya (2001), one way by which collective 
identities are formed is “the overlapping ambit of the national identities of individual 
member states, and their respective constitutive norms” (as cited in Rother, nd, p.7). 
These collective identities can take up a life of their own and develop even if they are 
not congruent with the identities of some of the members.  Wendt (1994) uses the 
quantum approach to define social systems as „super-organisms with collective 
consciousness”, which seems plausible even if one does not subscribe to the underlying 
view that this consciousness is constituted by „wave functions“ which collapse by the 
process of  inter-action. 
Since identity formation is a historical process, for Munif (2013) defines that 
Arab nationalism is a historical bond that induces and unites a group of people 
in the Arab speaking area. It is based on Language, history, psychological 
properties, and mutual interests. The aim is meant for a high goal, which is the 
ability to free the land and the people, establish a better plan for internal and 
external relations based on freedom, equality, justice, and contribute to building 
a better Arab World (p. 68). 
 
Based on his identification, Munif (2013) concludes that nationalism does not express 
ethnic loyalty because it is devoted to the land. It is not fanatic because it considers all 
ethnicities living on the Arab land are equal. Finally, it is not racist because it does not 
consider the Arab nation to be superior to other nations. It is clear that Munif’s (2013) 
definition of the Arab nationalism expresses generations’ sufferings through the rule of 
the Ottomans for four hundred years and then another fifty years of European 
colonialism. The Lebanese South is identified with this suffering along with the others 
who lived in the same geographical surrounding that spoke its language and shared the 
same history and hopes. Through this understanding Watfah (2013) clarifies that 
identity is primary a psychological and philosophical impression. He even sees in it as a 
unity based on the fact that society usually consist of many groups of different racial, 
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religious, political, or social backgrounds. Since this diversity exists, it is the duty of 
the political power to accomplish social integration (p.158-159). 
Wendt (1994) claims that this identity is based on norms, commonly defined as 
collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity. They “contain 
specific prescriptions for action which serve as standards for guiding the behaviour of 
an actor and enable others to evaluate his actions” (p.37)   
Therefore, Collective Identity Formation and the International State interaction at the 
systemic level change state identities and interests. He also declares that States are the 
principal unit of analysis for international political theory because the key structures in 
the states system are intersubjective, rather than material and that State identities and 
interests are in important part constructed by these social structures. This opens the 
door to international cooperation: By showing others through cooperative acts that one 
expects them to be cooperators too, one changes the intersubjective knowledge in terms 
of which their identities are defined. Second, through interaction, actors are also trying 
to project and sustain presentation of self. Thus, by engaging in cooperative behaviour, 
an actor will gradually change its own beliefs about who it is,  
 
6.9 Other considerations 
There are other considerations and definitions for identity within the Arabic literature. 
The Arab nationalist, such as Muflih (2013) elucidates that identity is considered as 
both subjective and objective matter, simultaneously. It is the awareness of the person 
that he or she is belonging to a certain society, nation, group, or social class, within its 
general humanitarian frame. Furthermore, Muflih (2013) considers that it is our 
knowledge about where we come from, where we are going, what we want for 
ourselves and others, and our position in relation to the contradictions and on the 
struggle map. It is clear that identity in general and Arab identity in particular defines a 
wide range of expectations. However, these expectations had to face challenges 
especially in regard to the Arab language. According to Al-‘Ashori (2013), these 
expectations are faced with the attempts to disable the Arabic language, which is the 
basic factor in building the Arab identity whether it was under the Ottoman Occupation 
that banded learning Arabic and in its final phase was trying to Turkify the Arab nation. 
Similarly, under the European colonialism, especially in Algeria and Morocco, people 
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were under a heavy Francophonie campaign. On another attempt, few Arab countries 
are teaching foreign languages in preschools and Universities. This act disables Arabic 
to be the language of science and researches and weakens the Arabic language. This is 
done by the constant trial to Lebanize the South and impose foreign language in 
preschools and universities. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This study tackled an outstanding stage in the history of the Arab region in general and 
South Lebanon in particular. It revealed the political identity of the South Lebanon 
during the Years 1943- 1978. It was an important stage in which the South was affected 
by the political events on the regional and national level. The study explored the 
historical events, political parties, and the political orientation of this area. It explained 
in the end how these different factors interacted to shape the political identity of South 
Lebanon through applying political identity studies. In the end I have concluded the 
following: the South was part of its Arab surrounding and identified itself within it. 
It was shown that the South was aware of its identity as part of the memory that the 
people expressed in the interviews that this study have conducted. The identity was also 
expressed in the political discussions that took place in several occasions. It was clear 
that this identity was not chauvinistic and did not expressed a narrow sectarian identity; 
on the contrary, it has expressed the interaction, which the South has witnessed with the 
different regional and national issues, such as the Palestinian dilemma, Baghdad Pact, 
Suez War, Al-Nakba 1948, Al-Nakssa 1967, the Arab Israeli October War 1973…etc. 
Furthermore, the South received the Palestinian refugees in 1948 and then again in 
1967, and in all the stages the people of the South embraced the Palestinian resistance.  
It was revealed that the relation between the political parties and the South was not 
stable. In 1948, when the Communist Party accorded with the Soviet Union acceptance 
the UN resolution to divide Palestine, the party lost its supporters to other parties that 
were against the division mainly the Arab National Movement and the Ba’th Party. On 
the other hand, the parties by embracing their partisans’ demands for the support of the 
Palestinians, to be part of Arab movement, and social justice, those parties were able to 
win their trust and support. In return the parties were able to mobilize the people in 
support of the Arab national issues, or even in the support of international issues 
against colonialism and economic exploitation. On the other hand, the Communist 
party established the first Union for the Tobacco farmers and supported them until they 
got their social security rights.  
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It was notable that the power of Arab Nationalism in the South was part of the need to 
liberate the Arab region, including the South. It expressed the resentment from the 
injustice they have suffered under the Ottoman Occupation, the French mandate, and 
later on the Lebanese governments since the independence until 1975. It was revealed 
that the South was ignored by the successive Lebanese governments. This area suffered 
from the lack of schools, hospitals, infrastructure projects, so that the electricity did not 
reach the villages until 1969. The impact of the occupation of Palestine on the South 
was enormous. The study reflected its consequences on the political and social situation 
of the South. The relation with the general Arab atmosphere became clear as well as its 
importance within the geographical and ecological environment. Accordingly, it was 
difficult to isolate the South from its surrounding in order to understand what has 
affected its political identity. 
 It was disclosed that the isolationist local parties that expressed Lebanese unity, and 
the separation of Lebanon from its surrounding were not popular in the South, or had 
very limited influence. Actually, parties that did not show consideration to the 
important national matters couldn’t find a place in the South. Even the Disinherited 
Movement, led by Moussa Sadr, was not recognized as a sectarian movement before 
1978, and it included people from different sects all around Lebanon. Even the South 
Support Association, which was established to support the South against the Israeli 
attacks, consisted of different sects back then. In Accordance, it was Sadr who 
established the High Shiite Council as a separate association to take care of the issues 
of the Shiite, before that, Dar Al-Fatwa handled the spiritual issue of both the Shiite 
and the Sunni sects.  
It was deduced that there are many factors that played an important role in establishing 
the South’s identity. These factors are related to the Arabic language, common history 
of the area, the common believes, and the common interests. The South has shared the 
facts that formulated its identity with its surrounding since the time it was inhabited 
until today. Finally, it was not an accurate information that El-Khazen (2000) has given 
about the Shiite of Lebanon that they were not in favour of the Arab Unite, and they did 
not raise the slogans the Sunnis rose in favour of the Arab State led by King Faisal. As 
a matter of fact, this is not true. First the Shiites portrait themselves as part of the Arab 
Revolution led by Sharif Hussein; and by the fact, they are part of the land, which 
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extended and known as the Arab Motherland. The Arab Flag was hoisted over the 
Grand Saray [house of government] in Nabatieh, Bint Jubeil, Marjoun, and Tyre. 
Representatives of the Arab State were assigned personally by King Faisal. Finally, Al-
Hujair Conference in April 1920 was held in the South in support of the Arab State, the 
leaders who attended this conference were from different religions and amongst them 
were prominent dignitaries of the Shiites, such as Sayyed Hussein Sharaf Al-Din and 
Sheik Ahmad Al-Zein…etc. and revolutionary men, such as Sadeq Hamzeh and Adham 
Khanjar… who fought in the Arab Army led by Faisal and later on fought against the 
French until they were executed by the mandate authorities. Many of the families that 
were persecuted by the mandate fled to Houran or Damascus in Syria and many of 
them are still there.   
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